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... Russia without any prejudice recognizes the self-rule and independence of the State of Lithuania with all the juridical consequences ... and for all times renounces with good will all the sovereignty rights of Russia, which it has had in regard to the Lithuanian nation or territory.

Peace Treaty with Russia
Moscow, July 12, 1920

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill:

1. Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Atlantic Charter
August 14, 1941

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
By Constantine R. Jurgela, LL.B., LL.M.

Diplomatic Literature

There is some evidence pointing to the fact that ancient Lithuanians had devised their own runic alphabet. Unfortunately, the few runic inscriptions reported in the sources have not been deciphered thus far.

Lithuania owed its earliest literature to Christianity which was introduced in the country in 1250, when King Mindaugas, "*Rex Lethoviae*," with his entourage and some 600 noblemen embraced Catholicism. Even though the rest of the country had not accepted Christianity and for another century and a half waged a bitter defensive war against the crusading Teutonic Knights, Catholic churches were built in Vilnius, Lyda and elsewhere and remained unmolested. Catholic monks—Franciscans, Dominicans, Bernardines—continued to settle in the country where they enjoyed full freedom of worship and catechization. There were a few Lithuanians among them, including abbots.

However, the Lithuanians were acquainted earlier with Eastern Christianity from its first arrival among the neighboring Slavic-Ruthene principalities. The easternmost Lithuanian tribe of Galindians (*Golyad*) succumbed to Slavic conquest by the mid-twelfth century, and central Lithuanian tribes engaged in wars with their Orthodox Krivichian and Ukrainian neighbors. Because of these contacts, religious Christian terms for holidays, churches etc. are of ancient Slavonic origin—terms largely forgotten in the modern Ukrainian, White Ruthene and Russian languages.




First printed Lithuanian book—the Lutheran Catechism by Martynas Mažvydas (Königsberg 1547).

Nevertheless, with the exception of some princes who were deputized to govern Ruthene territories, the Lithuanians were totally unresponsive to Orthodoxy. Orthodox chapels were built for the entourage of the Ruthene Christian spouses of Kings Gediminas and Algirdas, and for the convenience of the Ruthene merchants, but there were no native Lithuanian converts. A few people accepted Orthodoxy during the 120-year Muscovite rule (1795-1915) for the purely selfish consideration of careers in Russia, but, *to this date, there is no indigenous Lithuanian Orthodox population.*

The Lithuanian State Chancery had employed Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem secretaries and scribes well versed in the contemporary "literary" languages. The first Lithuanian-Volynian peace pact of record (1219) was written in Church Slavonic. Royal correspondence with the Western courts and the Teutonic Order was conducted in Latin and German, with the Patriarchate of Constantinople in classic Greek, and with the Tatar and Turkish empires in Arabic.

The rulers themselves became linguists. King Gediminas understood the Ruthene dialect but dictated his letters in Lithuanian. Kings Kęstutis and Algirdas spoke German, Polish, Ruthene, and understood Latin. It is said that Algirdas read Greek Scriptures. Grand Duke Vytautas, in addition to his mastery of these tongues, could also converse in the Tatar.

The first legal writs (*Privilegia*), the constitutional bases of law for Lithuania Proper, were granted by



King Jogaila in Latin (1387). The first political pamphlet, *Origo regis Jagello et Witholdi Ducum Lithuanie* was written in Latin. It was based on an earlier complaint in German, *Dis ist Witoldes Sache*, as well as a companion *Summarium von Jagel und Wytaut*.

The Chancery

Since then, however, the Grand Ducal Chancery published its edicts and corresponded with the local authorities in Church Slavonic. Latin translations were simultaneously made of the more important writs.

There were two principal reasons for this tendency. Nearly one half of the population of the Grand Duchy was Ruthenian and scribes were readily available among the Orthodox clergy. This practical consideration was also influenced by the desire to stress the distinctive character of Lithuania in its diplomatic intercourse with Poland, where Latin exclusively was used for state affairs.

The Church Slavonic was as "dead" as Latin and in no way resembled the contemporary dialects of the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian subjects of Lithuania. This dead language was likewise employed in state affairs of Slavic Muscovy, Serbia, and non-Slavic Moldavia and Valachia. Eventually it succumbed to local influences. By the middle of the 17th century the "*Ruski yezyk*" of the Lithuanian Chancery was called "*Lithuanian*" in Moscow. Some 200 Lithuanian words are found in the First Lithuanian Statute (1529), where no comparable Slavic terms were available. Furthermore, Polish influences steadily gained due to the predominance of the Catholic clergy of Polish origin.

The first chronicles and histories of Lithuania, written from a Lithuanian point of view, as well as the legal writs and codes (the *Sudebnik* of 1468-1492, the First Lithuanian Statute of 1529) were written in this "*Ruski*" language.

Literature in Latin

Since the middle of the 15th century, when first Lithuanian graduates returned from foreign universities (Poland, Bohemia, Germany, Holland, France, Switzerland, Italy and Austria), Latin became the principal literary language as distinguished from the State Chancery records.

Attracted by the similarity of a great many Lithuanian and Latin words and phrases, educated Lithuanians accepted the notion, first developed during the Vitoldian reign, of their alleged descent from the Romans. In that age, centuries prior to the rise of the comparative study of the languages, these noblemen preferred to "revert to the original language of their ancestors," rather than use "the adulterated vernacular." Poems and books were written in Latin. More Latin schools were demanded. Chronicles and legal codes were translated into Latin.

Alongside this "Latin" ardor, the Polonization was gaining in cultural life. Since 1385, when King Jogaila ascended the throne of Poland, Lithuanian statecraft was closely interrelated with that of Poland. The

first Bishop of Vilnius, Andrew Basil Jastrzębiec, was a native of Poland, although he spoke Lithuanian fluently since he had resided in Vilnius during the reign of Algirdas. Most of the clergymen were Poles who neglected to learn the language of their flock — the difficult and archaic Lithuanian. No steps were taken to train native Lithuanians for the priesthood, and the pastoral mission suffered. Bishops, on the other hand, were ranking Senators and, according to constitutional law, had to be Lithuanians by origin and speech. However, bishops were royal nominees and were not necessarily trained clerics.

Progressive Polonization

Linguistic conflicts arose early. Chancellor Albert Goštautas in 1524 evicted some Polish friars for their refusal to learn Lithuanian and threatened to expel other Polish clergymen. He warned that the Polish language and customs may be excellent for Poland, but they must not encroach upon the Lithuanian language and customs.

King Sigismundus II was obliged to intervene twice in Rome, requesting that the Papal See investigate the complaints of the Lithuanian friars of the Order of Franciscans-Observants. He wrote that "the Lithuanians cannot tolerate being despised in their own country and having their valuables taken abroad by the Poles. . . . They greatly oppose subrogation to the Poles who despise them" (1 August 1528). A year later (22 August 1529) he wrote again that Lithuania was an independent country under his scepter, united with Poland by dynastic ties conferred unto the Polish realm by Lithuania. He noted that dissension among the clergy was undesirable, "particularly now," in the period of the aggressive Reformation Movement.

The Lithuanians were coming into frequent contacts with the Poles not only in church affairs but in diplomatic missions. The Poles demanded "execution" of the earlier "union writs" and bitterly assailed Lithuania and its customs.

The Rev. Orzechowski, prolific father of Polish journalism, published "*Quincunx*". After citing the Scriptural references to "the Kingdom of Heaven" and "the Principality of Hell," he noted that Poland was a Kingdom and Lithuania a principality — and drew appropriate conclusions. In Poland rulers were elective officeholders, but in Lithuania they were born into the office and enjoyed hereditary succession rights — which he termed slavery. Furthermore, he deemed that the lack of political emancipation of the caste of nobility, not yet enjoying as broad powers as in Poland, was another evidence of slavery, "as among the heathens."

This argument necessitated reply in a language understood by the adversaries. A group of scholars under Augustinus Rotundus, Mayor of Vilnius, published "*Lithuanian's Conversation with a Pole*." Citing political philosophy of Aristotle and others, and examples of history and administration in other Christian

Sooner or later, the world will have to take note of their struggle and give it the support it deserves."

Preparations for War

The Russians are rushing their preparations for an anticipated war. The Lithuanians are praying for a war to come sooner—war holds no terror for people with no future in the present so-called "peace of enslavement." The Russians themselves, even the drunken MVD-MGB troopers, believe that war is imminent.

The vast network of airfields, greatly expanded by the Germans, is being enlarged in Lithuania. New large airfields are under construction—in the area of Šiauliai, the large railroad "knot" junction, near Ežerėnai on the Latvian frontier, and near Klaipėda on the coast. Construction work is done mostly by Mongols uprooted from Central Asia. These Mongols are kind souls but they walk in filthy rags. In some places, German prisoners of war are employed in construction work.

All fishing fleets of the Baltic States were liquidated in summer. Tens of thousands of Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian fishermen with their families and some of the modern boats were "voluntarily" moved from "the overpopulated Baltic republics" to the Sea of Okhotsk in the Far East. The Russians gave as the reason "absence of fish" in the Gulf of Riga and Estonian coastal waters. The fishing industry of all three Baltic States was concentrated in the port of Klaipėda in Lithuania. Fishing is restricted to the Kuršių Marės (Kurisches Haff bay). Occasionally, however, 40 former German trawlers of about 200 tons each are taken offshore into the Baltic Sea, under a heavy escort of naval craft, speedboats and scouting planes. The recently escaped Estonians report that as of December 1947 not more than 10% of the fishing personnel are Balts.

Having evicted all native fishermen from their own fishing waters and cleared a 5-kilometer coastal zone of all native civilians, the Russians began erecting vast fortifications. An experimental station for guided missiles was installed on the Saaremaa Island, under the direction of captured German rocket specialists. Another station is operated at Petrozavodsk in Karelia, and a third station was recently reported in operation on the Estonian mainland. Subterranean munitions dumps, oil storage tanks and barracks are erected on the main islands of Saaremaa (Oesel) and Hiiumaa (Dagoe). Underground dumps and barracks are under construction, in limestone, at Paldiski ("The Baltic Port") and Pärnu in Estonia. Paldiski is presently the second largest populated point of Estonia—inhabited by military and naval personnel exclusively. German and "English PWs"—the latter are the Russians from the former Nazi units of Gen. Vlasov—are employed for construction work at Paldiski. American bulldozers and cranes are used—the lend-lease and UNRRA gifts of American taxpayers.

