

... Russia without any prejudice recognizes the self-rule and independence of the State of Lithuania with all the juridical consequences ... and for all times renounces with good will all the sovereignty rights of Russia, which it has had in regard to the Lithuanian nation or territory.

Peace Treaty with Russia
Moscow, July 12, 1920

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill:

1. Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Atlantic Charter
August 14, 1941

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LITHUANIA IN A WHIRLPOOL OF POWER POLITICS

The following article dealing with Lithuanian foreign policy is an excerpt from a volume—LITHUANIA 1918-1945—now in preparation by the Lithuanian American Information Center. Its principal features were taken from a study by Dr. Dovas Zaunius, a Prussian-born Lithuanian patriot who served as Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1929 to 1934. He died in Lithuania in February 1940.

FOREIGN POLICY is probably the most consistent and stable phase of any nation-state's progressive development. Ancient state traditions and historical reminiscences exercise much influence in a nation's international relations. It is a natural process, inasmuch as the nation's policy is never based exclusively upon day-by-day developments and needs. It is an evolutionary process reflecting the experiences of many generations of the past and merging the aspirations of past generations with those of the present generation. For this reason, the people's servants entrusted with the task of piloting the nation's foreign policy must possess a complete understanding of their nation's history and must be able to visualize the mistakes of the past viewed retrospectively in the light of political developments.

The problems of some states are so stationary that mere mention of that state's name recalls its most characteristic policies. It may suffice to recall "the rule of the waves" policy of Great Britain, the *Drang nach Osten* of Germany, or the dynamic expansionist policy of Muscovy. Similarly, it is very likely that mention of Lithuania at once vividly recalled, in the years 1920-1939, a country that was fighting for the recovery of its capital city of Vilnius and was

stubbornly fighting against being involved in the whirlpool of power politics of its three big neighbors.

The three widely known slogans—the *Drang nach Osten* of the Germans, the westward "Drang" of the Muscovites, and "Fight for Vilnius" of the Lithuanians—vividly reflect the three basic problems of the foreign policy of Lithuania. These slogans point to the geographic and geopolitical location of Lithuania within the focus of three big neighbors. They identify the areas where Lithuanian foreign policy was being put into operation—Vilnius and Klaipėda, the two focal cities wedged in between Germany and Russia, with a Polish Eastern Corridor separating Russia from Lithuania and Germany.

The names of Vilnius and Klaipėda recall the mistakes of many past generations which exhibited a lack of resistance to the waves of foreign influence, and thus contributed to a loss of large areas formerly inhabited by Lithuanians exclusively. When the nation awakened and started building up its strength from scratch, Lithuanian nationalism was making rapid progress in reclaiming national and linguistic positions in those areas. However, World War I called upon Lithuania to resume its place in the ranks of independent nations without having completed the natural process of national reawakening in all of the areas inhabited by an ethnically Lithuanian population.

It so happened that the first cardinal problem of the foreign policy of the Republic of Lithuania centered around the recovery of the country's ancient capital city—which should have been a problem of

internal domestic policy. This problem is closely connected with the recognition of the Lithuanian State by foreign powers and with Lithuanian-Polish relations.

Lithuania and Poland

In striving for the reconstitution of a Poland, the Polish people generally visualized Lithuania either as a mere province of Poland or, at best, as a country perpetually tied to Poland by the bonds of a political confederation or union. For this reason, the people of Poland viewed the Lithuanian struggle to reconstitute an independent Lithuania as an *attempt to injure the vital interests of Poland*, especially since Lithuania very determinedly decided to center its life around its ancient capital city of Vilnius which the Poles had grown to love as "The Pearl of the Crown of Poland."

Because of this popular Polish viewpoint, Lithuania was slated to experience the most bitter military and diplomatic opposition from Poland, the former political partner of Lithuania. Poland attempted by various ruses and by sheer force to impose the ties of union upon Lithuania. This Polish opposition blocked the road for Lithuania seeking admission into the family of sovereign nations.

The *essence and core* of the Lithuanian dispute with Poland was *not a territorial wrangle*. It did not lie in the visible exposal of injustice—the seizure of the Capital and of a huge territorial slice of Lithuania. *Its essence is hidden in the basic premise that existence of an independent Lithuania was generally undesirable and ran counter to the interests of Poland as interpreted by the creators of this new Poland.*

Polish statesmen well realized that it would be quite embarrassing to operate openly with this slogan. After all, Poland was recreated only because of international recognition of the principle of national self-determination. Consequently, *the formal argument* advanced by Poland against Lithuania was limited to delineation of *state frontiers* under a slogan of *reunion* of the lands inhabited by Poles within the political frontiers of a new Poland. *The true designs of Polish diplomatic intrigue* concerning Lithuania were consistently exposed by frequent Polish argumentation to the effect that Lithuania, far from being an independent state, was in fact a creation of Poland's enemies (Russia and Germany), and that this "artificial creation" was aimed at weakening Poland. Lithuania, being an artificial menace to European peace, should be eliminated from the map in the best interests of European powers. By such reasoning, Poland automatically denied not only all the achievements of the Lithuanian national renaissance movement, but national renaissance itself.

Polish activities directed against Lithuania succeeded in preventing Lithuania from gaining access to the councils of world powers that were settling the destinies of Europe immediately after World War I. While the Allied Powers helped materially and morally the fight for the independence of the other two Baltic States, Lithuania was unable to get the supplies she needed so badly in her own struggle for maintaining political independence. *Lithuania was excluded from the Allied recognition de jure of the independence of Latvia and Estonia* which meant a great moral and juridical victory for the northern Baltic States. The Allied failure to incorporate unconditionally the Klaipėda-Memel District in Lithuania, after that territory had been detached from Germany, is also to be *traced to the Polish diplomatic intrigue in Paris and London.*

However, the balance of power in Eastern Europe was not such as to enable Poland, without the aid or at least a favor of the great powers, to realize its ambitions with regard to Lithuania. Poland managed to impede the tempo of Lithuanian economic reconstruction, yet was unable to stifle the political independence of a mutilated Lithuania. Having successfully contained the Polish military intrusion deep into Lithuania, the Lithuanian people were able to develop their own political counter action, to unmask Poland's true designs, and to convince the Western Democracies that a realization of Poland's imperialistic ambitions would run contrary to the principle of national self-determination and to the interest of Europe, because such imperialism would create an internal source of discord that would eventually disrupt the peace of the continent and upset the balance of powers. Lithuanian diplomacy strove to convince the Allies that it was in the interest of European peace to help along the creative abilities of small Eastern European nations and to prevent their absorption by Polish imperialism. These were *the basic theses* of the parties to the Polish-Lithuanian disputes in an international forum. Russia was excluded from the Western councils at the time. Yet every one realized that, in view of the "long range" ambitions of westward expansion through bolshevization, Soviet Russia had every reason and interest not to allow Poland to absorb Lithuania.

Military events in Eastern Europe projected the local Polish-Lithuanian struggle into a forum of international problems. The drama was developing in a rapid succession of fateful events. Lithuania successfully defended herself from the Russian bolshevik invasion, expelled the German and Russian "White" invaders, and held her own against the Polish invasion. When Poland invaded Lithuania the second time, the League of Nations was compelled to act

and to bridle the rampant Polish militarism. A truce was negotiated at Suvalkai, under the auspices of the League of Nations Military Control Commission. When Poland seized Vilnius in open violation of an international agreement signed by Polish plenipotentiaries a day or two earlier, the *Polish-Lithuanian dispute ceased to be a local problem* between two neighboring states and *developed into an international question of law and order*, affecting all of the international community.

Statesmen of the Western world now realized that Polish imperialism against Lithuania and the open violation of all the principles of international law and order, coupled with an utter disregard of the principle of national self-determination, threatened to wreck the entire structure and ideology for which so much blood had been shed in the four years of war. They readily understood that this example of lawlessness and violence in disregard of international treaty obligations by a young state, would be seized upon as a precedent by other aggressors and by ideologists of brute force as against an international order based on respect for law and treaties. This argument, and the realization of its truth by various statesmen, pushed Lithuania to the fore of international attention as a representative of noble ideals, of the forces of law and order. This moral force was strong enough to hold the Polish imperialists in check, yet not strong enough to compel Poland to restore the legal order violated by its imperialistic military clique.

A number of statesmen who had played an important role in international councils published their memoirs some twenty years later. Most of them express a regret that the League of Nations had lacked the determination to restore the order violated by Polish armed might—puny in comparison with the great powers yet overwhelming in comparison with Lithuanian capacity of resistance in a situation where Russia and Germany were neutral. The League's "great" statesmen consider *the seizure of Vilnius and the violation of the pact of Suvalkai* to have been *the first and the most important disruption of international order under the rule of reason, of justice and of law*, which eventually led to the series of other violations and outbreaks of aggression.

Lithuanian Relations with Russia

From a purely formal point of view, Lithuania was able to regulate her juridical relations with Russia,—the state wherein Lithuania had been incorporated after the dismemberment of the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth in 1795. After brisk, yet comparatively brief, fighting Lithuania successfully

stopped the Red Russian invasion and pushed the Russian forces beyond the ethnographic frontiers. Peace negotiations were thereafter initiated in Moscow and a peace treaty was signed with Russia on the *12th day of July 1920*. Russia renounced "for all times" its former sovereignty rights in favor of the Lithuanian Government and recognized the independence of the Lithuanian Republic. Frontiers were delineated which embraced all of ethnographic Lithuania (except the areas under the sovereignty of Germany) within the new state whose capital was to be the city of Vilnius. Furthermore, *Russia promised to recognize the perpetual neutrality of Lithuania*—should other powers do the same.

During the next nineteen years Russia based its policy regarding Lithuania on the premise that she was interested in the existence of Lithuania as an independent State and, consequently, that *any attempt to destroy Lithuania was to be construed as a design directed against the interests of Russia*—and any such attempt must reckon with the reactions of Russia.

Russian backing of the sovereignty of Lithuania and consistent Russian self-interest in the preservation of such independence, tied the hands of Poland to some extent.

Germany, the other great neighbor, likewise recognized the independence of Lithuania. It was readily understood that any design directed against the independence of Lithuania would similarly affect the self-interest of Germany and upset the balance of power. Even if official Germany of Weimar did not venture to speak about the continuation of a *Drang nach Osten*—it was clear, to those whose business it was to know, that Germany would not favor absorption of Lithuania by any other power.

Thus, both colossi—while nurturing their basic plans for further conquests and adhering to the principle of *Divide et impera*—showed great interest during the two decades in maintaining the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This situation was somewhat similar to that of Germany's small western neighbors—where the German General Staff pursued an identical policy concerning the status of Belgium and the Netherlands. Russia and Germany, with equal determination, were both interested in barring any possibility of the absorption of Lithuania by Poland. Unfortunately, Poland overestimated her own powers and possibilities. Poland's leaders over-indulged in operating on the level of a "great power" (*mocarstwo*) and in resorting to gangster methods in power politics. Instead of building up a common front by dealing fairly with her neighbors, Poland persisted in the policies of *fait accompli*, military bellicosity and fist settlements.

In view of this twin reaction by two great neighbors, *Poland was unable to achieve by force all of her designs against Lithuania*. When the Poles realized that the international situation would not permit Poland to accomplish such designs—at least for some time to come—the Polish Government was obliged to grant a reluctant recognition of the fact of the independence of Lithuania (*de facto* recognition in July 1920). Poland's conflict with Lithuania—hitherto but a belated diplomatic explanation and commentary on military events—presently passed into an international political arena.

The League of Nations

Lithuania succeeded in gaining international recognition of her rights.