A large submarine base is being completed at Padasaare in Estonia. Another submarine base was reactivated at Pillau in East Prussia, just off Königsberg,

and the Latvian port of Liepaja was transformed into a large naval base for surface craft. A modern motor speedway is under construction—passing from Leninograd and Pskov to East Prussia. Because of the naval bases at Liepaja and Pillau codfishing is restricted to the area of Klaipėda, which lies between the two ports.

The coastal area of Lithuania, the wide belt from Šventoji on the Latvian frontier, through Darbėnai, Palanga, Klaipėda and Pagėgiai on the Nemunas River, is settled almost exclusively by the Russians.

The first Russian settlers were brought there by the retreating Nazis in 1944. Masses of Russians with their cows and goats were forcibly driven from the Leninograd area and White Ruthenia. German Commissar Rikus settled these Russians at Palanga. These "burlaks" are now in the seats of power. They live in the "luxurious" homes of the fishermen, having murdered the natives who attempted to object.

Letters received recently in Sweden disclosed the present whereabouts of some of the former fishermen. "... Ivan buried Jonas Mukšas when the Russians returned. ... Kuršys, the elder Embrektas of Butingė, Duršys, Mikelis from Šventoji and numerous others are resting underground, though they had entertained different wishes. ... There is no need to rush home, as no one is expecting you, you wouldn't recognize your former home. ... A great many of our people moved to the Klaipėda District to reconstruct the deserted farms of the Prussians. ... We managed to save a hundredweight of potatoes and to trade our nets for an old nag—we may manage to plant some. ..."

Eradication of Church Hierarchy

In May 1947 Lithuania still had three surviving bishops, out of eleven. The Most Rev. Mečys Reinys, Archbishop of Vilnius, disappeared in June, soon after his alleged "interview" with the Soviet *Tass* press agency. The nonagenarian, the Most Rev. Antanas Karosas, Bishop of Seinai and Vilkaviškis, died at Marijampolė on 7 July 1947. His burial on 11 July disclosed the present status of the Church Hierarchy of Lithuania: *only one Bishop remains*. The funeral was attended by the Most Rev. Kazys Paltarokas, Bishop of Panevėžys, and "Acting Administrators"—Canon Stankevičius of Kaunas Archdiocese, Canon Juodaitis of Telšiai Bishopric, and Monsignor Sužiedėlis of Kaišiadorys Diocese. Not one Catholic priest survives in the Klaipėda District.

The Lithuanians were pleased to learn that several Jews had volunteered—in vain—to testify in behalf of Bishop Borisevičius of Telšiai. They reminded the Red occupant of the frequent protests by Bishop Borisevičius addressed to the Nazis and publicized in pastoral letters read in all of the churches, in behalf of his Jewish fellow men. The bishop saved many Jews who had sought refuge at his residence, and he directed other lifesaving missions of his clergy. Nevertheless, the bishop was doomed in a secret trial held at the Lukiškės Prison in Vilnius: independent humanitarian actions not directly authorized by the

Communist Party constitute a crime against the Nazis' Russian partners.

Lithuanians are horrified that not a single protest was raised regarding the murders and arrests of the Lithuanian bishops and the cruel mass deportations. They listened to the BBC, the Voice of America and the Vatican radio broadcasts which condemned the farcical trial of Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia, but no mention was made anywhere of the crucifixion of the Lithuanian people.

The Persecution of the Clergy

A great many churches in Russian-inhabited Vilnius, Kaunas, and in the provinces are now without pastors. The pastors of five out of twelve parishes of Kaunas were deported. Some churches are boarded up. Bishop Padolskis, formerly of the Vilkauskis Diocese, but now in exile, reports that out of 1,500 priests in Lithuania before the Russian occupation only 700 remain.

In the summer of 1947 the Russians began a vilification campaign against the monasteries. Priests and nuns were already removed from all educational institutions and orphanages. At present the Soviets attempt to "prove" that the monasteries are "bandit nests" and their inmates are "murderers." The campaign was inaugurated by "*Pravda*" (*Tiesa*) which published the following article by a native renegade, Jonas Šimkus, in the issue of 6 July 1947.

"The (Franciscan) monastery of Kretinga was turned into a central hiding place and organizing nest of Lithuanian fascist bandits. (Abbot) Čepulis and his subordinates continued, as in the past, with pious mien, to urge the love of one's neighbors, to aid the suffering. Secretly, however, they sheltered class outlaws in their underground cells and organized bandit gangs to murder their neighbors, to terrorize and destroy Soviet settlers.

"Čepulis, as the chief of all Franciscans, had given instructions to his subordinates to organize an anti-Soviet underground, to consecrate the banners and weapons of the bandits, to bless the murders of innocent people by the bandits. By order of Čepulis, the most important leaders of the underground were sheltered in the Franciscan monastery at Kaunas. Large gangs of the bandits were sheltered at night in the Franciscan monastery in Nėmaniūnai, also at the direction of Čepulis, and the gangsters were sworn in to murder the Soviet people."

Šimkus, of course, did not dwell on the fate of Abbot Čepulis. He simply used the past tense reporting about the Abbot and his several successors. He continued:

"Patricius Puodžiūnas, replacing Čepulis, behaved exactly as his predecessor had. Puodžiūnas not only sheltered the bandit leaders and their agents in the monastery but on the pretext of making 'inspection trips' and organizing religious retreats, he traveled to the bandits, gave sermons and confirmed the lists of people slated to be murdered.

"Father Pius was also responsible for the murder of many innocent people, new settlers, Soviet officials.

"Friar Jurgis Andraitis, the new chief of the monastery at Kretinga, was also a bandit and an enemy of the people. Andraitis, who replaced Father Pius, sheltered the bandits, their arms, and even the military uniforms for bandits' use. Andraitis converted not only the monastery but the church edifice into a haven to mask his black deeds. Andraitis instructed the bandits to murder the new settlers who had received land-grants from the Soviet government."

In this manner, comrade Šimkus disclosed that the "bandits" were members of the patriotic underground resistance movement and of the military formations which prevented, thus far, the Russian colonization of rural areas. Šimkus had personally accompanied the NKVD-NKGB squads during the horrible mass man-hunts of 14-21 June 1941, and he identified the people personally known to him for deportation to Siberia. It seems, however, that his public admission of the existence of the patriotic liberation movement and of the attempted colonization of Lithuania by the Russians, will bring its own retribution.

The Budget of a Police State

The British Continental News Service recently analyzed the budgetary figures of the pre-war Lithuanian state and the post-war Soviet satrapy. The analysis erred in one respect: the agency stated that the Lithuanian Litas currency had been equalized with the Russian ruble. The fact is, however, that 5 rubles were paid for one Litas in foreign exchange markets prior to the occupation of the country; in 1940 the Russians arbitrarily fixed the rate of 90 kopeks for a Litas, and in this manner robbed the people of Lithuania of 82% of their savings.

The press agency compared the budgetary figures of 1937 with those of the fiscal year 1946-1947.

"Before the war, Lithuanian exports always exceeded imports, enabling that country to build up a gold and currency reserve which was supplemented by relatively large sums received annually from the Lithuanian immigration in America (from 1934 to 1939 an average of between 30 and 40,000,000 lits a year was sent back to the 'old country'). The lit had a 72% gold backing.* Exports for the year 1937 included 80,000,000 eggs (chiefly to Great Britain and Germany) and over 500,000 kilos of butter.**

"Lithuania now exports exclusively to the USSR. In 1946, notwithstanding the devastation of war and two foreign occupations, and despite the dislocation resulting from the switch-over to Soviet agricultural economy, 64,500,000 eggs and 379,000 kilos of butter from Lithuanian farms were sent to Russia proper.

"The Lithuanian budget, which in 1937 amounted

*One Litas amounted to \$0.10 in gold prior to devaluation of the American dollar in 1933. Thereafter, 6 Litas was paid for \$1.00. — *Lithuanian Bulletin*.

**16,368 tons of butter was exported in 1939 — *Lithuanian Bulletin*.

to 303,000,000 lits, was nearly 800,000,000 rubles for the financial year 1946/7. . . . The budget for the same year provided 62,000,000 rubles for education and 310,000,000 for the Security forces, compared with 45,000,000 lits for education and 28,000,000 lits for the Ministry of the Interior in 1937 (when the Ministry controlled uniformed and plain clothes police forces numbering about 3,500 men in all).

"Before the War, Lithuania possessed an army of about 30,000 men and six air squadrons. Today, Lithuanian regiments are stationed at Nikolayevsk (on the Sea of Okhotsk), Igarka (on the Arctic Ocean), in the Soviet-occupied Zone of Korea and on the island of Sakhalin. In Lithuania itself there are five mixed divisions from Siberia and Uzbekistan and strong air formations which do not contain a single Lithuanian. In 1946, there were approximately 75,000 men in the special M.G.B. (Security) forces and the uniformed and plain-clothes militia. One of the reasons for the maintenance of this huge police force in a country which, according to Soviet statistics, has a population of only 2,800,000, is that Lithuania is a Soviet frontier Republic and one of the main transit centres for Red Army demobilization. Early this year (1947) the Security forces in Lithuania were supplemented by five special M.G.B. air squadrons.

"Between the two World Wars, Lithuania was one of the Comintern centres for Northern Europe, but today no important positions in Lithuania are occupied by Lithuanian Communists, though many of them worked for the 'painless' incorporation of their country into the USSR. In Wilno, Kaunas and Memel, the great majority of responsible posts in the central administration, the security services and the army are occupied by Russians. Lithuanian towns are now practically devoid of Jews—those who survived the German occupation having been sent to the Far East. Only parts of the countryside which offered no resistance to the new regime have retained their Lithuanian character. The whole area between Šiauliai and East Prussia has been 'de-Lithuanianized'. The sovkhoses in that region, numbering about 60, are worked by so-called 'military settlers,' mostly from Russia proper and Siberia."