Already in 1920 Poland sued Lithuania for an alleged violation of neutrality in the Russo-Polish war. The dispute went through several stages of venue in the League of Nations Council and in the various tribunals, even in the plenary session of the League, for eleven years. Having originated in charges brought by Poland against Lithuania, this dispute developed into a litigation concerning the Polish violation of International Law and of the Suvalkai Agreement signed under the League auspices. The League Council at one point declared that it would recognize no other decision on the disposition of the Vilnius territory, except a judgment made within the League's forum by its organs or except an agreement freely negotiated and accepted by both litigating parties. In 1931 the dispute went into the International Tribunal at the Hague. This high *International Court of Justice rendered a decision to the effect that Poland had violated the International Law by the seizure of Vilnius and that Lithuania was justified in refusing to maintain any direct relations with Poland by reason of such violation*.

The verdict of the highest international Court of Justice knocked the props from under the Polish attempt to legalize a political situation created by an act of violence.

It is difficult to evaluate all the consequences which followed from this litigation. The Polish diplomatic assault against Lithuania in the League forum failed completely. Legal deliberations and consideration of all the aspects in the various venues of the League machinery brought much understanding of Lithuania's aspirations. The prolonged litigation evoked a wave of sympathy for Lithuania as a defender of the principles upon which the League was based. All in all, *Poland's attack on Lithuania strengthened and improved Lithuanian international standing*.

Establishment of diplomatic relations, forced upon Lithuania by Poland by means of an ultimatum (March 1938), backed by armies deployed along the frontiers and ready to strike in an unprovoked aggression, did not mean legalization of the Polish fruits of violence. Unfortunately, this "normalization of relations" failed to solve the dispute. Polish-Lithuanian differences continued to poison international relations, and Polish aggression continued to weaken European security and collaboration for peace.

Lithuania resorted to arms only in defense of her existence which had been threatened by the invading Polish armies. *Throughout her independent existence, Lithuania deplored the use of force in international and domestic disputes and continued to favor the achievement of her national aspirations and the strengthening of her internal and external situation, through the medium of peaceful methods of consultation and arbitration*.

Lithuania and Germany

Another aspect of Lithuanian foreign policy was the German problem—likewise demanding a perpetual vigilance and exertion of energies.

German-Lithuanian relations date back to the early part of the thirteenth century when the Teutonic invaders had first established their bridgeheads in Prussia and Latvia. From then on the Lithuanian nation lived in a perpetual status of war and bitter defence against the German designs of conquest and subjugation. Nevertheless, there had been a few periods of peaceful neighborhood, and even of military alliances. During some periods, Lithuania had been weakened and lost much to the Germans (all of East Prussia), and was obliged to mortgage Samagitia and Sudavia for some decades. At other times Lithuania had been the victor (Tannenberg in 1410, Pabaiskas in 1435) and enjoyed the relationship of superiority over her German vassals of Prussia (1525) and Livonia (1561). Lithuanian folksaws recall the ancient enmity against the Teutonic crusaders. Modern political developments reflected a duplication of ancient relations, at least to some degree—*Lithuania was no longer a great power*.

Call it Divine Providence or a mere trick of fate, —Germany, the state which had actively promoted and participated in the three dismemberments of Lithuania in the eighteenth century, was slated to participate in the creation of conditions which enabled Lithuania to resurrect herself as an independent State in 1918.

Those Germans who claim that *Lithuania was enabled to achieve her independence from Russia only because of the disintegration of Imperial Russia*

following the victory of German arms in World War I—are right. But those Germans who claim that Lithuania must be grateful to German arms for her independence—are wrong. The fact is that *Lithuania was able to restore her independence only when German arms had been vanquished on the Western Front in 1918*, and that the German military occupants were fully prepared, in the event of a German victory, to annex Lithuania as a new Eastern Province and to absorb the Lithuanian people by colonization and systematic denationalization-germanization.

Consequently, Lithuania's fight for independence might have been rendered more difficult without a weakening of Germany. Between the two World Wars, just as in the Vitoldian period, the political interests of Lithuania—assigned by fate to the focal point of power politics by reason of her geopolitical location—*volens-nolens* favored certain equilibrium of power among her great neighbors. Lithuania did not desire a *disproportionate weakening* of any one of the neighboring powers, inasmuch as such weakening could affect Lithuania only adversely in favor of another aggressive power—and might conceivably destroy the independence of Lithuania completely.

This was the reason Lithuania looked with a great deal of apprehension at the rising might of Hitlerian Germany. For the same reason Lithuania did not conceal her apprehensions over the imminent weakness of Poland, in spite of the outstanding differences with that country.

Drang nach Osten

Let us now review the two decades of political relations between Lithuania and Germany.

When the bitterness caused by the hardships of the German occupation of Lithuania, and by the exceptional brutality of Bermondts gangs, began to fade and German exterminative designs of colonization of Lithuania collapsed together with the German defeat in 1918,—Lithuania established fairly good neighborly relations with Republican Germany. Democratic Germany seemed to have acquiesced in the fact of the existence of an independent Lithuania. This did not mean that Germany was sincere in her relations with Lithuania, or that Germany had ever succored the cause of Lithuania. On the contrary: the relationship was *strictly businesslike*.

When Lithuania declared her independence in February 1918, the Germans had not yet grasped the utter hopelessness of their situation. German military and civil officials deliberately obstructed the Lithuanian attempts to resume state functions and to create an armed force. The Germans refused to supply

arms to Lithuanian militiamen and to the rising national Lithuanian armed force. The Germans also deliberately turned over some arsenals to the Poles, along with several strategic sites. German reasoning was self-apparent: in the event of an eventual resurgence of Germany as a military power, it will be easier for them to deal with a weak and disorganized state or, at least, Lithuanian weakness would pave the way for the success of the illegitimate German offspring—armed venture of the Baltic barons and Bermondts-Avalov.

However, when Lithuania showed great powers of resistance and successfully defended herself on two fronts (the Red Russian and the German-White Russian),—Germany looked up with respect and began to deal with Lithuania more realistically.

When the slow German mind finally understood the true situation of Germany, it was not slow in drawing the deductions practically based on the factual situation.

In the first place, Germany painstakingly strove to erase—morally and psychologically—the status of belligerency vis á vis Russia, her former enemy who had found herself in a similarly strained situation in relations with the Western Powers. Ties of an alliance were established between Soviet Russia and Germany by the Rapallo Treaty. Lithuania had already negotiated by that time a peace treaty with Russia and had no outstanding disputes with either Russia or Germany. For this reason, Lithuania maintained friendly relations with both Russia and Germany, always remaining mindful of *the historic axiom of keeping an equal distance between two of her powerful neighbors*. Lithuanian relations with the so-called “Rapallo parties” tended to grow more cordial — in exact proportion to the increasing pressure by Poland, the antagonist of the two parties.

Republican Germany adhered to the policy of living up to the terms of the Versailles Peace Pact. This basic German policy enabled the Klaipėda Insurrection and Klaipėda's reunion with Lithuania to pass off without an especially violent repercussion in German-Lithuanian relations. German colonization plans, developed during the occupation of Lithuania, were filed away for the time being and were, officially, forgotten in Berlin. Official Germany had not yet dared to speak about a “return of territories detached from the Reich at Versailles.” German policy concerning Lithuania was limited, for some time, to *expansion of economic influence in Lithuania*.

This situation enabled both neighboring states to pursue their own interests in peace. Lithuanian foreign policy of that period centered around the defense against Polish offensive actions and around establishment of direct relations with foreign coun-

tries. *Lithuanian policy* concerning Germany was limited to finding the means *to prevent the predominance of Germany in the economic life of the country and to bring under control the German economic infiltration, lest the economic power be turned into a political lever among the German minority.*

Economic problems of Lithuania caused some difficulties in international relations. Lithuania had been badly devastated by war and needed extensive financial aid for reconstruction. Having lived for 120 years the life of a neglected agricultural province of Russia, and now separated from her political and economic capital hub-city of Vilnius, Lithuania was anxious to hasten the process of reconstruction and modernization of the country as an independent state approximating the cultural standards of Western Europe. Normal economic relations with rich capitalist countries were practically non-existent at the time. On the other hand, Germany, a great neighboring industrial state, seemed to be anxious to develop close economic relations with its neighbors—probably in expectation of eventually becoming able to reassert its importance in world politics as well, through economic penetration. German colonization plans of the occupational regime were, for the time being, replaced by economic penetration plans.

This German policy particularly manifested itself in persistent attempts to gain for German citizens the right to settle in Lithuania and to assure for them and for German firms the opportunities to expand in the field of economic activities. German plans were helped along, at the time, by the economic situation of Lithuania. There was in the country a great demand for manufactured products, which demand was coupled with the ready offer of such products in Germany for export. Germany needed some quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials, which were readily available in Lithuania for export. The economic machinery of Lithuania was disrupted by the war and the occupation—and there were masses of unemployed German merchants, salesmen and tradesmen familiar with the conditions of the market of Lithuania. It was not at all strange that more than 80% of Lithuanian trade exchange went on with Germany, that Lithuania was overstuffing with German merchandise and overcrowded with German salesmen, and the *Germans were acquiring a monopoly of trade* in Lithuania.

Gradually, however, Lithuanian relations with foreign countries expanded, and Lithuania was beginning to shake off this economic German penetration. *The evolution of Lithuanian policy was helped along by the changed mood of Germany.*

Germany regained her self-confidence and her weight in international affairs. Germany immediately attempted to use her monopoly of economic relations in Lithuania for strengthening her political influence and, in effect, for creating a sphere of political domination beyond the frontiers of Germany. Lithuanian perseverance in eliminating the economic and political penetration of Germany and German firms caused a strain in political relations.

Lithuanian interests also clashed with Germany's in Klaipėda.

When Germany recovered her international weight and influence, a *new trend* was made apparent in the foreign policy. A new objective rapidly forged ahead as *the main principle of German policy: liquidation of all consequences of the defeat in war and, in the first place, recovery of all territories detached from the Reich at Versailles.* This policy directly affected Lithuania. Lithuania desired to base her policy with Germany upon the principle of the territorial situation defined by the treaties. On the other hand, Germany strove to defer recognition of the Versailles-imposed territorial settlement with Lithuania, to create international juridical reservations, and to cause conditions leading to eventual reannexation of territories lost by Germany in the East.

German ambitions caused new international complications for Lithuania—on an *intrinsically domestic issue of administration of Klaipėda.*

The difficulty arose out of the meddling of Germany in the internal affairs of Lithuania—by abetting a section of disgruntled citizens of Lithuania to work for territorial changes in favor of Germany. With this undercover activity, Germany expanded her concentrated diplomatic action against Lithuania on an international scale. Lithuania was being repeatedly accused of violating the Klaipėda Statute, of restricting the freedom of the German minority, and of abolishing the Home Rule.

Lithuania attempted to ease the strain in relations with Germany by explanations and negotiations. These tactics served only to encourage the German arrogance. Finally, *Lithuania was obliged to abandon appeasement and to accept the challenge to a diplomatic battle.*

After preliminary discussions in the League of Nations forum, the issue went to the Hague Tribunal in 1932: *Lithuania won the legal battle.* German charges were found to be baseless, and German hopes of establishing a political "sphere of influence" over Lithuania through a medium of interpretation of the Klaipėda Statute faded. Alas, this verdict did not deter the continuing German tendency of extending "influence" across the Nemunas River. And soon

Germany resorted to direct methods of intervention.

The situation of Lithuania has meanwhile also undergone a transmutation. Lithuania was no longer a state lacking recognition of the "great powers" and striving to regulate somehow her relations with her nearest neighbors. After two decades of independent existence Lithuania gained self-confidence born of experience in self-government and economic prosperity. Lithuania was now a full-fledged member of the international community of independent states. The country had put its domestic affairs in order, raised the cultural and living standards of the people, and became accustomed to playing the role of an equal partner in international relations. German trade monopoly dwindled, and the predominant influence of German artisans and merchants in the national economy of Lithuania was about to disappear. With her close political and cultural ties with all of the great powers, Lithuania managed to establish also an economic balance. Other countries were now sharing in Lithuanian export and import trade. Lithuanian ships were plying the high seas in seaborne trade. Growing economic relations with distant states enabled the country to gain self-confidence in dealing with its immediate neighbors.

During the first decade of independence of Lithuania, her immediate neighbors predominated in the market of the country. During the second decade, a network of economic relations was established with other states. Part of the trade exchange was carried on in the hulls of the rapidly expanding Lithuanian merchant marine. *Political independence of the country has grown more secure through economic independence which checked the active expansion of German influence.*

This regrouping and expansion of international relations was the fruit of the labors of many years and made Lithuania truly independent. One part of these labors was successfully carried through the medium of the League of Nations where Lithuania defended her rights, explained her efforts, and gained sympathy and confidence among the powers.

When German Nazis resorted to the tactics of terror and murder, Lithuania again accepted the challenge and prosecuted the criminals. The trial attracted world-wide attention. The terrorists were punished, despite the howls of rage in Germany, in the Nazi-controlled press and over the radio. We can be proud of this Lithuanian perseverance in adhering to the rule of law and order, and this *first prosecution of the Nazis gained much sympathy for Lithuania in the free world.**

* The author wrote before the seizure of Klaipėda by Germany. Lithuania bowed to force only after having been advised to do so by England, France, Russia and Poland.—Editor.

International Cooperation for Peace

The League of Nations played an exceptionally important role in the international relations of Lithuania during the two decades of her independence. Of course, Lithuania felt some reproach—the League had not always exercised its influence to accomplish its ends, i.e., it failed to rectify the injustice done to Lithuania by Poland. Similarly, the League did not use its full weight in curbing German penetration.

Nevertheless, Lithuania was satisfied that the *League of Nations was a defender of law and justice*, even if a reluctant and shy defender. The League helped Lithuania to gain world-wide recognition as an independent state, to win international sympathies, and to establish direct relations with the world. *The League consistently recognized the principle of equality of all sovereign states, large and small.* Scores of times Lithuania enjoyed the opportunity of representing her views in an international forum as an equal member of the international community, together with other great powers. On her own part, Lithuania proved to the world that her policy was *not a narrowly nationalistic one—Lithuania was eager to cooperate with the rest of the world for peace, for order under the law.*

In appraising the role of Lithuania in the League, we must admit that—if moral prestige is of any importance to a State—the cooperation in the League's activities has gained Lithuania as much prestige as was possible to gain. The principle of sovereign equality of nations enabled the little nations, such as Lithuania, to contribute their efforts toward maintaining in international relations the rule of reason, of order, and of law.

Baltic Entente

Lithuania consistently strove to strengthen the friendly relations with her immediate neighbors to the north. Since the beginning of her independence, close cooperation was maintained with the sister Baltic nations of Latvia and Estonia. The menace of imperialistic designs by rapacious great neighbors at the very start tended and impelled to coordinate their common defense. Indeed, all three of the Baltic States were invaded by the Red Russian armies and by the mixed armies of Russian White formations and a German corps (the armed gangs of General von der Goltz and Colonel Bermond-Avalov). Of necessity, military operations against these enemies were coordinated in the field: the Estonians and Lithuanians helped the Latvians in clearing Latvia of the bolshevik invaders; Estonians aided the Latvians in forming military units and in clearing northern Latvia of the Russo-German bands; and the

Latvians helped the Lithuanians in clearing northern Lithuania of the Bermondts forces.

At the very first conferences of Baltic ministers for foreign affairs (1919-1922), a serious attempt was made to organize a common defense for repelling the common menace. When the menace of Russia and Germany was removed, Lithuania had no choice but to fight back the Polish invasion, and the Baltic cooperation weakened: *Estonia and Latvia were not directly affected by the Lithuanian life-and-death struggle against Polish aggression. Estonian and Latvian statesmen, we are sorry to state, failed to realize the intrinsic menace of the continuing Polish-Lithuanian strife.* Northern Baltics failed to see their community of interest in this struggle, and they termed "the Vilna dispute" (that is, *the Polish attempt to annihilate Lithuania*) to be "a specific problem of Lithuania," "a domestic issue" hindering the realization of a Baltic Entente.

Indeed, Latvia and Estonia sought to entrench themselves in the European community of nations by complying with the British and French demand to establish close contacts with Poland. Poland, a belated member of the Entente that had won the World War, was enjoying the full confidence and aid of the Western Allied Powers. *Poland was, so to speak, a branch establishment of the Entente in Eastern Europe* and, for quite some time, maintained strained relations with Germany and Russia. It was not at all amazing that, when the Goltz-Bermondts gangs were vanquished and the wars against Soviet Russia were concluded (while all of the European powers continued to be fearful of the Soviet State and its Third International),—Latvia and Estonia were most anxious to maintain close links with Poland. Poland was deemed to be a power slated by fate itself to defend the Baltic nations from the German and Russian menace. Friendship with Lithuania, an enemy of Poland, seemed too dangerous and provocative. The Baltics realized that *Lithuania was not popular in London and Paris, where Poland was being lionized* in no uncertain manner and where Polish princes and counts were cutting great figures on the rugs of the fashionable salons. They also realized that *for this very reason Lithuania was not averse to equal friendship with Germany and Russia*, the very countries against whom Estonia and Latvia were seeking a counterweight in Poland.

The unpopular "peasant Lithuania" did not budge from her stubborn defense of what she deemed to be *justice and decency*. Lithuania kept on plugging, and she repeatedly won diplomatic victories in the legal battles against Polish and German pretensions. Gradually Lithuania strengthened her international position as a dignified state basing in-

ternational relations on *law, order and principle*. This "hard-necked" Lithuanian attitude won her respect in international councils, and a belated recognition *de jure* by the great powers.

No such difficulties had been in the way of Latvia and Estonia: these two Baltic States enjoyed the friendship of Poland and the Western Allies, and they were readily granted recognition *de jure* and admitted to the League of Nations.

There were other difficulties, besides these contrasting interests, in the way of a Baltic Entente. During the climax of the League of Nations prestige, *regional blocs, such as the proposed Baltic Union, seemed unnecessary and obnoxious to the authority of the League.* For this reason, Baltic collaboration expressed itself mostly in a growing cultural cooperation, exchange of professors and students, exchange concert tours, etc. These efforts tended to unify juridical systems and administrative organization, without directly affecting the cardinal policies of the states concerned.

Eventually, Latvian and Estonian relations with the Soviet Union lost somewhat in their acuteness, and the menace seemed to have receded. Simultaneously the problem of a Baltic Entente was revived. Frequent Polish-Russian exchanges of visitors and missions posed before the Latvians and Estonians a question: would Poland prove to be the strong defender of their interests? Was the natural friendship with Lithuania to be sacrificed for the benefit of Poland in the uncertain state of affairs among the great powers?

The question was quite a natural one. The Soviet Union was toying with the idea of an alliance with France, and the Soviet menace on the surface at least did not appear so terrible and real. Furthermore, Poland strained her relations with France, abandoned her role of a representative of France in Eastern Europe, and established friendship and close collaboration with Germany. The Baltics wavered, their confidence in Poland weakened and came close to disillusionment.

This readjustment of views has done away with the difficulties in the path of the Baltic Entente. *Instead of the directly opposite ways taken by Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and Lithuania on the other, for the promotion of their security, the three Baltic States finally came together in realization of their own common interests.* On Lithuanian initiative early in 1934, a triple Baltic Entente began to take shape. All three Baltic States began to co-ordinate their policies not only in secondary matters, but also in their cardinal foreign policies.

Of course, such tasks are not accomplished merely by a simple waving of the hand or by signing a piece

of paper. Estonian and Latvian statesmen continued to be much affected by their recollections of the past experiences in their Polish relations. The "issue of Vilnius" (again it must be stressed that *the issue was the very existence of Lithuania as an independent nation, and not a territorial dispute*) did not yet become one of the problems common to all three Baltic States. In the Estonian-Latvian view, the problem of Vilnius remained a specific Lithuanian affair not deserving a coordinated common action of all three Baltic States. Nevertheless, all the States realized that their *common interests did not permit any one of the trio to assume a stand adverse to the interests of other partner(s) on an important political issue.*

This Baltic Entente, as created in 1934, could best be characterized as an agreement not to injure, not to place difficulties in the way of a friend. It was far from an agreement to help one's friend. The Lithuanians were perfectly willing to act on this basis: they deemed it unrealistic to demand that their neighbors should strain their relations with Poland, not being certain that Lithuania could reciprocate in any emergency. The Entente was established to cooperate in the affairs common to all three States, and to assume a *benevolent neutrality on the affairs of a partner which did not directly affect the interests of other states.*

It may be stressed that divergence of interests on specific problems depends on the *degree of proximity and friendship established at the moment.* When general friendship begins to grow and deepen, it may be expected that *divergence of interests will tend to disappear on specific matters.* The pilots of Lithuanian foreign policy entered into the Baltic Entente with a deepset conviction that the growing Baltic rapprochement must take the route of development of general close relations toward inclusion of specific problems in the common program.

Economic Policy

Regulation of economic relations with other countries has become a prominent feature of foreign policy since the World War. Economic interdependence of states has grown in importance to such an extent that no state is any longer able to prosper without maintaining beneficial economic relations with other countries. *Foreign trade and national economy in state policies mean as much as the circulation of blood to a human body.* In a foreign policy pure and simple, rupture of trade relations and economic sanctions are held to be the most harmful weapons—unfortunately, also one of the most difficult weapons to control. In the thirties of the present century, regulation of international trade has changed, due to the

worldwide depression, from free trade into planned or collective economy. This trend vitally affected the foreign policy of Lithuania.

Development of potential defensive power and relations with more powerful states depend upon planned regulation of international trade. It is not enough to attempt to convince a neighbor that one is right. It becomes necessary to prove to him that one is necessary for that neighbor's own interests, as well as for the eventual rivals of that neighbor. At the same time, each country strives to be self-sufficient and able to withstand and resist the pressure.

There was very little economic regulation in Lithuania during the first decade of independence. Lithuanian policy relied on the principles of *free trade and private initiative.* During the second decade, Lithuania undertook, quite successfully, to regulate her economic life and foreign trade. Exchange of goods with foreign countries was regulated in order to secure a profitable balance. International trade became one of the most important problems of foreign policy, inasmuch as most of the European and overseas states regulated their trade by treaties.

This peaceful rivalry in world trade opened up new perspectives. Lithuania became interested in trade and commerce. She found these activities very attractive, and plunged into a planned development of her economic resources,—*always trying to encourage the private initiative and always ready to back up the private initiative with loans from the fisc.* Of course, *economic activity is at all possible in the conditions of tranquility and peace.*

In general, *Lithuanian foreign policy was averse to military alliances and power politics.* During the troublesome thirties, Lithuania carefully avoided any involvement in the machinery of power politics of any one of her dynamic neighbors. Lithuania always readily and willingly sided with the international measures for the maintenance of peace, and obligated herself to seek solution of international disputes *by peaceful means exclusively.* Guided by this steadfast policy, Lithuania readily signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact and consistently supported the peace machinery of the League of Nations.

Which Way?

(Editorial Postscript)

The peace machinery lay disintegrated in 1939. On the one hand, the United States and Germany were not members of the League of Nations, and the League could exercise no power in curbing aggression. On the other hand, there no longer was a hard and fast Entente to deal with the menace of resurgent German imperialism. Power politics found their expression immediately before the outbreak of

hostilities of World War II, i.e., after the German-Soviet friendship pact of August 23, 1939.

At that time the Lithuanian Government felt that the only hope, however slender, of safeguarding the country's independence lay in the maintenance of loyal and scrupulous neutrality. The strict neutrality of Lithuania was proclaimed immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Poland. All the insistence of the German Government to induce Lithuania to march against Poland thus to reclaim Vilnius was of no avail.