The British analysis of the budgetary figures and other symptomatic factors is quite correct. It deserves some attention: in a "liberated" country which had "voluntarily joined the Soviet Union," the Russians need 310 million rubles for the police forces, not counting the regular armed forces, and 62 million rubles for education . . . once 3,500 men were sufficient to police the country: now hundreds of thousands are needed. . . .

Genocide

The Russians are not wasting these huge appropriations. Their expensive "security" forces are busy with the extermination of the aboriginal inhabitants whose ancestors had inhabited that country thousands of years prior to the arrival of the first Slavic nomads in north-eastern Europe.

The much publicized "abolition of death penalty" does not preclude the indiscriminate shooting of people by way of reprisals—a method first introduced by the Nazis. At Kaltinėnai the Russians recently executed 16 persons, including a 12 year old child, at Kražiai 22 people, at Laukuva 17 persons. There is a difference, however, between the Nazi and MVD systems: the Germans arbitrarily selected the prescribed number of hostages and executed them in mass shootings; the Russians subject the victims to refined tortures prior to execution. They submerge them in icy and boiling water; they beat them systematically into unconsciousness and repeatedly revive the victims; they suspend them by feet or arms from a wall while "questioning"; they plunge needles under the nails, remove the skin from hands or faces, burn the victims over the fire—the last act of extinguishing life is a merciful relief.

In addition to outright murders, the Russians employ other methods of genocide.

(1) *Mass Deportations*.—2,000 to 3,000 people are deported monthly. The prisoners are brought to Kaunas and Vilnius where secret "trials" are held. When the long columns of prisoners are driven on foot, people are ordered to clear the streets and traffic is diverted.

Most of the deportees are charged with the "crime" of being unable to meet the heavy grain and produce delivery quotas imposed on them. There are only two "corrective labor camps" in the country—at Praviėniškis (the scene of the massacre of 1941) and Kretinga. These camps house only those charged with minor infractions, those sentenced to a few weeks or months. These people afterward are moved to East Prussia where they are settled among the Russian colonists in sovkhoses.

The next largest contingent of deportees is made up of people charged with "anti-Soviet sympathies." When a political suspect is detained, the Russians station two or three armed guards in his residence for a week or two and they detain all comers for deportation: visits to a politically suspect person provide the "evidence" of one's connections. Afterward guards are placed in the homes of the detained callers, and persons calling on the latter are netted for exile. In this manner the list of victims is endlessly multiplied and enlarged. This method was recently introduced in Poland where the sympathizers of the Mikołajczyk's peasant party are collared in this manner.

The Soviets plan the total physical destruction of Lithuania's educated classes. In addition thereto, family life is deliberately disrupted and the right of procreation is taken away from the people: families are split up, male prisoners are deliberately debilitated, female prisoners are raped and infected, children are taken into Soviet orphanages in Russia.

(2) *Military Service*.—Men of military age are continually drafted in graduated classes. They are assigned to Russian units and to so-called "Lithuanian Regiments" where most of the troops are Russians.

The draftees are transported "for training" to the Far East, and few have been released thus far. About 40% of the draftees were collared. It may be recalled that about 20,000 Lithuanian soldiers died in the forcing of the Oder River fortifications and in the capture of Königsberg—untrained recruits officered by Russians were deliberately carnaged.

(3) *Technical Training*.—The so-called "technical labor duty" was introduced for children of the 12-15 year age. Farm boys, "sons of the kulaks," are victims of this servitude. "Labor reserve schools" claim town and city children for training in railroad and industrial work. The children are officially described as "volunteers"—the same as the Baltic fishermen who were moved to the Far East. Nevertheless, these "volunteers" are not entitled to select the place of service or to retire from their "voluntary" servitude. Of course, devastated Lithuania needs no assistance and the youthful slaves are dispatched "to reconstruct sister republics" somewhere deep in Russia.

The puppet "president" Justas Paleckis recently announced that 30,000 "specialists" were to be trained in this manner according to the five-year plan imposed by the Kremlin. In 1947 in this manner about 7,500 young boys were abducted to Russia—as Paleckis admitted in his book: *"Ką davė Tarybų Valdžia Lietuvos darbo žmonėms"* (What the Soviet Government had given the working people of Lithuania), Vilnius 1947, p. 37.

(4) *Labor Duty*.—The Soviets are not satisfied with the kidnapping of Lithuanian children: men up to the age of 64 years and women to the age of 55 are repeatedly drafted for slave labor by so-called "labor mobilization" decrees.

The machinery is quite simple. A Ministry of the USSR in charge of some specific industry discovers a shortage of workers somewhere in Russia. Orders are then issued from Moscow to respective "Union Republics" to produce a specified number of workers for the "sister republic" in question. The Baltic States being frontier communities where "anti-social and anti-Soviet" feelings are still intense, Moscow deems most convenient to demand manpower quotas from these victimized countries.

In Lithuania, the first lend-lease human materiel to be drafted for slave labor in the unwanted "sister republics" were people not connected with the critical skilled trades. Of course, most of that "non-essential" manpower reserve was found on the farms. Furthermore, independent smallholders—"the kulaks"—must be eliminated at any rate; consequently, Lithuanian farmers are expendable from the point of view of the alien invader.

When the younger people went into hiding in cities or enlisted with the guerrillas, the Russians began systematic manhunts in the cities. People were seized in motion picture houses and restaurants, and were packed on the trains.

Finally, government and industrial offices were scoured and young clerks were deported as "volun-

teers." Regardless of the much advertised skilled manpower shortage in Russia, skilled and unskilled Russian laborers are continually imported to Lithuania—thus creating additional demands for manpower at the expense of Lithuania.

(5) *"Repatriation" of Poles*.—Large gaps in the indigenous population were caused by the so-called "repatriation" to Poland of people, who, during the past millennium, had been rooted in the Lithuanian soil and had no connections with Poland.

Soviet Poland and Soviet Lithuania signed a treaty in 1944 providing for the exchange of populations. This system of bartering the population was intensively pushed by the invader in 1945. At first, the Polish speaking people considered it their duty to remain in Lithuania. Only persons deemed useful and necessary for specific tasks in Poland, where there is a genuine shortage of professionals and skilled laborers, were to leave for Poland in accordance with the secret instructions elaborated by the Polish underground. However, when terror was intensified in Lithuania, everyone tried to become a "Pole" in order to escape into comparative liberty in Poland. Pure-blooded Lithuanians hastened to claim Polish ancestry, married Polish girls or boys, and forged their papers.

The authorities announced that 83,000 people were "repatriated." In fact, however, more than 150,000 people were uprooted—mostly to Russia, due to the "unmasking" of either Lithuanian or White Ruthene nationality of the registrants for "repatriation" to Poland.

(6) *Liquidation of Jews*.—The Nazis had either murdered or deported to other European countries most of the 185,000 Jews of Lithuania (including the Vilnius area). About 22,000 Jews were reported still in the country in 1946, and a few of the thousands of Jews deported to Russia in 1941 were permitted to return. For a while, a peace with Zionism was advertised. During 1947, however, some Jews escaped to Poland and westward, some were "repatriated" to the Far East by the Russians, and the number of Jews still in the country cannot be definitely verified at the moment. One of the recent escapees stated that most of the Jews now in Lithuania do not understand the Lithuanian language.

Altogether, since 1940, Lithuania lost between 650,000 and 750,000 people—roughly one-fourth of the original population. The Russian genocidal practices continue with no end in sight.

Russian Colonization

Russia is loudly espousing self-determination for "non-selfgoverning colonial peoples" in the United Nations councils. Russian spokesmen also condemn the "colonialism" and "imperialism" of the British and Americans. At the same time, Russia is busy erecting her own colonial empire.

During the first Soviet occupation 1940-1941, about 20,000 Russian "Kulturtraegers" had been brought to Lithuania, in addition to hundreds of thousands of

Russian and Asiatic troops. These settlers were "kolkhoz specialists" who were to transform the Lithuanian private enterprise economy into a Soviet-patterned system. Most of these would-be masters fled with the retreating Red Army in 1941.

When the Russians again invaded the country in 1944, colonization was intensified. Of the 180 deputies of the "Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR," one-third are non-resident aliens—including Stalin "The Sun" and his lesser luminaries, Molotov, Zhdanov, Suslov, etc. Of the 32 "Ministers," 18 are Russian aliens and every "minister" is controlled by his Russian "deputies" who transact all business for the "ministers." The Chairman of the "Lithuanian" Communist Party (which numbered 1,500 members in 1941, in a country with a population of 3,300,000) is one Scherbakov, an alien. Its first secretary is a native renegade, Antanas Sniečkus, whose mother fled to Western Germany and stubbornly refused* to come home to bask in the glory of her son's treason. The second and third secretaries of the Party are Russian aliens. Lithuanian personnel retained some influence only in the Ministry of Public Instruction.

Mass colonization of the Russians began simultaneously with the "repatriation" of Poles to Poland. Within a single year, 60,000 Russians settled in Vilnius and 30,000 in Kaunas. Additional numbers were brought to Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys and Marijampolė.

The Russian attempt to colonize rural areas failed completely—the guerrillas warned the settlers to clear out and the laggards were mercilessly picked off one by one. Thereafter, the Russians needed no further warnings—they fled to the cities and remain there, under the protective wing of Soviet troops. Large Russian garrisons are stationed in the towns and on the few sovkhoses settled by Russian military colonists. They were able to maintain these "state farms" and several "collective farms" only in the outskirts—in Zarasai county on the Latvian frontier in the extreme north-east, where there had been Russian settlements since the insurrections of 1831 and 1863-4; in Seinai county along the Polish frontier; and in the coastal area Liepaja-Palanga-Klaipėda.

In this manner, the ethnic Lithuanian population is completely cut off from the sea and from the overland escape routes to Poland and Latvia. Larger towns are gradually occupied by the Russians and are firmly held by large armed detachments. The strategy is clear—it is a military strategy aimed at bisecting the resistance of the indigenous people.

The colonization was carefully concealed in the press. In 1947, however, "Tiesa" admitted the settlement and Moscow's "Pravda" noted the arrival in Lithuania of 80 professors and teachers. Thus, semi-civilized Eurasia attempts to carry its "culture" on the tips of bayonets to Christian Lithuania. . . .