Poland was destroyed within an incredibly short space of time. Toward the end of the second week of hostilities, all orderly coordination of the field armies was irremediably broken. When the Russians marched into Poland on September 17, they encountered but a scattered and insignificant resistance. Germany established a direct territorial link with Soviet Russia.

Lithuania found herself encircled by two totalitarian powers, and all direct links with the rest of the world were cut off. Facing the new situation, Lithuania bravely fended off all the wily attempts to draw her on the German-Russian bandwagon and strove to retain her neutrality. Regardless of all the public and secret pacts of German-Russian partnership in rapine, Lithuania remained, more than ever before, an object of German-Soviet rivalry—but the decision rested with the two powerful rivals.

Very reluctantly, Lithuania was forced by both Germany and Russia to accede to the Soviet "Diktat" of October 10, 1939—the so-called Mutual Assistance Pact—and to admit Soviet garrisons to man the bases leased to Russia. The Lithuanian Government never believed in the "firm friendship cemented with blood" between the two powers that had dismembered Poland.

Regardless of all the Lithuanian fairness and honesty in foreign affairs, and regardless of the sincere friendship which the Government and people of Lithuania felt and openly showed in the relations with Russia,—the inevitable happened. On June 15, 1940, Lithuania was occupied by the Reds—with the blessing of the Nazis. The Government took upon itself the responsibility in ordering no resistance, for

it was obvious that any armed resistance against the overwhelming Russian armies would have forced the small Lithuanian army into the arms of Nazi Germany for an inevitable internment in East Prussia—a perspective which the Lithuanian people wanted to avoid at any price. A year later she was submerged by the Teutonic hordes. After three more years of suffering and hardships, Lithuania was once more occupied by the rising Red tide. Now she lies prostrate, together with a dozen other nations, in a firm grip of Red totalitarianism.

All her fairness, honesty, consistent friendliness were of no avail. Power-greedy totalitarian nations could not resist the temptation to seize the progressive and prosperous little country. Both totalitarian neighbors had a share in the destruction of little Lithuania. Now one of them, Nazi Germany, is beaten down to her knees. Should Russia, the former partner of the Nazis and the winner in the game of treachery and rapine at the moment, persist in the policies of rapacity—we may logically assume that, sooner or later, she will *meet the same fate as Nazi Germany*.

It may be timely to ask ourselves: what direction the post-Atlantic Charter world will take in reshaping its destinies? Will it be a return to the false game of power politics, with the Red totalitarianism replacing the Brown-Black one in an attempt to dominate and subjugate the freemen of the world? Or will it be a return to the policy of fairness and international cooperation for peace among the free and self-determining nations, all enjoying the Four Freedoms and the effects of the unadulterated Atlantic Charter, as the English speaking democracies continue to insist?

Moral leadership rests with the United States and Great Britain. It happens that the United States is also the only really strong military and economic power. If America will only realize her power, and use this unprecedented power for effecting a moral leadership for a better world—humanity will triumph. But, if America fails to assume leadership—there will be *no happiness for mankind, and other legions of American manhood sooner or later will sail again to die on foreign battlefields*.

DISPLACED LITHUANIANS

A MEMORANDUM was submitted to the attention of the American government on August 21st of this year by the Lithuanian American Council. A few days later, a letter pertaining to the same subject was sent to the War Department by the Rev. Dr. J. B. Koncius, President of United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., member agency of the

National War Fund. The Director of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, answered to the effect that the facts mentioned in this memorandum had been forwarded for comment to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theatre.

The following letter, dated November 3, has been received from the War Department:

"Dear Father Koncius:

In my letter to you dated 31 August 1945 I advised you that a memorandum entitled "The Situation of Displaced Lithuanians in American-occupied Germany" had been forwarded for comment to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theatre and that upon receipt of a reply the War Department would furnish you with further information concerning this situation. Comments have now been received from the Commanding General, European Theatre.

These comments state that it is the policy of Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theatre, to repatriate only those Lithuanian Nationals who express a desire to be returned to their homeland, and that there are no known instances of forcible repatriation of Lithuanian Nationals.

The comments from the European Theatre further advise that although there are Soviet repatriation representatives in the American Zone who are engaged in the work of identifying Soviet citizens and assisting in their repatriation, these Soviet officers are expressly prohibited from entering assembly centers accommodating non-Soviet United Nation's nationals including Lithuanians, unless authorized and accompanied by a Military Government official. It is true, however, that on a few occasions Soviet officers have entered assembly centers accommodating non-Soviet nationals. Such incidents have occurred infrequently and on each occasion have been brought to the attention of Soviet authorities. In any event, no forced repatriation of Lithuanian citizens has resulted from any of these unauthorized visits by Soviet officers.

Lithuanian nationals, when so authorized by Military Government, are accorded preferential treatment as compared to the German population. They reside in assembly centers or, if they wish, in individual billets in German communities. At the assembly centers a basic food ration of 2,300 calories per person per day is provided, and in most instances to date, this ration has been exceeded. An intensive program is at present underway to improve the accommodations and care provided in displaced persons assembly centers in preparation for the cold winter weather and in accordance with this program, assembly centers accommodating Lithuanian nationals will be progressively improved with the approach of winter.

I hope that the above information which I have been able to pass on to you will reassure you as to the present condition and treatment of Lithuanian displaced persons in the United States Zone of Germany.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) J. H. HILLDRING
Major General
Director, Civil Affairs Division"

Elsewhere in this issue of THE LITHUANIAN BULLETIN is presented a summary on the situation of displaced Lithuanians in Western Germany as of the middle of last October.

As may be seen from this summary, the situation of displaced Lithuanians, compared to last summer, is greatly improved.

MEMORANDUM of the Lithuanian American Council, Inc. Concerning The Situation of Displaced Lithuanians in American-Occupied Germany

A letter addressed to the Lithuanian American Information Center, under date of May 24, 1945, and signed by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, read:—

"It may be stated for your information that it is contrary to the policy of this Government to arrange for the involuntary repatriation of persons who have had to leave their countries of residence because of the danger to their lives and liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs."

A similar letter from the War Department, May 18th, signed by Colonel L. L. Hill, stated that:—

"The United States Government policy provides that Lithuanian nationals will not be repatriated to the Soviet Union unless they affirmatively claim Soviet citizenship. Reports of violation of this policy would naturally be subject to investigation, but no specific reports of such violation have come to my attention."

The phrase, "*contrary to the policy of this Government to arrange for the involuntary repatriation,*" was construed by the undersigned to entail opposition to all sorts of pressure—physical, moral, etc.—to induce the displaced Lithuanians to deliver themselves into the hands of the Soviet authorities.

Information at the disposal of the Lithuanian American Council bears out the fact that the policy of using no physical force in the case of Lithuanian nationals was adhered to by American military authorities.

However, attention of this Council has just been called to specific instances of *mental pressure* being applied to displaced Lithuanians in the American zones of occupation. The following facts are cited:

(a) On July 12, 1945, members of the Lithuanian Committee at Bamberg, including its chairman, Dr. Maceina, were arrested by order of the local officer in charge of displaced persons. They were charged with "illegal activities." The committeemen were later released, after proofs were submitted that the Committee was organized with the authorization of the local military commander for specific purposes.

(b) In many instances and in the various localities, the Lithuanians are continually exposed to persistent reproaches and questioning by local American occupational officials, as to why they remain in occupied Germany instead of going to Soviet-occupied Lithuania. In some cases, this action is taking the form of *unmistakable pressure and threats*,

coupled with the forcible measures of corralling displaced Lithuanians in the camps. This attitude of individual American officers is exercising a demoralizing and depressing effect on these people, and it undermines their confidence.

(c) On July 18th, the Lithuanian community at Wangen, in the American zone, was visited by a Red Army officer who broke into the mess hall and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the people to return to Soviet-occupied Lithuania. When the officer realized that his exhortations failed their purpose, he vilified the unwilling audience in a most disgraceful manner and finally told them: "Those who refuse to be repatriated, will be forcibly removed. You, fascist swine, will be brought by force into our camps, from which the exit is short and expeditious."

Furthermore, food allotment in some camps is limited to a daily diet of some 600 calories.

The eyes of the world are now focused on the drama and the plight of all displaced persons, particularly those, like the Baltics, who remain at the moment in the situation of men without a country. Nearly one million of loyal Lithuanian Americans are vitally concerned with the plight of their relatives and with saving what is left of a once proud nation, the victim of German and Russian aggression.

We beg to submit the above cited facts and considerations to the attention of the Department of State, and we hopefully request the Government to take whatever measures it deems necessary to remedy the situation.

THE LITHUANIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL, INC.

1739 So. Halsted Street, Chicago 8, Ill.

by Leonard Simutis, *President*

William F. Laukaitis, *Vice-President*

Dr. Pius Grigaitis, *Secretary*

Michael Vaidyla, *Treasurer*

SITUATION OF DISPLACED LITHUANIANS IN WESTERN GERMANY UP TO THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER, 1945

(Prepared by the Social Service Bureau of the Lithuanian American Council, Inc.)

A DIGEST of all available reports from sources directly associated with Assembly Centers of Lithuanian refugees, classed as Displaced Persons by the Allied authorities, presents a picture of general improvement, in treatment, care, food, medical, educational and recreational facilities. The reports are as of the middle of October, 1945, and cover all zones—American, British and French.

The reports stress that *housing conditions are still bad*, although the situation varies. There were no windows or doors in some Assembly Centers in early October. Some refugees were housed in private homes. But, in general, both the military authorities and UNRRA urge refugees to move to Assembly Centers of Displaced Persons. There is some understandable reluctance on the part of the refugees to move to such camps.

The condition of Lithuanian prisoners-of-war is exceptionally bad, due to mistreatment and discrimination at the hands of German PW committees.

It is generally known that several German mobilization attempts in Lithuania ended in complete fiasco. However, a great many men and women were seized forcibly by the Germans for labor service, and were later incorporated into Luftwaffe auxiliary units. Some of these "auxiliaries" had scarcely

reached the ripe age of fourteen years. . . . Instead of the long-awaited liberation by the Western Allies, those unwilling men and women dressed in German uniforms were indiscriminately placed in POW compounds.

In the *Oldenburg* POW Camp, there are about 500-600 Lithuanians. Their food ration consists of 1100 calories daily. Food distribution is entrusted to German prisoners, and these resort to all sorts of malicious practices against their hated non-German fellow prisoners. The Lithuanians receive very little food—only the very meagre supplies provided by their civilian fellow-citizens, the Displaced Lithuanians.

At *Bellin*, some 70 km. from Luebeck, there were about 2,500 Lithuanian prisoners-of-war. About 1,000 managed to desert. The prisoners lived in the open, in dugouts. Their tattered clothing soon fell to shreds. Many suffer from rheumatism. The Germans brutally mistreated the non-Germans. In one instance, the Lithuanians received no water and no bread for three successive days. Numerous protests from these victims of Nazism finally led to a concession and the Lithuanian prisoners were permitted to handle their own affairs. There was a slight improvement, although 200 prisoners, in abject misery, consented to return to Lithuania to suffer slavery under the Russians. Lithuanian DP's contribute food to the military prisoners from their own meagre ra-

tions. The Lithuanian Red Cross was permitted to extend recreational and medical facilities.

Small groups of from twenty-five to thirty prisoners-of-war are living in scattered camps around *Hamburg*. In the *Stode* camp, Lithuanian prisoners were separated from the German masses. They elected their own chairman.

In the French zone, the plight of Lithuanian prisoners ended tragically. The Russians were permitted to forcibly "repatriate" some prisoners. Some Lithuanians enlisted in the French Foreign Legion, others enlisted in the Polish armed forces as an escape from imprisonment. The Germans continued to practice their "Herrenvolk" theories and to terrorize the Lithuanians, giving them only a portion of their food allotments.