Only two Lithuanians were retained in the railroad service inside their own country. All of the managers

of machine-tractor-horse "stations" are Russians. These foreign thieves and exploiters openly engage in all sorts of "rackets" and "squeezes," and are drunk most of the time. The large garrisons guard their useless lives.

In addition to regular settlers, there are masses of the so-called "myeshochniki"—ragged men, women and children who make their way to Lithuania and the Baltic States carrying sacks; they beg and steal; when their sacks are filled, they go back to Holy Russia. The guerrillas receive no mercy at the hands of the enemy, and they show no mercy in dealing with the Russians found in the country under any pretense—the "myeshochniki" of Russia, the living examples of Russia's prosperity and culture, are killed whenever they show a reluctance to depart.

The Lithuanians repeat bitterly that their government is in Moscow, their population in Siberia, their army in the Far East. . . .

The "Elections"

The *New York Times* reported January 25th from London the official returns from local Soviet "elections" held January 18th: "In Lithuania only 11.6 per cent of the candidates elected were Communists, *Tass* said. In agricultural areas the percentages of Communist candidates elected seem to be even below the average for the country as a whole, primarily, it was believed, because the Communists are interested in dominating city and town councils."

This is an oversimplified view of the actual situation.

It must be recalled that the Communist Party never numbered more than 1,500 members in Lithuania and these, for the most part, were non-Lithuanian by nationality. If Russians exclusively were to occupy all offices, they would be hopelessly lost and unable to meet the least minimum of various levies imposed on a population not personally known to them and speaking a different language. The Russians have to retain some native officials—and there are no communists in the rural areas. The guerrillas saw to that.

Consequently, the Russians must of necessity nominate non-Communist Lithuanians for offices. On the other hand, the natives realize that service to the oppressor would be immediately penalized by the underground—and no one dares to accept office without specific permission from the underground. Finally, the underground realizes full well that a semblance of administrative apparatus is necessary for the protection of the native population itself, if for no other reason. Therefore, non-Communists are permitted to hold office. Of course, they must "watch their steps" and not become instruments of the invader.

The "elections," however, are viewed differently by the underground: the movement is firmly determined to prevent any falsification of the people's will or an implied "consent" to the alien rule. For this reason, complete boycott of all "elections" was ordered and firmly effected.

*She died at Hanau 27 January 1948.

The first "elections" in 1946 were complete fiascos in the rural areas—it was a day of intermittent skirmishes, explosions, and most of the "polling places" were under fire. Naturally, people did not go to the polling places: not more than 3 to 5% of the eligible voters "voted" in the rural areas. In the cities, of course, the armed forces visited the voters at home and compelled them to cast their single-list ballots.

A similar procedure was followed in the "elections" of 1947: city dwellers and Russian troops "voted," rural inhabitants boycotted the "polls," and the guerrilla units were out in full force.

The "voting" of January 18, 1948, followed the same process: the Russians had their gala day in the large cities and armed camps in the major rural towns, but the "polls" were completely boycotted in rural areas. The people and the occupants were used to the process by this time. Large units of troops carefully guarded the polls, motorized reserve units were held in readiness, and additional troops were brought from Poland (the troopers admitted having performed a similar duty in Poland) and East Prussia. The troops complained, however, that they had been forced to cover the distance on foot. It may also be mentioned that the MVD troops deliberately elected to guard city polls and dispatched the Red Army troops into rural towns and wooded areas—experience was their tutor.

In the 1948 elections, the bolsheviks attempted one novelty—they openly spread rumors that non-voting people would be deported to Siberia. This threat had no effect, inasmuch as the people reasoned that this fate awaited them sooner or later, anyhow.

Regardless of their pre-knowledge, the alien overlords went through the intensive motions of campaigning. In order to "elect" 45,000 officials,—180,000 agitators were scattered all over the country (Tėvynės Balsas, Vilnius, Nov. 10, 1947, citing the speech of "Premier" Gedvila)—under the protective wings of the escorting troop convoys. These "flying brigades of agitators" visited the villages, but few people heeded the summons. In some places there were more agitators than listeners. Village elders were repeatedly summoned by MGB investigators who lectured them on the importance of the elections. Threats were made to hold these elders personally responsible for bringing in the "voters." Individual summons were mailed out to the "voters." 15 to 20 farmers were summoned with their horses to perform "stavka" duty at the election polls. MVD and MGB officers were assigned to each of the 2,777 polling stations to act as election supervisors. Office and factory workers were formed into columns and marched to the "polls." Two bottles of vodka and a piece of bologna were promised to the "first voters" in each district. Polling time was fixed from 6 A.M. to midnight.

On the date of "elections," the Communists, together with the Russian troops amounting to a half million, and the office and factory workers were marched in columns to the "polls."

In the provinces, however, an average of 20% of the voters heeded the threats. This represented a "great victory" in comparison with the 3 to 5% of 1946 and 1947—but there are fewer people in the country. . . .

In the morning, few people showed up in rural poll stations. By noon, the Russians dispatched armed "election committees," escorted by 10-15 soldiers each, to the homes of the voters. The urns were carried there. Nevertheless, they found the doors locked, or children explained that their parents were not home. The Russians forcibly invaded homes and searched for the "voters." The few uncovered people attempted to excuse themselves by feigning ignorance—they were "satisfied" with their present government and wanted no other, they had never voted before and do not want to vote now. The officials threatened, took down the names of those refusing to vote, and demanded that they report the next day to the militia precinct—unless they elected to vote. Some people weakened. Some, however, firmly refused to vote regardless of their fate. Some were killed. In the end, however, the militiamen preferred to stuff the urns with "ballots." In one instance militiamen forcibly held a woman's fingers around the ballot slip and pushed it into the urn. In some places the militiamen did not trouble with paying visits—on passing a farmhouse, they checked the address and stuffed the requisite number of ballots into the urns.

A group of crying women was observed at one place. When they refused to vote, the Russians made them kneel in the snow in 25° Celsius weather until they consented to vote.

The underground reported that the various election districts had received secret orders to report the fixed percentages of voting. In Paežeriai, the commissioners were still short of 114 votes for the "quota" and they stuffed the necessary ballots in plain view of onlookers.

All in all, the underground reports state that not more than 5% of the people had actually "voted," and of those "voting"—85% permitted the Russians to place their ballots in the urns.

Not a single ballot need be cast in order to "elect" Soviet officials, and that sort of "election system" never represents the people's will. The Russians may enjoy the vote of their half-million troops and police forces, but they did not get the vote of confidence of the people of Lithuania.

Morale

The ever present terror deeply affected the people. One recent escapee stated: "I had come to Vilnius on 3 June 1947 to see the opera. However, having unexpectedly met a column of prisoners being loaded on trains for deportation and having seen their faces—I could not go to the opera. All I wanted was a gun, a knife, some weapon to get at the brutal exterminators of my people."

Another escapee, a former resident of the United States, reported from Poland: "I retain a dim recollection of the days of pre-war freedom and you may be surprised at my happiness in Poland, a police state. However, life in Poland is the 'life of Riley' in comparison with conditions in Lithuania where fear of Siberia dominates everyone's daily and nightly thoughts."

Vorkuta—that horrible slave camp claiming a million and a half former freemen, where the sun never shines over the bleak snow wastes, is everyone's nightmare. The few prisoners who were permitted to return popularized the song being sung by the Lithuanian exiles:

*"Ten, kur maža saulės,
Žmogus yra liūdnas . . ."
/There, where there is little sunlight,
Man is ever sad . . ./*

Vorkuta had claimed tens of thousands of Lithuanians who will never return to their homeland. Educators, jurists, officers, statesmen, farmers, laborers—all of them are straining their tired muscles in the dark mines, and they die fast.

A repatriated German PW reported: "In Vilnius, women approached us and asked whether we had combs or kettles to sell. Few young people were seen. In Šiauliai, one Lithuanian told me: 'You are a war prisoner and you will eventually return home a free-man. But we are losing our faith of ever recovering freedom.' The Lithuanian farmers in all places helped me with food and words of consolation."

One escapee reported: "I was detained in 1945 and deported to Karelia. What for? I don't know. Most of the prisoners were farmers who failed to deliver their quotas of produce levies, and many died there. The Russians would come to a house and inquire for the husband. It was best to say that the man was deported by the Germans or to show a letter from abroad—otherwise they suspected that the man was with the guerrillas."

The farmers are overburdened with all sorts of compulsory and "voluntary" levies. An armed detachment arrives at the home of a farmer who had met his quota. Its leader announces that the "people" of that particular township had voluntarily assumed additional quotas—and the farmer must sign. If he fails to meet his "voluntary" obligation—his farm is confiscated and family dispersed throughout Russia.

The Russian chiefs—Yefimov, Verik, Roptsov and Voinov are especially notorious for their brutality. Two renegades with the MVD also gained notoriety—Vaitiekus Fabijonavičius and Zabulionis of the Mažeikiai MVD office.

There is no bus service in the rural areas—trucks are occasionally made available. Buses in Kaunas function on an hourly schedule—the buses are without windows, boarded up, and the streets are impassable. "It is a sad experience to walk on the streets of Kaunas—one sees only slant-eyed Mongol faces."

Stores have empty shelves. Food is getting scarce. Average earnings of a laborer amount to 300 rubles monthly—the price of one kilogram of meat.

But the "Soviet barons" lead a gay life—the MVD and other Soviet officials, "Heroes of the Soviet Union" and Communist Party members, nicknamed "the normed people" because of their privileged rations ("norms"). They have special restaurants, theaters, concert halls, cabarets, baths—and brothels. They revel in drunkenness, they parade up and down the streets with shining "shoulder boards" and clinking medals—but they remain in the cities.

Count Zubovas, an old friend of the Tolstoy family, had appealed to the late "president" Kalinin of the USSR on behalf of his friend, Putvyis, founder of the National Guard Association, whose children had been deported to Russia. Two children of Putvyis were returned—but they were soon deported again, and the father died heartbroken.

Church is the only place where people can escape the maddening ravings of their oppressors. Consequently, churches are full. Long lines stand before the confessionals. A foreign consul who had married a Lithuanian girl was permitted to claim his son, after two years of trying. The boy's mother had died during the war and the youth attended Soviet schools. He reported that, despite the threats of school supervisors, the pupils still go to the churches en masse.