When UNRRA took over the administrative tasks in Displaced Persons Centers, its officials repeatedly stressed that those refusing to settle in Assembly Center would receive but the ordinary inhabitant's (German) ration cards. This also meant—no allotment of clothing, shoes and fuel.

Lithuanian refugees realize fully the difficulties facing UNRRA, and they state that *UNRRA has done and is doing all that is possible* to provide better and more spacious quarters, and decent living and cultural standards; they voice confidence that UNRRA officials will be able to settle all the refugee problems, *before the winter colds set in*. The refugees know that they will winter in Germany. Much credit is given to both the Military (American, British and French) and UNRRA authorities.

The solicitous hand of the Military and UNRRA is seen everywhere and in everything—in material provisions for the refugees, in educational and recreational facilities, in providing medical assistance in cooperation with the Lithuanian Red Cross and Lithuanian Committees. UNRRA organizational efficiency is rapidly developing, and its apparatus is functioning quite well.

The following data illustrates the present situation—

In nearly all Assembly Centers, adults receive a standard of 2,000 calories of food daily. Children and the sick receive additional food. Lithuanians living outside of Assembly Centers, in some places in the American zone, also receive additional food. Furthermore, the American authorities often grant them the privilege of receiving supplies on a group basis (*Gemeinschaftsverpflegung*).

UNRRA encourages the establishment of primary, secondary, trade and professional schools. Professors and university students were allowed to meet and to establish their academic centers. A small number of Lithuanians, mainly doctors, nurses and social work-

ers, are employed by UNRRA. Knowledge of English is desirable, but not a prerequisite for employment, although knowledge of some foreign language is desirable. This, however, is no problem to Lithuanian intellectuals who are, as a rule, multi-lingual.

There is a Lithuanian Priests' (Roman Catholic) Seminary in operation, and a University is being planned. A large faculty staff is available among the refugees. High schools and junior colleges are functioning in about eighteen places, in Augsburg, Blomberg, Richstadt, Hassendorf, Regensburg, Wiesbaden, etc. A People's University is functioning at Wiesbaden, also a forestry school; a commercial school at Ovelgon; a chauffeur's school at Neu Muenster. There are about seventy grammar schools. English classes are operated in nearly every larger center of Lithuanian refugees, together with Kindergartens, trade schools, athletic clubs, literary evenings, and theatres. Periodicals and almanacs are printed. Boy and girl scout movements are again rapidly reappearing among the Lithuanian youth.

Fraternities are established at Wuerzburg, Muenchen, Tuebingen, Innsbruck, Bregenz, and Detmold. UNRRA handles the applications for matriculation in the German universities—Heidelberg, Marburg, Erlangen, Hamburg, Hanover, Muenster, Cologne, Kiel, Bonn, Stuttgart, Darmstadt, Tuebingen and Freiburg. The students hope to receive scholarships. It may be noted, *inter alia*, that a number of Lithuanian students living abroad have received scholarships enabling them to complete their education in Sweden, Denmark, France, Switzerland and Italy.

Typewritten and mimeographed newspapers are printed in a great many centers.

The Lithuanian Association of Lithuanian Committees is attempting to provide standards of uniformity in the various schools and is working out school programs.

Lithuanian choirs and folk dance ensembles frequently entertain the American, British, and French troops, and visit prisoners camps. Concerts and plays are regularly staged in the camps.

Above all else the Lithuanian refugees are trying to maintain an excellent record for good conduct. They stress the cooperative attitude of the Military and UNRRA officials in enabling them to demonstrate their national arts to international audiences. Lithuanian sculptors and painters, too, take advantage of the opportunities offered them—in the difficult life of exiles under an orderly administration.

The following is a summary of conditions in some camps—

DONAUWOERTH (U.S.A. zone)—Food is fair.

German ration cards and additional food allotments for foreigners.

EICHSTADT (U.S.A. zone)—UNRRA feeds and cares for Assembly Center residents. Food has become poorer lately. UNRRA opened a mess hall in the town for foreigners living in private homes, and dinner is served free. There is a high school here and cultural life is very active.

HAFFKRUG (British zone)—The Swedish Red Cross has sent gifts for the children of Lithuanian exiles in the Assembly Center.

KIEL (British zone)—Food is satisfactory.

WENTORF (British zone)—Daily food norm: 400 grams of bread, 57 gr. of meat, 30 gr. of fats, 25 gr. of sugar, 25 gr. of cereals, 150 gr. of flour. The Assembly Center is under the care of the British Red Cross.

HAMBURG (British zone)—The Lithuanians are accepted for work to assist the British army. Almost 200 Lithuanians are thus employed, and all receive an English soldier's ration.

AUGSBURG (U.S.A. zone)—Lithuanian refugees are quartered in RAD (Reichs Arbeit Dienst) blocks. UNRRA feeds the inmates.

OCHSENZOLL b. HAMBURG (British zone)—Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian displaced persons are quartered together. Food is satisfactory. The British bring a German orchestra to the camp each day.

LUEBECK (British zone)—A weekly ration is 3,970 gr. of bread, 700 gr. flour, 400 gr. meat, 150 gr. butter, 150 gr. sugar, 150 gr. marmalade, 100 gr. cereals, 1 kg. vegetables, 3.5 kg. potatoes and 62.5 gr. salt.

WATENSTADT (U.S.A. zone)—Representatives of the International Red Cross recently visited the camp, informing the people that they would winter here. They promised to send reports to Lithuanian Americans and to Red Cross authorities.

Lithuanian *prisoners-of-war*, in the vicinity, receive regular help from refugee supplies. Efforts are being made to release them. A few days ago, the first six prisoners were released from POW compounds. The civilians received food, 70% of English origin, 30% of German origin. The English food is considerably better. All able-bodied men must work three days a week, four hours daily. The camp is being conditioned for winter.

HANOVER (British zone)—The Lithuanians of the Hanover-Braunschweig area are organized. The commandants informed the refugees that soon they would be moved west to a larger camp.

MANNHEIM (U.S.A. zone)—UNRRA accommodates the refugee needs.

TUEBINGEN (French zone)—Relations between

the Lithuanian refugees and the French occupational authorities are good. All Lithuanians eat in the mess halls for foreigners. Food is free and is not bad.

FLENSBURG (British zone)—UNRRA cares for children under the age of twelve years. Others receive German ration cards. Additional food is supplied on demand. The norm reaches 2,000 calories.

NUEREMBERG (U.S.A. zone)—About 600 Lithuanians live in the Assembly Center. A Kindergarten, primary school and high school are functioning. Most of the Lithuanians, until recently, lived in a crowded, partly demolished garage. They were moved to individual homes, which, even now, are without windows. The American Army supplies the refugees. The food is not bad.

HEIDELBERG (U.S.A. zone)—Lithuanian refugees live privately in the city, and receive a German food norm, which is about one-half of the Displaced Person's ration.

VOIDEN-MEIERHOF—Quarters are crowded, supplies moderate, people receive the foreigners ration norms.

HANAU (U.S.A. zone)—About 3,000 Lithuanians live here. It is the largest Lithuanian group in the American zone. UNRRA supplies the Center.

SCHWARZENBECK—No complaints about the food.

BIBERACH a R. (French zone)—The French military authorities care for the Lithuanians and supply good food.

CELLE (OVELGON AND OLDAU) (British zone)—There is a commercial school here. The first of its type. Daily food ration is 400 gr. of bread, 50 gr. of meat, 50 gr. of butter and additional miscellaneous food.

BLOMBERG (British zone)—Daily food ration consists of 500 gr. bread, 25 gr. meat, 35 gr. butter, 600 gr. potatoes, 100 gr. beans, 15-20 gr. sugar.

NEU MUENSTER (British zone)—Daily food ration is 400 gr. bread, 50 gr. meat, 50 gr. butter, and 0.5 liter milk.

BREGENZ (French zone)—About 150 Lithuanians live in the Alpine camp on the shores of the Boden Lake. All of them reside in private homes. Maintenance is good. Bregenz is the center for all Voralberg Lithuanians.

LUSTENAU (French zone)—The Assembly Center is under the supervision of the French Red Cross. Living quarters are bearable. The food is good.

OLDAU (British zone)—UNRRA feeds and

clothes almost all. Food is good, and each family prepares its own food.

Education and Recreation

"A high school and a junior college, a national art ensemble, an athletic club, four primary schools, four Kindergartens, a trade school, and several choirs are functioning here. Also, two newspapers are published." *This is a typical picture of the larger refugee colonies.*

The smaller centers present a more modest picture. "A grammar school, Kindergarten, and English language courses have been established."

A resurgence of the spirit of security and confidence in the Allied Administration is gleaned from camp bulletins and the Elta agency news organized by the refugees. ELTA reported that early in September, at Nueremberg, Russian repatriation agents by force placed ten Lithuanians aboard a transport bound for the Russian zone. Before leaving the American zone, at the Bamberg railroad station, a thorough M. P. inspection was made, and these "repatriates" were discovered. The refugees were freed by the Americans and were returned to Nueremberg. This incident encouraged the movement into Assembly Centers.

The most urgent plea of these Lithuanians is for direct postal and telegraphic communication with their American and Canadian relatives. **THIS IS THEIR PRIMARY AND PRINCIPAL REQUEST.** They detest their forced partial idleness, and only desire gainful employment in their vocations.

They are satisfied with the facilities extended to Catholic and Protestant clergy to administer spiritual help. Their wartime experiences under two hostile occupations of their country, and their long trek to safety in the Western zones have intensified their need for something to improve their morale. They beg for newspapers, magazines, and books in their own language from the United States. They hope that they will not be obliged to endure the hardships of another winter—that their hosts, UNRRA and the Military, will solve their housing and fuel problems.

Higher Education

Our informants write that the American, British and French occupational authorities and UNRRA have solved one of the great problems—*facilities for academic education*. A number of German universities have either re-opened or are re-opening. The following details are given, as part of the advice for

Lithuanian students seeking enrollment. Each university has made provision for the admission of certain quotas of Baltic students and in addition, several French universities will welcome Lithuanian students.

MARBURG—Already accepts application for admission to the Medical Faculty.

HAMBURG—Accepts applications for all schools.

GOETTINGEN—Applications no longer accepted. An Agricultural College is already functioning, and applications are accepted.

HEIDELBERG—A Theological Faculty is functioning: lectures in the Medical School will be resumed November 1st, and applications are still accepted. The faculties of Philosophy, Humanitarian Sciences, Law and Natural Sciences will resume activities a little later. Deans of all schools are already functioning.

ERLANGEN—The Medical School began classes October 15th, and applications are still accepted. Other faculties are expected to resume shortly. Dormitories are already provided for Lithuanian students.

HANNOVER—A Veterinarian College is functioning; applications are accepted. A Polytechnical Institute will soon resume its functions in the architectural and civil engineering branches.

MUENSTER—Enrollment is open in the Musical Conservatory.

COLOGNE, KIEL, AND BONN—Universities are already operating, but there is lack of specific information relevant to enrollment.

STUTTGART—A technical college will shortly resume training in architectural, civil engineering, and technology branches. Applications are not yet accepted.

DARMSTADT—A Technical College is to re-open shortly with architectural and civil engineering faculties; applications are not yet accepted.

TUEBINGEN—A Theological Faculty School is open. A Medical Faculty still accepts applications.

FREIBURG—A university is expected to reopen shortly.

INNSBRUCK — Medical, Law, Natural Sciences, Mathematics, Chemistry, Philosophy and Humanitarian Sciences faculties are already functioning. Students are still accepted. Personal appearance is required for admission. No difficulties for Lithuanian students desiring to enroll.

AN EYEWITNESS REPORT FROM LITHUANIA

INFORMATION service of the displaced Lithuanians in Western Europe published the following eyewitness account of life in Lithuania under the second Russian occupation, as of February 1945.

Several youths from northern Lithuania found their way into Western Europe in September 1945. The youths are entirely trustworthy in the judgment of the interviewer who had known them for years. They had escaped from Lithuania on February 16, 1945 and, consequently, their information reaches only that far back.