It may be recalled that an American Communist, Anthony Bimba, was the only American ever permitted to enter Soviet Lithuanian Satrapy. His cousin was brought back to Lithuania just prior to his arrival, but his brother was still in Siberia. Bimba was permitted to talk to his cousin alone—and a great change was visible. Bimba toured the country in company of "president" Paleckis. In one place, the audience stamped the floor and made noise. The drunkard "president" yelled: "Why do you make noise like animals?" Some one yelled back: "Because it is so terribly cold in Lithuania now." When Bimba addressed high school girls in Vilnius and praised the glorious achievements of Stalin and of the Soviet regime in Lithuania, the girls were bitterly disappointed to hear such talk from an alleged freeman and the audience burst into tears. Bimba cried with them and abruptly ended his prating. Back in the United States, comrade Bimba, of course, extols the glories of Soviet life . . . but it must be said to his credit that he delivered to addressees letters which had been stuffed into his pockets by the students. Presumably, he did not read the letters and did not turn them over to his NKVD sponsors, inasmuch as their contents were "treasonable" . . .

Instillment of Collective Fear

"Tiesa," the Communist Party organ, reported in its issue No. 97 that 1,260,925 hectares of land had been seized "from estate owners, kulaks, churches, monasteries and stooges of the Germans." Nevertheless, calling upon a quotation from Lenin The Saint, the

paper noted: "the kulaks are attempting to restore their domination, to regain their privileges, to secure by crookedness at least a part of their privileges."

Tiesa cited the following examples:

1. The kulak Mikoliūnas of Joniškėlis township was turned over to the prosecuting organs for secreting a cow and sabotaging produce delivery.

2. A drunken kulak and bully, A. Šeštokas, had built a nest in the cooperative at Troškūnai. "He was purged."

3. In Gudeliai township, Marijampolė county, 90 secreted cows were located. 6 kulak saboteurs were unmasked in Veiveriai township and turned over to the prosecuting authorities. Grain deliveries plenipotentiary Lekeckas was removed from office for drinking with the kulaks and appeasing them.

4. The kulak Petrulionis of Daugailiai permitted hay to rot underneath last year's straw, and was held for sabotage.

The issue No. 152 contributed more facts:

5. "The struggle is so weak in a number of counties that the hostile elements, the kulaks and their appeasers openly sabotage milk deliveries. In Ukmergė county, 1,970 cows were secreted—thus far 500 cows were located. The sabotage by kulaks is not combatted with the necessary severity. For instance, in Raseiniai county, the kulak Pr. Širvinis fictitiously divided his farm with his wife and does not deliver milk. Similarly behaves the kulak Vl. Jucevičius. The kulak J. Petravičius and others in the area of Kepurniškės likewise sabotage the decrees of the party and the government. The milk reception station of Tytuvėnai is indebted to the peasants about 20,000 rubles, the Šiluva station—10,000 rubles, the entire country area—up to 100,000 rubles."

The issue No. 92 reported from Bubleliai township, Šakiai county, that the Executive Committee in a special meeting "carefully weighed the taxing capacity" of every individual farmer and elaborated a planting plan. "The plan makes certain that the kulak, who always strives to disrupt the economic objectives, will be unable to sabotage the planting or to plant a lesser area than fixed in the plan. . . . Local Communists, Komsomol members and the Soviet apparatus of activists . . . will scrupulously control the kulak farms."

The issue No. 156 disclosed that, in their maddening zeal of exploitation, the Communists appointed "plenipotentiaries" for every 10 farmers. "In the Zarasai county, the Executive Committee installed the following order: directors of the milk receiving stations each day supervise the progress of milk deliveries and constantly report the delinquents to the township and district Executive Committees, and to 10-men (*dešimtininkai*) plenipotentiaries, and the latter take measures to equalize the arrears."

The "*Pionyerskaya Pravda*" of Moscow reported in its 13 June issue:

"Is there a person in the Soviet homeland who had not heard of the hero pioneer—the little Pavel Morozov? Little Pavel Morozov was born and raised in the

northern Urals, in the taygas, in Gerasimovka village. He was an exemplary pupil, an alert leader of the village pioneers and a splendid comrade. He loved dearly his father and mother, he supervised his younger brothers.

"Came the year of the first five-year plan. Enemies of the plan retarded the socialistic construction, slandered the kolkhozes. The pioneers assisted the Communists and the Komsomol in unmasking the enemies. And suddenly the little Pavel noted that his father was with the people's enemies. The boy was harshly shaken by this knowledge; no matter how difficult it was for him, he could not keep silent. In the courtroom, Little Pavel pointed at his father and said tearfully:

"—Dyadenka-Judge, he is an enemy. I say this now not as a son, but as a pioneer.—Thereafter the maddened enemies of the people murdered the little Pavel.

"By a decision of the USSR Government, a monument will shortly be erected in honor of P. Morozov in Moscow, the work of I. A. Rabinovich. Our pioneer organization is glorious and militant. It is a great honor to be a member of such an organization. . . ."

The Russians now attempt to breed patricides in Lithuania, too. The issue No. 153 of "*Tiesa*" published a photograph:

"The Central active of Leliūnai township—Komsomol members and auxiliary brigades' brigadeers who are responsible for the work of crop collection in the area, shown in a regular consultative meeting with the communists."

The photograph shows little girl pupils encircled by fiercely glaring "rogues gallery" characters. . . .

The 5 July issue of *Tiesa* also published a decree of the LKP/b CK (Central Committee, Lithuanian Communist Party-bolshevik): the pioneers and non-party youths of the villages are directed to observe the morale in the villages and to assist the party and government in effecting the five-year plan and unmasking the people's enemies.

Just Out!

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Betrayal of Europe

Comments on the Documentation of the Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941

The Department of State has rendered a distinct contribution to worldwide understanding of the Soviet objectives by publishing some of the authentic secret documents of the German Foreign Office of the period 1939-1941.

Although it does not reveal in its entirety the sordid and reprehensible story of the Nazi-Soviet conspiracy against peace and humanity, the book, nevertheless, presents an outline of the last phase of negotiations of the Hitler-Stalin partnership in aggression. The story deserves the greatest publicity and the closest scrutiny not only of all statesmen but of all citizens who had paid, and will continue to pay, a heavy price in lives and material wealth for the folly of would-be conquerors of the world and for the errors of our statesmen who had failed to grasp the full significance of the Soviet objectives within the past few years.

The *Lithuanian Bulletin* herein records selected documents from "Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Office, Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, Washington 1948," together with pertinent observations from other sources.

Readers are reminded, however, that the aforesaid publication excluded the Nazi-Soviet deals for the barter of populations 1939-1941 and, by limiting itself to German sources, did not reveal the horrible story of the Soviet-conducted crime of genocide. Some of the documents of the Russian secret police had been published on these pages in the past, and additional documents will be published in the future.

* * * *

1. Soviet overtures to Democratic and Nazi Germany prior to 1939

1920's. — The contention that the United States financed a revival of the German economy and thereby becomes responsible for the war cannot be taken seriously. American loans, which were trifling compared with the cost of German remilitarization under Hitler, were considered a natural and even desirable contribution in the 1920's when Germany was still a democracy and had virtually no armed forces. The Communist parties throughout the world were most vociferous at the time defending Germany's right to rehabilitation. Moreover, *the Soviet Government concluded secret agreements with the German military, giving them, against a modest fee, facilities in Russia to manufacture heavy arms and conduct experiments prohibited under the Versailles Treaty.* Relations between some German generals and Soviet agencies were close and friendly.

If Molotov could expect free criticism in his own country, he would have skipped this chapter of history,

which has shown that *no other government did as much for the remilitarization of Germany in the decade between 1923 and 1933 as did the Soviet Government.*

1935. — In January, 1935, Molotov in a speech before the Congress of Soviets publicly appealed for the improvement of relations with Nazi Germany. "For our part we can say that we have never wished for anything other than the continuance of good relations with Germany. . . . Not racism, nor Fascism is the obstacle—normal relations with Italy are objective proof of the possibility of developing collaboration between countries with completely opposite social systems."

1936. — A year later Molotov again told the Central Executive Committee in Moscow that "the Soviet Government would like to establish better relations with Germany than those existing at present. The realization of this policy rests not only with us but also with the government of Germany."

Still later, in an interview with the editor of the *Paris Temps*, Molotov stated:

"The main trend among our people, the trend which determines the policy of the Soviet Government, considers an improvement in relations between Germany and the Soviet Union possible. . . . The participation of Germany in the League of Nations would be in the interest of peace and would be favorably regarded by us."

"Even of Hitler Germany?" asked the editor.

"Yes," Molotov replied, "even of Hitler Germany."

The record shows that *the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 was not a spontaneous reaction against the Munich policy of Chamberlain and Daladier. Stalin and Molotov had long before been prepared for collaboration with an imperialist Germany, and they plunged into it as soon as Adolf Hitler responded to the wooing.*

/David J. Dallin, "A Spurious Alibi," *The New Leader*, New York, February 14, 1948, p. 2./

2. Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, March 27/April 9, 1917

The Provisional Government . . . deems it its right and duty to declare here and now that free Russia does not aim to dominate other peoples and deprive them of their national patrimony, to occupy foreign territories by force, but to establish a firm peace on the foundation of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny. The Russian people do not covet any accession of power abroad at the expense of other peoples, do not aim to subjugate or degrade any one. . . .

PRINCE LVOV

President of the Council.

/Papers Relating to the FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1918, Russia, vol. I, Washington, 1931, pp. 39-40./

3. Russian Foreign Minister Michael I. Tere-schenko to American Special Ambassador Elihu Root, at Petrograd, June 15, 1917

... nations should have a right to show themselves the way they wished to go and to decide for their future, and this high principle the Russian people have accepted and consider that it must guide their politics, and they consider also that all nations, however small or great, have the right to decide what their future will be and that no territory and no people can be transferred from one country to another without their consent like things. Human beings have the right to say for themselves what they shall do and whose subjects they shall become.