The Russians Arrive

The Red Army vanguard arriving in the church town of Vaskai consisted of several tanks that had come by way of Joniskelis and Gruziai (all located in northern Lithuania). Vaskai was practically a deserted town, except for several communist agents and informers. The Russians had a list of three persons, aged 30 to 35, whom they sought. One, Petras Gurliauskas, 30, a farmer from Sleniagrostis, was located and detained. For a full month thereafter no further searches were announced, and the alien regime began consolidating its administrative hold on the township.

Executive Committee of Vaskai Township was formed. One Bielinis, a shoemaker who had been Chairman of the Executive Committee in 1940-1941 and had fled with the Soviets to Russia to escape retaliation for his indiscriminate atrocities, was made Chairman again. For his secretary he picked Jonas Murauskas, 22, a prisoner liberated from the Germans who in 1941 had been chairman of the local branch of the Communist party and very active in arranging the mass deportations. Aleksandras Danusaitis, 40, was a new recruit for the Ispolkom (Executive Committee). In the era of independence this man was a notorious drunkard and murderer with several human lives on his conscience.

The Ispolkom next organized the "militia," that is, the police. The militiamen wore no uniforms but were armed "to the teeth." Several of them were Lithuanians, i.e., Jonas Zvirblis, 34, a worker from Vaskai and a recent convert to communism,—he personally arrested his brother-in-law, Jonas Belte, as the very first official act in new duties. Another Lithuanian militiaman was Baksys from Kiburiai township, 28, also a notorious drunkard and idler who lived off his father, the shoemaker. This young man had murdered Petras Noreika in the years of independence and was released from prison by the Russians in 1940.

First "Deeds"

NKVD detachments arrived at Vaskai on September 15, 1944. Platoons of NKVD were at once quartered in Vaskai and in the neighboring villages—Barysai, Vainoronys, Noriai, Jovidonys, Nakvosai and Noriunai. By the end of 1944 NKVD detained more than one hundred persons known to the community as peaceful, decent, serious-minded inhabitants. Among the arrested were the following: (1) Aleksandravicius, former chairman of the communist youths (Komsomol) in 1940-1941, who renounced his party affiliations; (2) Antanas Cinga, 26, from Titkonys, a farmer,—who was arrested and executed for his failure to report for mobilization; the authorities decided that he be buried without the religious rites in a ditch alongside the cemetery, together with (3) his neighbor, Maskoliunas, 26, who was shot for refusal to enlist in the Red Army; (4) Steponas Naricionis, 38, owner of the threshing machine; he was held in the prison at Birzai and was later liberated by Lithuanian guerillas; in retaliation, NKVD arrested (5) his brother Juozas and tortured the latter to death; (6) Petras Noreika, 40, a farmer of Gineikiai, who was shot down and beaten to death with rifle butts; the Russians refused to grant a public burial and the man was buried by NKVD secretly at the edge of his field;

(7) Norvaisa, 22, a student of the Agricultural School of Joniskis, a former communist youth;

(8) Juozas Valusaitis, 36, a carpenter, who was later liberated from the prison of Birzai by the guerillas, in a dying condition caused by torture;

(9) Bronius Zukas, 35, a farmer from Paliepiiai, arrested because of the fact that his father used to be a township elder in the days of freedom;

(10) Vegys from Biemenai was shot on the spot, because he had been a guerilla leader in June 1941 during an anti-Soviet uprising;

(11) Petras Astrauskas from Vaskai; (12) Vladas Bytautas, former township elder; (13) Kazys Burkus from Noriai; (14) Petras Dulevicius from Kriausikes; (15) Petras Garliauskas from Sleniagrostis; (16) Povilas Garliauskas, university student, from Bajenai; (17) Grigonis, former precinct commander of the police; (18) Jonas Jerasiunas from Vecekiai; (19) Boniface Jasenas from Leveikonys; (20) Vincas Juozapavicius from Gineikiai; (21) Petras Kruopis from Leveikonys; (22) Juozas Lepa from Degesiai; (23) Algirdas Lukstas, university student, from Noriai; (24) Maskoliunas from Titkonys, shot during the arrest and died from wounds; (25) Zenonas Meiliunas, former township elder, who was

subsequently liberated by the guerillas; (26) Balys Meiliunas from Titkonys; (27) Zigmas Nakvosas from Nakvosai; (28) Antanas Nakvosas, from the same place; (29) Antanas Nakvosas from Barysai; (30) Juozas Naricionis from Manikunai, shot to death during the arrest; (31) Vladas Pazemeckas from Gineikiai; (32) Ignas Petrukonis from Barysai, liberated by the guerillas from the prison of Birzai; (33) Povilas Sabijonas from Vaskai; (34) Jonas Skardinga from Pamanciai, (35) Baltrus Skirpa from Sleniagrostis; (36) Antanas Uogintas from Gutgaliai; (37) Bronius Valeika from Payslikis; (38) Stasys Valeika from Payslikis, etc.

The interviewer recorded only a part of the more than 100 names, told in full by the escaped youths from memory. All of these victims of the Red terror were arrested during the first seven months of the occupation, and many of them died in prison later. The picture presented from a small township situated far from the urban centers of Lithuania gives an insight into the vast size of the terror in all of the country. It must be taken for granted that NKVD did not fail to visit all of the hamlets of Lithuania on the bloody "mission". The list of victims must run into tens of thousands throughout the country.

"Census Taking"

One of the first measures of NKVD was to prepare the lists of survivors of the first Russian and the German occupations. They prepared several classified rosters: (1) men to be mobilized; (2) guerillas; (3) detainable Lithuanian patriots; (4) childless women up to the age of 50, to be deported for labor in Russia; (5) families of those who had escaped abroad and who evaded the mobilization (this list was to be completed by October 5, 1944); (6) former army officers and civil service employees; (7) owners and trained operators of the threshing machines (all of them were later either arrested or mobilized); (8) teachers; (9) railroad employees (all of them were arrested, some were released and later rearrested); (10) priests and servants of the churches. Furthermore, NKVD carefully listed the animals, stocks of grains, vegetables and farming implements.

All of these "census taking" visits and arrests instilled a great terror in the population. Many went to sleep outside at night, other villages posted the guards at both ends to spread an alarm on the arrival of NKVD at night.

Mobilization

The first mobilization was decreed at Pasvalys, Vaskai and Joniskelis on October 5, 1944, at Salociai

a week later. Placards were posted on homes and trees alongside the roads. However, the people ignored the posters. Thereafter the Russians posted second notices. Induction commission members were Russians exclusively. Mobilization of men born in 1908 through 1926 was decreed. None of the reporting men was released by the Russians: the men were immediately surrounded by Red Army guards and marched out. Men from Pasvalys and Joniskis were driven to Siauliai and assigned to the 16th Infantry Division. Men from Vaskai were driven to Panevezys and thence, two hours later, to Vilnius.

Few people answered the mobilization call in Joniskelis, Linkuva and Pasvalys. Thereafter all men were ordered to gather at Vaskai. Altogether 460 men were seized. When the interviewer asked why the young Lithuanians responded, the youths answered that every one was fearing the retaliation against the families, the old Russian "custom" of arresting members of the families of the "people's enemies" and burning down their farms. All of the mobilized men nurtured hopes of eventually deserting or surrendering at the front. After the first mobilization a terror of retaliation was instituted, and no one heeded the further summons to report for mobilization; soon the men took to the woods.

Guerrillas

No young men can be observed in Lithuania—on the roads, in the hamlets and towns. A visitor instinctively is seized with a feeling of eeriness on entering the town and meeting no people on the streets. Most of the able bodied men took to the woods, under the leadership of the former commissioned and non-commissioned army officers. The forests of northern Lithuania and Latvia are full of men in hiding. At the end of 1944 the guerillas still had ample supplies of rifles and cartridges, even some trucks. A great many guerillas were killed or seized by NKVD detachments during the systematic search of the forests around Pasvalys.

On November 20, 1944, Lithuanian guerillas, well armed, arrived aboard trucks in the town of Birzai. They quickly overcame the Red Army garrison and NKVD troops, seized the prison and liberated most of the prisoners. The leader spoke to the liberated prisoners. "Fellow Lithuanians! You are free! Whoever wants to—may join our ranks, those who do not want to—may go into hiding near your homes." Unfortunately, not all of the prisoners were liberated: the guerillas were not aware at first that, due to overcrowding of the prison, many others were locked in the cellars of the destroyed homes—when they learned of this fact, there was no time left:

Russian reinforcements were speeding from all sides. The prisoners left in the cellars were soon evacuated to Russia. NKVD does not hold the prisoners long: as soon as a prison is filled, it is emptied of the inmates by taking them to Russia and more room is left for new prisoners.

Economic Life

As soon as the Russians "liberated" the above mentioned townships, they posted notices to the effect that all the "landless and smallholders" will receive landgrants of 10 hectares (25 acres). Immature minors were urged to become members of the "land distributing commissions," and "the poor" were urged to submit petitions. In the township of Vaskai *not one petition* was filed. After a full month of publicizing, the Russians raised the ante to 20 hectares (49.5 acres). Still no one was tempted to ask for the land. When no one claimed any land of the larger farms, the latter were transformed into State Farms. Serfdom was at once reintroduced 80 years after its abolition: people were drafted, according to a certain quota system, to till the estates and to gather the harvest.

The Russians confiscated all landholdings and personal property of the people who had fled abroad or went into hiding. Leonas Narkevicius from Kaupai was in hiding; his farm was confiscated and his mother and sister evicted, and the women were made dependent for shelter and food upon the kind hearts of their Christian neighbors. Similarly was evicted the family—wife and children—of Gurliauskas, a farmer from Zizmiai. Occasionally the former owners of the confiscated estates are permitted to remain as hired hands and servants. All former guerillas and persons formerly active in political and social life are arrested and deported, unless they managed to go into hiding. In some cases the Russians left to the families of the deportees 5 hectares of land, one cow and one horse. However, all the better grade animals—cows, sheep and horses—were requisitioned and transported to Russia. In the Payslikis farmstead of 80 hectares only one horse, out of seven, was left on the farm, and all the sheep were driven away. Zenonas Meilunas of Burniskiai, owner of 138 hectares, was left with one horse out of the ten he owned; his wife and the latter's sister were left as servants, and the former domestic was appointed the manager in behalf of the state. Rancius, an illiterate farmhand, was appointed a commissar.

There is practically no labor manpower. For instance, only one aged man was left on the Bayslikis estate. People from Lithuania were driven to Bauska in Latvia to gather the harvest—these workmen re-

ported that they had met not a single Latvian in that part of the country.

The autumn of 1944 was rather mild. The people, mostly women, gathered the harvest, except that the rye grains were spilled in the fields, the harvesting being undertaken too late. The Russians at once imposed the various levies of requisitions, one after another. People were unable to comply with the quotas and had no time to do the harvesting. Threshing was not completed, when new levies were assessed; people borrowed the grains from neighbors to meet their quotas. As soon as this was done, the Russians levied new requisitions in seed grains. Thereafter no seeds were available, although the Russians were promising to deliver "from the magazines"; the magazines evaporated into Russia or for the Red Army on the move.

There was no fuel for motorized threshing: the people, hard pressed by perennial requisitions, had made "hootch" and beer out of the fuel oil to trade with the Red Army men. Thereafter, whenever any threshing was done, a complete set of "committeemen," made up of the communist youths from the cities, took up posts by the threshing machines and carefully recorded each bag of rye grain.

Up to one hundred carts daily were ordered from the township to carry the "liberators" on their many official trips. No horses and no hale men were left on the farms to attend to farming, and for this reason the fall sowing was poor—very little winter rye and wheat was planted. Sometimes the men with their carts remained "on duty" away from their homes for a month and longer. Some failed to return, some came home minus the carts and horses.