/Ibid., p. 124./

4. All-Russian Convention of Delegates from Councils of Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies — Resolution on War, June 25, 1917

6. In view of the fact that the war can only be ended by the united efforts of the democracies of all countries, the convention states that it is necessary (1) for the democracy of Russia, through its empowered agent, the All-Russian Convention of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, to address an appeal to the democracies of all nations, urging them to accept the slogan "peace without annexations or contributions, on the basis of each nation's right to determine its own future" and to put pressure to bear on their respective governments along this line. ...

/Ibid., p. 105./

5. Kerensky's Policy Less Friendly to Self-Determination: Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, Sept. 25/Oct. 8, 1917

In the firm conviction that only a general peace can give our great country an opportunity ... Russia ... will endeavor, in addition to coming to an agreement with our Allies regarding our common war aims, to effect an agreement with them on the basis of the principles announced by the Russian revolution. ...

Measures guaranteeing to the *nationalities* the right of *self-government* will be enacted by the Constituent Assembly. The Government will take steps to secure for the national minorities the right to use their own language in schools, law courts, in municipal institutions, and in communication with state institutions. ...

A. KERENSKY
Prime Minister.

/Ibid., p. 213./

6. Council of People's Commissars, November 22, 1917, to Gen. Dukhonin

The Council of Commissaries of the People by commission of the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has assumed the Government together with the obligations to propose to all belligerent nations ... immediate opening of negotiations

with a view to concluding peace on democratic principles. ...

The President of the Council of Commissaries of the People

V. LENIN

The Commissary for Foreign Affairs

L. TROTSKY

The Commissary for Military Affairs

KRYLENKO

/Ibid., p. 247./

7. Trotsky Communicates the Opening of Negotiations with Germany

Petrograd, November 29, 1917.

In reply to the formal proposition of the Council of the Commissaries of the People regarding the opening of negotiations for an immediate armistice on all fronts for the purpose of concluding a democratic peace without annexations and contributions with the right of all nations to self-determination the German supreme command has made known its consent. ...

Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs

L. TROTSKY

/Ibid., p. 253./

December 6, 1917.

For the information of the Ambassador of the United States of America.

... On the part of Russia it is proposed: (1) to announce that the armistice proposed has for its object a peace on democratic principles as they have been formulated in the manifesto of the All-Russian Congress of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies. ...

Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs

L. TROTSKY

/Ibid., p. 258./

8. Trotsky to the Allied Peoples December 29, 1917

... For it is clear that *to demand self-determination for the peoples that are comprised within the borders of enemy states and to refuse self-determination to the peoples of their own state or of their own colonies would mean the defense of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism.* If the Governments of the Allied countries were to manifest the readiness—along with the Russian revolution—to construct peace on the basis of an entire and complete recognition of the principle of *self-determination for all peoples and in all states; if they were to begin with the actual giving of this right to the oppressed peoples of their own states:* this would create international conditions. ...

/Ibid., pp. 406-407./

9. Kamenev Reports on Brest Litovsk Negotiations in December 1917

... 2. Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in accordance with its principles, has already proclaimed for all the peoples, without exception, entering into the make-up of the Russian state, the right to self-determination even to entire separation; it takes note of the decision expressing the will of the people: of

the desire of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livland for complete national independence and for separation from the Russian state. The Russian Government recognizes that in the present conditions these declarations must be regarded as an expression of the popular will, and is ready to draw the conclusion logically resulting therefrom . . . the time and the method of the declaration as to separation, on the basis of a plebiscite on a broad scale and with the exclusion of any sort of military pressure in any fashion whatsoever, which declaration is on the Russian side affirmed to be necessary. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 410-411./

10. Resolution of the Petrograd Soviet, Jan. 1, 1918

. . . In point of fact the *free expression of the will of the population* of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and all the other occupied provinces is *impossible whilst foreign armies remain in them and until the return of the evacuated portion of the original population*. . . . Under a state of siege, under the yoke of military censorship, the peoples of the occupied provinces have not yet been able to express their will. . . .

We declare:

The Russian revolution remains true to its international policy. *We stand for the effective self-determination of Poland, Lithuania, Courland*. We never recognize as just the imposing of an alien will on any peoples. . . .

/Ibid., p. 420./

11. Lithuania's Declaration of Independence, February 16, 1918

Decision

The Council of Lithuania, in its session held on the 16th day of February, 1918, unanimously decided to communicate to the governments of Russia, Germany and other states the following declaration:

The Council of Lithuania, as the only representative of the Lithuanian People, *basing itself on the recognized right of nations to self-determination* and on the resolution of the Lithuanian Conference held at Vilnius on the 18-23 days of September, 1917, declares the reconstitution of the independent State of Lithuania, ordered on the democratic foundations, with its Capital in Vilnius, and the severance of all ties which had formerly bound this State to any other nations.

At the same time, the Council of Lithuania declares that the State foundations of Lithuania and its relations with other States must be finally determined by the Constituent Assembly, elected in a democratic manner by all of its inhabitants and to be convoked as soon as possible.

Communicating this declaration to the government of . . . , the Council of Lithuania asks for the recognition of the independent State of Lithuania.

February 16th, 1918, at Vilnius.

/Signed/ Dr. J. Basanavičius, S. Banaitis, M. Biržiška, K. Bizauskas, Pr. Dovydaitis, S. Kairys, P. Klimas, Donatas Malinauskas, Vl. Mironas, S. Narutowicz,

Alfonsas Petrulis, K. Šaulys, Dr. J. Šaulys, J. Šernas, A. Smetona, J. Smilgevičius, J. Staugaitis, A. Stulginskis, J. Vailokaitis, J. Vileišis.

12. Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, March 3, 1918

Art. 3.—The territories lying to the west of the line determined by the contracting powers and which formerly belonged to Russia will no longer be under her sovereignty. The line determined upon is marked on the appended map (Appendix I), which is an important part of the present treaty of peace. . . .

In respect to the mentioned territories no obligations towards Russia are to be considered as issuing from their formerly having belonged to that country.

Russia gives up all interference in the internal affairs of the said territories. . . .

/Foreign Relations of the U. S., Russia 1918, supra, p. 442./

13. Appendix I:

The line prescribed in Article 3 . . . follows the course of the Dūna to the east of Dwinsk (Dünaberg) to the place where ended the former Courland frontier, almost to Druja, and from this place it extends in a straight line southwest crossing Strusky Lake . . . close to Mjelengjany . . . crosses the railway line from Swenziany to Lyntupy upon midway. The line then passes along a stream by the localities Michalischki and Gerwjany, both of which are left to the west of the line, along the rivers Oschmjanka and Loscha . . . reaches the railway from Wilna to Smorgon, which it crosses somewhat west of Slobodka . . . to Klewisa on the German side, by Oschmjany and Dsewenischki on the east, and Geranony on the west, along the rivers Opita and Gawja to the Niemen . . . to a point above Mosty. . . .

/Latvian-Russian Relations. Documents. Washington 1944, p. 48./

14. Russo-German Supplementary Treaties, August 27, 1918

Part IV Art. 10.—With regard to Esthonia, Livonia, Courland and Lithuania, agreements are to be concluded with Russia, as to the following points; among others:

1. With regard to the nationality of the former Russian inhabitants of these territories, to which they must in any case be allowed the right of option.

2. With regard to the return of the property in Russia belonging to subjects of these territories. . . .

5. With regard to the regulation of the new frontiers. . . .

/Ibid., p. 54./

15. Annulment of the Partitions of the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of 1772, 1793, 1795

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars No. 698.

Moscow, August 29, 1918.

Art. 3.—All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the former Russian Empire with the Governments of the Kingdom of Prussia and the

Austro-Hungarian Empire in connection with the partitions of Poland, are annulled and for ever by the present Revolution, in view of the fact that they are contrary to the principle of the self-determination of peoples and to the revolutionary, legal conception of the Russian nation, which recognizes the inalienable right of the Polish nation to decide its own fate and to become united.

Signed: *Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:*

V. ULIANOV /Lenin/

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:

L. KARAKHAN

Executive Secretary of the Council of People's Commissars:

VLAD. BONCH-BRUYEVICH

/Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-1943. Documents. New York 1943, pp. 5-6.

16. Baltic Sea—the Sea of the Social Revolution

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are directly on the road from Russia to Western Europe and are therefore a hindrance to our revolution, because they separate Soviet Russia from revolutionary Germany. . . . This separating wall has to be destroyed. The Russian Red Proletariat should find an opportunity to influence the revolution in Germany. The conquest of the Baltic Sea would make it possible for Soviet Russia to agitate in favor of the Social revolution in the Scandinavian countries so that the Baltic Sea would be transformed into the Sea of the Social Revolution.

/Izvestiya, Editorial, Leningrad, December 25, 1918./

17. Estonian-Russian Peace Treaty of February 2, 1920, at Tartu

Art. 2.—On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to decide their own destinies, and even to separate themselves completely from the State of which they form part, a right proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy of the State of Esthonia, and renounces voluntarily and for ever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia over the Esthonian people and territory by virtue of the former legal situation, and by virtue of international treaties, which in respect of such rights shall henceforth lose their force.

No obligation towards Russia devolves upon the Esthonian people and territory from the fact that Esthonia was formerly part of Russia.

/League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2, p. 30./

18. Lithuanian-Russian Peace Treaty of Moscow, July 12, 1920

Art. 1.—Proceeding from the right, proclaimed by the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, of all nations to free self-determination up to their complete separation from the State into the composition of which they enter, Russia recognises without reservation the sovereign rights and independence of the

Lithuanian State, with all the juridical consequences arising from such recognition, and voluntarily and for all time abandons all the sovereign rights of Russia over the Lithuanian people and their territory.

The fact of the past subjection of Lithuania to Russia does not impose on the Lithuanian nation and its territory any liabilities whatsoever towards Russia.

/League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 3, p. 106./

19. Latvian-Russian Peace Treaty of Riga, August 11, 1920

Art. 2.—By virtue of the principle proclaimed by the Federal Socialist Republic of the Russian Soviets, which establishes the right of self-determination for all nations, even to the point of total separation from the State with which they have been incorporated, and in view of the desire expressed by the Latvian people to possess an independent national existence. Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and sovereignty of the Latvian State and voluntarily and irrevocably renounces all sovereign rights over the Latvian people and territory which formerly belonged to Russia under the then existing constitutional laws as well as under international Treaties, which, in the sense here indicated, shall in future cease to be valid. The previous status of subjection to Russia shall not entail any obligation towards Russia on the part of the Latvian people or territory.

/League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2, p. 196./

20. Polish-Russian Peace Treaty of Riga, March 18, 1921

Art. 3.—Russia and the Ukraine abandon all rights and claims to the territories situated to the west of the frontier laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty. Poland, on the other hand, abandons in favour of the Ukraine and of White Ruthenia all rights and claims to the territory situated to the east of this frontier. The two Contracting Parties agree that, in so far as the territory situated to the west of the Frontier fixed in Article 2 of the present Treaty includes districts which form the subject of a dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the question of the attribution of these districts to one of those two States is a matter which exclusively concerns Poland and Lithuania.

/Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-1943, supra, p. 9./

21. The Baltic States Admitted to the League of Nations, Sept. 22, 1921

The Emir Zoka-ed-Dowleh (Persia): I am very glad to see for a second time free and independent peoples coming to ask for admission. . . .

1. Request for Admission of Esthonia. . . .

The President: The number of Delegations voting "Aye" is 36. The number of Delegations not answering is 12. Therefore, the two-third majority is obtained, and Esthonia is admitted to the League of Nations. /Applause/

2. Request for the Admission of Latvia. . . .

The President: There have been thirty-eight votes in favour. Ten States have not answered. Therefore, Latvia is admitted to the League.

3. Request for the Admission of Lithuania. . . .

M. POULLET (Belgium). The Report . . . has been distributed . . . Lithuania has pledged herself to conform to the Recommendation of the Assembly with regard to the protection of Minorities. Accordingly, the Sixth Committee proposes the admission of Lithuania. . . .

A vote by roll-call was then taken.

There voted: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Haiti, India, Italy, Japan, Holland, Liberia, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Portugal, Siam, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela.

There abstained or were absent: Argentine, Czechoslovakia, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Luxemburg, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Roumania, Salvador, Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The President:

Thirty-six voted for. Twelve States did not vote. Therefore, Lithuania is admitted to the League of Nations.

/Latvian-Russian Relations, supra., pp. 107-109./

22. Recognition of the Baltic Republics by the United States

The Secretary of State to the Commissioner at Riga (Young)

Washington, July 25, 1922, 4 P.M.

98 Advise Foreign Offices of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania as nearly at the same time as possible on the morning of July 28 that the United States extends to each full recognition. The fact will be communicated to the press at Washington for publication in the morning papers of July 28 and the following statement will be made:

The Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been recognized either *de jure* or *de facto* by the principal Governments of Europe and have entered into treaty relations with their neighbors.

In extending to them recognition on its part, the Government of the United States takes cognizance of the actual existence of these Governments during a considerable period of time and of the successful maintenance within their borders of political and economic stability.

The United States has consistently maintained that the disturbed conditions of Russian affairs may not be made the occasion for alienation of Russian territory, and this principle is not deemed to be infringed by the recognition at this time of the Governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania which have been set up and maintained by an indigenous population. . . .

Signed: (Charles Evans) HUGHES.

/Foreign Relations of the U. S. 1922, vol. II, pp. 873-4./

23. Russo-Lithuanian Non-Aggression Treaty, signed at Moscow 28 September 1926, ratified 22 December 1926, extended to December 31, 1945

Art. 2.—The Republic of Lithuania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mutually undertake to respect in all circumstances the sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability of each other.

Art. 3.—Each of the two contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any aggressive action whatsoever against the other party.

Art. 5.—Should a conflict arise, and if impossible to liquidate it in a diplomatic way, both contracting parties agree in such case to nominate conciliatory commissions.

/International Conciliation. Documents. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1929, pp. 412-415./

24. "The Litvinov Protocol" — Providing for Immediate Effectation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed at Moscow 9 February 1929 by Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, the USSR, adhered to by Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and Danzig by July 1929

The Governments . . . being desirous of promoting the maintenance of peace between their respective countries and for this purpose of putting into force without delay, between the peoples of those countries, the Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed at Paris on August 27, 1928, have decided to achieve this purpose by means of the present Protocol. . . .

Art. 2.—The entry into force in virtue of the present Protocol, of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 in reciprocal relations between the Parties to the present Protocol shall be valid independently of the entry into force of the Treaty of Paris of 1928. . . .

Art. 3. Sub. 3.—As from the date of the deposit of the instruments of ratification by two of the Contracting Powers, the present Protocol shall come into force. . . .

ANNEX. Art. 1.—The High Contracting Powers solemnly declare . . . that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Art. 2.—The High Contracting Powers agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin . . . shall never be sought except by pacific means.

/Latvian-Russian Relations, supra, pp. 166-169./

25. Latvian-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty, Riga, 5 February 1932,—identical with Russian Non-Aggression Treaties with Finland (21 January 1932) and Estonia (4 May 1932)

Art. 1.—Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression directed against the other, and also from any acts of violence directed against the territorial integrity and inviolability or the political independence of the other Con-

tracting Party, regardless of whether such aggression or such acts are committed separately or together with other Powers, with or without a declaration of war.

Art. 2.—Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes *not to be a party to any military or political treaties, conventions or agreements directed against the independence, territorial integrity or political security of the other Party*, or to any treaties, conventions or agreements aiming at an economic or financial boycott of either of the Contracting Parties.

Art. 4.—... undertake to submit all disputes, whatever their kind or origin, which may arise between them ... to a procedure of conciliation in a joint conciliation commission. ...

/Ibid., pp. 170-171. /

26. Definition of Aggression ("The Litvinov Definition") Convention, London, 3 July 1933, among Rumania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, USSR, Persia and Afghanistan.

... Mindful of the fact that the Briand-Kellogg Pact, of which they are signatories, prohibits all aggression;

Deeming it necessary, in the interests of the general security, to define aggression as specifically as possible, in order to obviate any pretext whereby it might be justified;

And noting that all States have an equal right to independence, security, the defence of their territories, and the free development of their institutions;

And desirous, in the interest of the general peace, to ensure to all peoples the inviolability of the territory of their countries; ...

Art. 1.—Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to accept in its relations with each of the other Parties ... the definition of aggression. ...

Art. 2.—Accordingly, the aggressor in an international conflict shall, subject to the agreements in force between the parties to the dispute, be considered to be that State which is the first to commit any of the following actions:

- (1) Declaration of war upon another State;
- (2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a declaration of war, of the territory of another State;
- (3) Attack by its land, naval or air forces, with or without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State;
- (4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State;

(5) Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request of another State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.

Art. 3.—No political, military, economic or other consideration may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression. ...

ANNEX to Article III: The High Contracting Parties, ...

Declare that no act of aggression within the meaning of Article II of that Convention can be justified on either of the following grounds, among others:

A. The internal condition of a State:

E.g., its political, economic or social structure; alleged defects in its administration; disturbances due to strikes, revolutions, counter-revolutions, or civil war.

B. The international conduct of a State:

E.g., the violation or threatened violation of the material or moral rights or interests of a foreign State or its nationals; the rupture of diplomatic or economic relations; economic or financial boycotts; disputes relating to economic, financial or other obligations towards foreign States; frontier incidents not forming any of the cases of aggression specified in Article II.

The High Contracting Parties further agree to recognise that the present Convention can never legitimate any violation of international law that may be implied in the circumstances comprised in the above list.

(6th Signature) MAXIME LITVINOFF.

/Ibid., pp. 175-177. /

27. Foreign Commissar Litvinov's Declaration to Latvia, 28 March 1939

The presumption of the Latvian-Soviet peace treaty of August 11, 1920, as well as of the non-aggression treaty of February 5, 1932, was to render to and secure for the Latvian nation entirely self-determining and independent existence as a state, conforming with the wishes of the Latvian people. The Soviet government acted upon this presumption when it immediately put into force the Briand-Kellogg pact, extended the non-aggression treaty for 10 years, and assumed obligations in accordance with the statutes of the League of Nations.

... From the above emanates what *enormous importance* the Soviet government has constantly laid and continues to lay upon preserving the complete independence of the Latvian as well as of the other Baltic Republics, conforming not only with the interests of the peoples of these republics, but also with the vital interests of the Soviet state. From this it should be clear that no matter what kind of agreements were signed, "voluntary" or concluded under outside pressure, should they result ... in the abatement or restriction of the independence and self-determination ... permitting in it the political, economic or other domination of a third state ... this would be recognized by the Soviet government as insufferable and contradictory to the stipulations and spirit of the above mentioned treaties and agreements ... a violation of these agreements with all the consequences arising therefrom.

This declaration is made in the spirit of sincere benevolence with the purpose of enhancing ... a feeling of security and confidence in the readiness of the

Soviet Union to prove with deeds, in case of need, its interest in preserving in its entirety for the Republic of Latvia its independent existence as a state and its political and economic independence, as well as confidence in the *inability of the Soviet Union to remain an idle bystander of open or masked attempts to destroy their self-determination and independence.*

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs

M. LITVINOFF.

/Ibid., pp. 188-189./

28. Foreign Commissar Molotov's Speech to the Supreme Soviet 31 May, 1939

... We stand for the cause of peace, and for an end being put to the development of aggression. ...

There is no need to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy is thoroughly pacific and is directed against the aggressor.

... In a united front of the peaceful Powers which effectively opposes aggression, the USSR could occupy only a foremost place.

/Polish-Soviet Relations, supra, p. 23./

29. German Ambassador to Moscow reports to Berlin 29 June, 1939

... Molotov replied. ... The foreign policy of the Soviet Government was, in accordance with the pronouncements of its leaders, aimed at the cultivation of good relations with all countries, and this of course applied—provided there was reciprocity to Germany too. ... As to the question of the treaty negotiations for nonaggression pacts with the Baltic countries, Molotov remarked that Germany had concluded them in her own interest, and not out of love for the Soviet Union. He had to doubt the permanence of such treaties after the experience which Poland had had. ...

SCHULENBURG.

/Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Washington 1948, pp. 26-27./

30. Schulenburg to Ribbentrop 3 July 1939

... Molotov did not go into the question as to the meaning of the concept "political basis," but he declared that the Soviet Government in accordance with the enunciations of its leaders desired good relations with all countries and therefore—provided there was reciprocity—would also welcome a normalization of relations with Germany. ...