A kilogram of butter cost 300 rubles; lard 350-400 rubles per kilo; grain 800 rubles per centner. In the kolkhozes women were paid two rubles daily, and no men were available. The women whose husbands were mobilized were promised pensions—three rubles a month. . . . Nevertheless, until February 1945, no one had received any "pension".

Red Army and NKVD

Russian soldiery misbehaved from the very first day of the occupation. On the very first Sunday the Russian soldiers raped five women at Vaskai, and the crimes simultaneously were committed in the neighboring village. In the village of Salaikonys the NKVD troopers pressed a pistol to the chest of Vyskupaitis and demanded that he surrender his daughter to them; when their search for the girl failed, the troopers beat up the father. Vegys, in the village of Zvirbliniai, was beaten into unconsciousness when the soldiers failed to find his daughters.

The dairyman of Vaskai and his wife were on the way to visit his relatives when they met two mounted Red Army men. One of them seized the woman, the other began beating the husband with the horse-whip and chased him in this manner a full kilometer. On the next day the brokenhearted man found his raped wife in Salaikonys.

Red Army soldiers relieve all persons of their watches, radio receivers, better clothing and other valuable and non-valuable possessions. This organized robbery and looting seems to be a universal practice.

Lithuanians in the Red Army

Our informers were mobilized into the Red Army and assigned to 251st infantry regiment. They had no military training. Food was bad—occasionally the rations included some American conserved bullymeat and the men had a regular meal. In this so called "Lithuanian regiment" there was not one Lithuanian officer, and the orders were given in Russian exclusively. The regimental commander was named Polkovnik—probably an assumed name, inasmuch as this word means "Colonel" in Russian. Their company commander was named Tripolsky. "Politruk"—the political officer—was one of the two men connected with Lithuania: he was a Senior Lieutenant Vorobyov, a Russian, though a native of Lithuania, and a former short-term chairman of Vaskai Ispolkom. The other was a Lieut. Mariampolsky, a former wholesaler from Pasvalys. His son was made a Sergeant. This renegade capitalist-communist invariably inquired of the Lithuanian draftees whether they had served in the police or in the Lithuanian military formations. Those admitting police connections disappeared during the next night. One man admitted having enlisted in the Lithuanian formations which had been brutally "liquidated" in an armed clash with the Nazis in May 1944. This particular man fought at that time against the Gestapo troops, several of his friends had been killed and he had managed to escape in the chaos of fighting. He thought that this circumstance might presently help him—after all, he did fight the Germans. Nevertheless, he, too, disappeared with the others one night in custody of NKVD, and a few weeks later the mutilated bodies of these men were found rotting by the roadside.

Ravages of War

The old section of the city of Birzai, the ancient castle and center of the city are in ruins. Out of the four Catholic, Lutheran and Calvinist churches, only one (the Catholic one) is left standing, although much damaged. The college building, the new primary school and the new section of the city escaped the demolition. The environs are intact. Salociai town was burned down completely, there is no church left. The Germans dynamited the railroad station, the mill, the bridge across the Mazupe and the warehouses in Joniskelis. All warehouses were burned down in Linkuva. All the bridges across the Musa River near Salociai are down, dynamited. The Germans retreating toward Bauska in Latvia systematically burned down the farms. Gruziai church-town is intact. Svobiskis railroad bridge across the Musa is intact. Pasvalys is intact, except for some farms in the direction of Vaskai. The street leading to the railroad station in the city of Panevezys is destroyed. The retreating Germans burned down the railroad stations at Petrasiunai, Pakruojis and Sukionys.

Details

Religious services in the churches are tolerated. However, few people are in attendance—only the old men, women and children, inasmuch as there had been instances of NKVD raids looking for young men. The churches suffer much from the requisitions and tax levies assessed against them.

Not one of the persons deported to Russia has ever returned home. However, several letters were received—with no information, just apprizing that the writers were alive at the moment of writing. This is true of both the Lithuanian and Jewish elements deported or evacuated in 1941.

One communist veteran worker from Geduliai who had fled with the Russians in 1941 returned as a Red Army sergeant. This was his verdict of the Russian paradise: "It is a real hell, the prison of nations and humans, universal poverty, chaos in public order that is maintained by horsewhip alone. . . ."

One Red Army Lieutenant, born and raised in new Russia, after observing the ways of life in Lithuania, confessed: "Here the people are well fed, dressed, while in Russia there are only—slaves, and I most certainly will not go back to the fatherland."

FACTS AND DOCUMENTS

Pertaining to the Foreign Occupation of the Baltic States since 1940

BEGINNING with this issue of the LITHUANIAN BULLETIN, we will submit to our readers more salient facts and documents concerning the foreign occupation of the Baltic States. Particular attention will be given to facts pertaining to the treatment inflicted upon the population by successive occupants.

According to chronological order, we will first present documents connected with the initial Soviet occupation (June, 1940 - June, 1941), then, with the German occupation (June, 1941 - summer of 1944), and, finally, with the second Soviet occupation (beginning in the Summer of 1944).

Most of the available documents come from the archives, collected during the foreign occupation, by former members of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Red Cross, now safe in various Western European countries.

It may be of some significance to state that every successive occupation began with the dissolution of the National Red Cross, member of the International Red Cross.

A particularly rich collection of revealing documents have been collected in relation to the first Soviet occupation and the three long years of German occupation.

Owing to the rapidity of military developments, the occupants, in both cases, were unable to remove their secret archives, thus leaving many conspicuous documents (mentioned as confidential, secret, top secret, etc.) in the hands of Baltic patriots.

We will provide the English translation of those written in Russian, German, or any of the Baltic languages.

The first document which we are submitting to the attention of our readers on the following pages is a "Five-day Cumulative Summary No." which shows *who* in Lithuania should be considered as the "anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary element." A similar summary was established for Latvia and Estonia as well.

The summary, distributed for official use in the late spring of 1941, is divided into two main sections: SPO (Special Division) and KRO (Military Counter-Intelligence). This document bears all the marks of the Moscow printing offices.

In reading these documents, one cannot fail to get the impression that, in Soviet interpretation, practically *all politically and nationally-conscious elements were considered anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary*, and as such, *liable to elimination, be it by deportation, extermination (with or without trial), or isolation (prison or forced labor camps)*, with particular attention being given to liberal-minded peo-

ple. As can be ascertained from the classification, this includes members of the *Socialist-Revolutionary Party* (Essers), leading *Social-Democrats* (item 21, page 1), all *Zionists* (section 4, item a), and members of *Jewish Bund* (section 4, item b). What is more remarkable is that the Social-Revolutionaries and leading Social-Democrats are listed under the heading of "Former leading officials of state apparatus," which is entirely incorrect, as those two parties, at that particular time, were uncompromisingly opposed to the existing administration and, therefore, none of them was connected with the state apparatus. Obviously, it was the intention of Moscow to present them as "fascist" and to smear them in the eyes of smaller Soviet officials.

In a similar summary of another date (see page 24, "An Appeal to Fellow Americans on Behalf of the Baltic States by United Organizations of Americans of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Descent," published by the Lithuanian American Information Center), *all Catholic organizations and members of the liberal party (Populists)* are also placed in this class.

On the first page of the summary, items 24, 25, and 26, *estate landlords, sizable manufacturers, sizeable merchants and large houseowners* are listed. It might be of interest to *know* whom the Soviet considers as estate landlords, sizable manufacturers, merchants and large houseowners. The answer can be obtained from the set of Soviet decrees introduced in Lithuania upon the entry of the Red Army in 1940.

"Everyone is considered an estate landlord who owns more than 240 acres of land."

"Everyone is considered a sizable manufacturer who owns an industrial installation in which more than twenty hands are employed, or any installation with important equipment if served by more than ten hands. Those installations are subject to nationalization." (Decree of July 26, 1940).

"Everyone is considered a sizable merchant or large house-owner if annual turnover is more than 250,000 lits (approximately \$40,000) or property value is more than 250,000 lits."

Finally, a word about the second division of said summary—KRO, which means "Military Counter-Intelligence." Not only were scores of people supposedly connected with Germany considered anti-Soviet and counter-revolutionary, *but also* anyone employed by the United States Legation, or the United States Consulate, or in charge of representation on behalf of any United States business firm.

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

Пятидневная сводка № _____

По учету а/с и к/р элемента, согласно приказа НКГБ Лит. ССР № 0023 от 25 апреля

1941 года по _____ Уездному Отделу НКГБ Лит. ССР

за время с _____ по _____ 1941 г.

О К Р А С К И	Выявлено и взято на справочный учет	Установле- но на обслуж. территории	Заведено дел форм.	Заведено учет. дел	Заведено розыскных дел
1	2	3	4	5	6
I. По линии СПО:					
РАЗДЕЛ ПЕРВЫЙ.					
а) Былшие руководящие чиновники государ- ственного аппарата:					
1) Основные референты					
2) Директора департаментов и выше. .					
3) Уездные начальники					
4) Военные коменданты уездов					
5) Полицейские					
6) Жандармы					
7) Тюремщики (работавшие на админи- стративной работе)					
8) Прокуроры					
9) Члены военно-полевых судов					
10) . военных судов					
11) . Верховного Трибунала					
12) . апелляционных палат					
13) . окружных судов (принимавшие участие в разборе полит. дел). . . .					
14) Следователи по особо важным делам.					
15) Чиновники Жвальгибы (Саугумас) .					
16) . Криминальной полиции					
17) Офицеры 2-го (разведывательного) отдела Генштаба литовской армии .					
18) Активные участники банд ПЛЕХАВИ- ЧУСА, БЕРМОНТ-АВАЛОВА, ФОН- ДЕРГОЛЬЦА, выступавшие против Советов в Битве.					
19) Троцкисты					
20) Эсеры					
21) Руководящие социалдемократы . .					
22) Провокаторы охраны					
23) Семьи репрессированных					
24) Помещики					
25) Крупные фабриканты					
26) Крупные купцы и крупные домо- владельцы					

О К Р А С К И	Выявлено и взято на справочный учет	Установле- но на обслуж. территории	Заведено дел форм.	Заведено учет. дел	Заведено розыскных дел
1	2	3	4	5	6
<p align="center">РАЗДЕЛ ВТОРОЙ</p> <p align="center">ЛИТОВСКАЯ НАЦ. КОНТР-РЕВОЛЮЦИЯ</p> <p>а) Руководящий состав организации таутининков:</p> <p>1) Члены комитетов начиная с апилинкес до главного руководства</p> <p>2) Активисты-агитаторы</p> <p>3) Постоянные сотрудники политической печати таутининков</p> <p>б) Руководство организации „Яунойи Лиетува“:</p> <p>1) Начальники подразделений от апилинкес до членов верховного управления</p> <p>2) Активисты-агитаторы</p> <p>3) Постоянные ответственные сотрудники журналов „Яунойи Карта“ и „Академикас“</p> <p>в) Руководящий состав организации таутининков и вольдемаристов среди интеллигенции и учащейся молодежи:</p> <p>1) Нео-Литуания</p> <p>2) Филие-Литуания</p> <p>3) Гележинис вилкас</p> <p>4) Лиетува</p> <p>5) Вильния</p> <p>6) Ромува</p> <p>7) Плиенас</p> <p>8) Рамове (офицеры запаса)</p> <p>г) Руководство союза торговцев и промышленников (Верслининку Саюнга)</p> <p>д) Бывшее руководство рабочей палаты (Дарбо Румай)</p> <p>е) Члены центрального и уездного правлений Союза учителей имени БАСАНАВИЧУСА</p> <p>ж) Весь актив вольдемарской организации „Железный волк“, постоянные сотрудники журналов „Жигис“ и „Теву Жяме“</p> <p>з) Руководящий состав организации „Шаулю Саюнга“ от командиров взводов до начальника союза; члены Центрального правления, члены штаба Союза, актив советов подразделений-рот, дружин—как мужских, так и женских. Постоянные сотрудники журнала „Тримитас“.</p>					
<p align="center">РАЗДЕЛ ТРЕТИЙ.</p> <p align="center">ПОЛЬСКАЯ НАЦ.-КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦИЯ</p> <p>1) Руководящий состав партии „Лагерь национального объединения“ (ОЗОН) и постоянные сотрудники печатных органов; активные пилсудчики</p> <p>2) Руководящий состав партии „Беспартийный блок“ (ББ) и постоянные сотрудники печатных органов</p> <p>3) Руководящий состав „Польская партия Социалистична“ (ППС) и постоянные сотрудники печатных органов</p>					

О К Р А С К И		Выявлено и взято на справочный учет	Установле- но на обслуж. территории	Заведено дел форм.	Заведено учет. дел	Заведено розыскных дел
1	2	3	4	5	6	
4) Руководящий состав и актив „Партии народных демократов“ (ЭНДЕКИ) и постоянные сотрудники печатных органов						
5) Руководящий состав организации „Стшельцы“ и постоянные сотрудники печати						
6) Руководящий состав организации „Легионеры“ и постоянные сотрудники печати						
7) Руководящий состав организации „Харцество“ и постоянные сотрудники печати						
8) Весь состав „Польской организации войсковой“ (ПОВ)						
9) Актив молодежных буржуазно-националистических и фашистских организаций и постоянные сотрудники их печати						
10) Бывшие руководящие чиновники государственного аппарата						
11) Полицейские						
12) Служащие охраны						
13) Офицеры разведывательных и контр-разведывательных отделов						
14) Тюремщики						
15) Прокуроры и судебный состав, имевшие отношение к политическим делам						
16) Кадровые офицеры действительной службы и подофицеры действительной службы (продолжительное время служившие в армии сверхсрочно-кадровики)						
17) Осадники						
18) Офицеры и подофицеры КОП (Корпус пограничной охраны)						
РАЗДЕЛ ЧЕТВЕРТЫЙ.						
ЕВРЕЙСКАЯ НАЦ КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦИЯ						
а) Руководящий состав всех сионистских организаций и постоянные сотрудники печатных органов						
б) Руководящий состав „Бунда“ и постоянные сотрудники их печатных органов						
в) Руководящий состав еврейских военизированных и фашистских формаций:						
1) „Союз евреев участников боев за литовскую независимость“						
2) „Союз евреев Комбатантов“						
3) „Бэтар“, „Эл-Ал“						
4) Партия Ревизионистов						
РАЗДЕЛ ПЯТЫЙ.						
РУССКИЕ БЕЛО-ЭМИГРАНТСКИЕ ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ						
а) Все члены организации „Братско русской правды“ (БРП)						
б) Все члены организации „Российский фашистский союз“ (РФС)						
в) Все члены организации „Русский общевоинский союз“ (РОВС)						
г) Все члены молодежной организации „Национальный трудовой союз нового поколения“ (НТСНП)						
д) Все члены организации „Младоросы“						
е) Все офицеры белых армий, контр-разведок и карательных отрядов						

О К Р А С К И	Выявлено и взято на справочный учет	Установле- но на обслуж. территории	Заведено дел форм.	Заведено учет. дел	Заведено розыскных дел
1	2	3	4	5	6
РАЗДЕЛ ШЕСТОЙ.					
УКРАИНСКАЯ НАЦ. КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦИЯ					
а) Все члены „Объединение Украинских на- ционалистов“ (ОУН)					
б) Все члены „Украинского национал-демо- кратического объединения“ (УНДО)					
РАЗДЕЛ СЕДЬМОЙ.					
БЕЛОРУССКАЯ НАЦ. КОНТРРЕВОЛЮЦИЯ					
а) Руководящий состав всех националисти- ческих контр-революционных белорусских формирований и постоянные сотрудни- ки печатных органов					
II. По линии КРО:					
1) Слушающие иностранных посольств, постоянные представители иностранных фирм и контр-агенты					
а) Германии					
б) Италии					
в) Японии					
г) Англии					
д) Франции					
е) С. Ш. А.					
ж) Скандинавских стран					
з) Прибалтийских стран					
и) Ватикана					
к) Прочих гос.					
2) Немцы, записавшие на выезд в Герма- нию но впоследствии отказавшиеся выехать					
3) Члены „Культурфербанда“ и „Манншафт“					
4) Контрбандисты и шмуклера, связанные с Германией					
5) Лица проживающие в погранполосе, име- ющие родственников в Германии					
6) Семьи и ближайшие родственники лиц, бежавших за границу (изменики родины)					
7) Лица, пытавшиеся бежать из Литовской ССР в Германию под предлогом репатриации					
8) Прибывшие в Литовскую ССР из Герма- нии или через Германию репатрианты, в от- ношении которых имеются достаточные данные о связи их с Германской или другими иноразведками					

Начальник _____

194 года

гор. _____

Translation from Russian

Strictly Secret

Five - Day Cumulative Summary No. _____

Account of anti-soviet and counter-revolutionary element, in accordance with the order of NKGB of Lithuanian SSR No. 0023 of the 25th of April, 1941, of " _____ " County Branch of NKGB of Lith. SSR. for the period of " _____ " through " _____ 1941

CHARACTERISTICS	Investigated and taken into prosecuting account	Cleared on the covered territory	Instituted files forms	Instituted accounting files	Instituted cleared files
1	2	3	4	5	6
I. ON ACCOUNT OF SPO:					
FIRST SECTION					
a) Former leading officials of state apparatus:					
1) Basic referents					
2) Directors of departments and up					
3) County Chiefs					
4) County Military commandants					
5) Policemen					
6) Gendarmes					
7) Prison-keepers (who had done administrative work)					
8) Prosecutors					
9) Members of field military courts					
10) Members of Military Courts					
11) Members of the Supreme Tribunal					
12) Members of Appellate Courts					
13) Members of Circuit Courts (who had taken part in political trials)					
14) Investigators of especially important legal prosecutions					
15) Officials of Zvalgyba (Security)					
16) Officials of Criminal Police					
17) Officers of the 2nd (intelligence division of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army)					
18) Active participants of the bands of Plechavicius, Bermont-Avalov, Von Der Goltz, who had served against the Soviets in battle					
19) Trotskyists					
20) Essers					
21) Leading social-democrats					
22) Security provocateurs					
23) Families of the repressed					
24) Estate landlords					
25) Sizeable manufacturers					
26) Sizeable merchants and large house-owners					

CHARACTERISTICS	Investigated and taken into prosecuting account	Cleared on the covered territory	Instituted files forms	Instituted accounting files	Instituted cleared files
1	2	3	4	5	6
SECOND SECTION LITHUANIAN NATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION					
a) Leadership personnel of the organization of tautininki:					
1) Members of committees starting with apylinkės (districts) to chief leadership					
2) Activists-agitators					
3) Regular contributors to political press of tautininki					
b) Leadership of the organization "Jaunoji Lietuva":					
1) Chiefs of subdivisions from apylinkės (districts) to members of the supreme board					
2) Activists-agitators					
3) Regular responsible contributors to magazines "Jaunoji Karta" and "Akademikas"					
v) Leadership personnel of the organization of tautininki and voldemarists among the intelligentsia and student youths:					
1) Neo-Lituania					
2) Filiae-Lituaniae					
3) Geležinis Vilkas (The Iron Wolf)					
4) Lietuva					
5) Vilnija					
6) Romuva					
7) Plienas					
8) Ramovė (reserve officers)					
g) Leadership personnel of the association of merchants and industrialists (Verslininkų Sąjunga)					
d) Former leadership of the Chamber of Labor (Darbo Rūmai)					
e) Members of the central and county committees of the association of teachers named after BASANAVICIUS					
zh) All active members of the voldemartist organization "The Iron Wolf", regular contributors to magazines "Zygis" and "Tėvų Žemė"					
z) Leadership personnel of the organization "Saulių Sąjunga" (Riflemen's Association) beginning with platoon leaders and ending with supreme commander; members of the supreme board; members of the staff, active members of the councils of subdivisions—companies, complements—both male and female. Regular contributors to the magazine "Trimitas"					
THIRD SECTION POLISH NATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION					
1) Leadership personnel of the party of "National Union Camp" (OZON) and regular contributors to press organs; active pilsudskites					
2) Leadership personnel of the party of "Non-partisan Bloc" (BB) and regular contributors of press organs					
3) Leadership personnel of the "Polish Socialist Party" (PPS) and regular contributors to press organs					

CHARACTERISTICS	Investigated and taken into prosecuting account	Cleared on the covered territory	Instituted files forms	Instituted accounting files	Instituted cleared files
1	2	3	4	5	6
4) Leadership personnel and all active members of the "Party of National Democrats" (ENDEKI) and regular contributors to press organs					
5) Leadership personnel of the organization of "Strzelcy" (Riflemen) and regular contributors to the press					
6) Leadership personnel of the organization of "Legionaries" and regular contributors to the press					
7) Leadership personnel of the organization of "Harcerstwo" (Boy Scouts) and regular contributors to the press					
8) All personnel of the "Polish military organization" (POW)					
9) Active members of bourgeois-nationalistic and fascist organizations of youth and regular contributors to their press					
10) Former leading officials of state apparatus					
11) Policemen					
12) Employees of security police					
13) Officers of intelligence and counter-intelligence branches					
14) Prison-keepers					
15) Prosecutors and judicial personnel who had had relations with political trials					
16) Cadre officers of active service and non-commissioned officers of active service (who had served a long time in the army as superterm cadre members)					
17) Settlers					
18) Officers and non-commissioned officers of KOP (Frontier Guard Corps)					
FOURTH SECTION					
JEWISH NATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION					
a) Leadership personnel of all Zionist organizations and regular contributors to the press organs					
b) Leadership personnel of the "Bund" and regular contributors of their press					
v) Leadership personnel of Jewish militarized and fascist formations:					
1) "Association of the Jews who had battled for the Lithuanian Independence"					
2) "Association of Jewish Combatants" ..					
3) "Betar", "El-Al"					
4) Revisionists Party					
FIFTH SECTION					
RUSSIAN WHITE-EMIGREE FORMATIONS					
a) All members of the organization of "Fraternal Russian Truth" (BRP)					
b) All members of the organization of "Russian Fascists Association" (RFS)					
v) All members of the organization "General Association of Soldiers" (ROVS)					
g) All members of the organization of youths "National Labor Association of the New Generation" (NTSNP)					
d) All members of the organization of "Mladorosz" (Young Russians)					
e) All officers of the white armies, counter-intelligence and punitive detachments					

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CHARACTERISTICS	Investigated and taken into prosecuting account	Cleared on the covered territory	Instituted files forms	In ac
1	2	3	4	5
SIXTH SECTION UKRAINIAN NATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION a) All members of the "Association of Ukrainian Nationalists" (OUN) b) All members of the "Ukrainian National-Democratic Association" (UNDO) SEVENTH SECTION WHITE RUTHENE NATIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION a) All leadership personnel of all nationalistic counter-revolutionary White Ruthene formations and regular contributors to their press organs II. ON ACCOUNT OF KRO: 1) Employees of foreign legations, permanent representatives of foreign firms and counter agents of: a) Germany b) Italy v) Japan g) England d) France e) U. S. A. zh) Scandinavian countries z) Baltic Countries i) Vatican k) other countries 2) Germans who had registered for departure to Germany and later refused to depart 3) Members of "Kulturverband" and "Mannschaft" 4) Contrabandists and smugglers having connections with Germany 5) Persons residing in the frontier zone who have relatives in Germany 6) Families and nearest relatives of persons who had fled abroad (traitors of the country) 7) Persons who had attempted to flee from the Lithuanian SSR to Germany under an excuse of repatriation 8) Repatriates arriving in the Lithuanian SSR from Germany				

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