... Molotov asked how we visualized further developments. ... As to nonaggression treaties, Germany had concluded them in the first place in her own interest, and they concerned only Germany and the countries participating, but not the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he would have to doubt the permanence of such treaties after the experiences which Poland had had.

I replied that our nonaggression treaties provided the Baltic countries with additional security, in which the Soviet Union was very much interested. ...

SCHULENBURG.

/Ibid., pp. 28-29./

31. Analysis by Schnurre, Head of the Eastern European and Baltic Section of the German Foreign Office. Berlin, 27 July 1939

... Collaboration appeared attainable to me now, if the Soviet Government considered it desirable ... because controversial problems of foreign policy, which would exclude such a relationship between the two countries, did not, in my opinion, exist in the whole area from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and the Far East ... one thing in common in the ideology of Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies. ... Therefore, it would appear to us quite paradoxical if the Soviet Union, as a Socialist state, were to side with the Western democracies.

... Molotov, himself, in his last speech had called the Anti-Comintern Pact camouflage for an alliance aimed against the Western democracies. ... I saw in these anything but a clash of interests between Germany and the Soviet Union. That we would respect the integrity of the Baltic countries and of Finland had become sufficiently clear through our nonaggression pacts and our nonaggression offers. ...

During the subsequent discussion Astakhov came back again to the question of the Baltic countries and asked whether, besides economic penetration, we had more far-reaching political aims there. ... After describing our commercial relations to the Baltic countries, I confined myself to the statement that no German-Russian clash of interests would result from all these questions. ...

/Ibid., pp. 32-34./

32. Berlin Instructs its Ambassador in Moscow 29 July 1939

... Schnurre had a detailed discussion with Astakhov and Babarin, ... If you see the opportunity of arranging a new talk with Molotov, ... sound him out. ... If the talk proceeds positively in the Baltic question too, the idea could be advanced that we will adjust our stand with regard to the Baltic in such a manner as to respect the vital Soviet interests in the Baltic.

WEIZSAECKER.

/Ibid., p. 36./

33. Ribbentrop Supplements Instructions to Schulenburg 3 August 1939

Last evening I received the Russian Chargé ... Astakhov was unable to give any clear-cut answer, but he thought his Government had the desire to pursue a policy of mutual understanding with Germany.

... I said there was room for the two of us on the Baltic and that Russian interests by no means needed to clash with ours there.

RIBBENTROP.

/Ibid., pp. 37-38./

34. Schulenburg Reports on Molotov's Reactions 4 August 1939

In conference of 1¼ hours today, Molotov abandoned his usual reserve and appeared unusually open. . . . I stated that from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in our opinion, no opposition of interests existed between Germany and the Soviet Union, that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not directed against the Soviet Union, that by concluding nonaggression pacts with the Baltic countries we had proven our decision to respect their integrity, and that our well-known demands on Poland meant no impairment of Soviet interests. . . .

M. answered point by point at some length. . . .

I thereupon against stressed the absence of opposition of interests in foreign policy and mentioned German readiness so to orient our behavior with regard to the Baltic States, if occasion arose, as to safeguard vital Soviet Baltic interests.

At the mention of the Baltic States, M. was interested in learning what States we meant by the term and whether Lithuania was one of them. . . .

SCHULENBURG.
/Ibid., pp. 39-41./

35. German Ambassador Reports from Moscow 7 August 1939

. . . In conversation with Molotov, the Ministers of Latvia and Estonia here also characterized the German Nonaggression Treaties as guarantees of peace, and remarked that the conclusion of the treaties had been entirely natural, since Latvia and Estonia had similar nonaggression treaties with the Soviet Union. Molotov, however, had taken position that these treaties indicated an inclination toward Germany, and he could not be moved from this position.

The Estonian Chargé here, in talking about the attitude of the Soviets toward Baltic questions, spoke of the possibility that Germany might guarantee the independence of Latvia and Estonia, as it had done with Belgium. I am of the opinion that the Soviets no longer want such a guarantee to be given by us. . . .

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG.
/Ibid., p. 43./

36. Molotov Sounds Germany on Lithuania— 14 August 1939

. . . The following were the main points in my last conversation with Herr Molotov: the statements about the Baltic States satisfied him to a certain extent, but he wanted to know whether we also included Lithuania among the Baltic States. . . .

The British and French military missions have been in Moscow for three days now. The Soviets made no great fanfare over their arrival. . . . I assume that the negotiations will last a long time. . . .

SCHULENBURG TO WEIZSAECKER,
from Moscow.

37. Ribbentrop Instructs Schulenburg 14 August 1939

I request that you call upon Herr Molotov personally and communicate to him the following: . . .

2) There exist no real conflicts of interest between Germany and the USSR. . . . The Reich Government is of the opinion that there is no question between the Baltic and the Black Seas which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. Among these are such questions as: the Baltic Sea, the Baltic area, Poland, . . .

5) The Reich Government and the Soviet Government must, judging from all experience, count it as certain that the capitalistic Western democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and of the USSR. They are today trying again, by the conclusion of a military alliance, to drive the USSR into the war against Germany. In 1914 this policy had disastrous results for Russia. It is the compelling interest of both countries to avoid for all future time the destruction of Germany and of the USSR, which would profit only the Western democracies. . . .

. . . Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop is prepared to make a short visit to Moscow. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 50-51./

38. Molotov Is All Attention—15 August 1939

I began the interview with Molotov on August 15 about 8:00 p.m. . . .

Molotov listened to the reading of the instruction with close (*gespannter*) attention, and he directed his secretary to make as extensive and exact notes as possible.

Molotov then declared that in view of the importance of my communication he could not give me an answer at once but he must first render a report to his Government. He could state at once, however, that the Soviet Government warmly (*lebhaft*) welcomed the intention expressed on the German side. . . .

The Soviet Government at the end of June of this year had received a telegraphic report from its Chargé in Rome. . . . Ciano had referred to the following items in his plan: . . . the possibility was envisaged of concluding a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and making a joint guarantee of the Baltic States. . . .

The contents of the foregoing points had aroused great interest on the part of the Soviet Government and he, Molotov, would very much like to know how much of the plan which Ciano had outlined in the form just mentioned to the Soviet Chargé was true.

I replied . . . Molotov replied that . . . he, Molotov . . . had seen nothing improbable about it. The Soviet Government all through recent years had been under the impression that the German Government had no desire to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Now the situation had changed. . . . He regarded the statement which had been made today as decisive and as one in which this

wish was especially completely and clearly expressed. As regards the Soviet Government, it had always had a favorable attitude. . . .

SCHULENBURG to Berlin 16 August 1939.

/Ibid., pp. 53-55./

39. Schulenburg Supplements His Report to Berlin 16 August 1939

Herr Molotov was quite unusually compliant and candid. I received the impression that the proposal of the visit of the Reich Minister was very flattering personally to Herr Molotov. . . . (I recall that . . . Moscow requested that England and France send a Cabinet Minister here and that, instead, only Herr Strang came.) . . .

Despite all efforts, we did not succeed in ascertaining entirely clearly what Herr Molotov desired in the matter of the Baltic States. It appears that he *mentioned* the question of a joint guarantee of the Baltic States as only one point in Herr Rosso's report, but did not expressly make the demand that we give such a guarantee. Such a joint guarantee seems to me at variance with the behavior of the Soviet Government in the British-French negotiations.

/Ibid., p. 57./

40. Ribbentrop Decides to Go to Moscow— August 16, 1939

I request that you again call upon Herr Molotov with the statement that you have to communicate to him, in addition to yesterday's message for Herr Stalin, a supplementary instruction. . . .

1) The points brought up by Herr Molotov are in accordance with German desires. That is, . . . Germany is ready to guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union. . . .

2) The Führer is of the opinion that, in view of . . . the possibility of the occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at this point explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is determined not to endure Polish provocation indefinitely), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian relations and the mutual adjustment of the pressing questions are desirable. For these reasons the Reich Foreign Minister declares that he is prepared to come by plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18. . . .

RIBBENTROP TO SCHULENBURG.

/Ibid., pp. 57-58./

41. Ribbentrop Communicates to Moscow— 18 August 1939

Please arrange immediately another conversation with Herr Molotov. . . . I am also in a position to sign a special protocol regulating the interests of both parties on questions of foreign policy of one kind or another; for instance, the settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area, the problem of the Baltic States, etc. Such a settlement, too, which seems to us of considerable importance, is only possible, however, at an oral discussion. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 61-63./

42. Molotov O.K.'s—19 August 1939

In my first conversation of today with Molotov— . . . M. acknowledged the positive importance of the proposed trip. . . . The German draft of the non-aggression pact was by no means exhaustive. The Soviet Government desired that one of the many non-aggression pacts that the Soviet Government had concluded with other countries (for example with Poland, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) should serve as a model for the nonaggression pact with Germany. . . .

Hardly half an hour after the close of the conversation, M. sent me word, asking me to call on him again at the Kremlin at 4:30 p.m. . . .

I assume that Stalin intervened. . . .

SCHULENBURG to Berlin.

/Ibid., pp. 64-65./

43. Hitler-Stalin Deal Taking Shape

(a) *Ribbentrop to the German Foreign Office*
Telegram

Moscow, August 23, 1939—8:05 p.m.

VERY URGENT

Please advise the Führer at once that the first three-hour conference with Stalin and Molotov had just ended. At the discussion—which, moreover, proceeded affirmatively in our sense—it transpired that the decisive point for the final result is the demand of the Russians that we recognize the ports of Libau and Windau as within their sphere of influence. I would be grateful for confirmation before 8 o'clock German time that the Führer is in agreement. The signing of a secret protocol on delimitation of mutual spheres of influence in the whole area is contemplated, for which I declared myself ready in principle.

RIBBENTROP.

(b) *The German Foreign Office to Ribbentrop in Moscow.*

Telegram

Berlin, August 23, 1939.

No. 205. Reference your telegram No. 204.

Answer is Yes. Agreed.

KORDT.

/Ibid., pp. 71-72./

44. Stalin Drinks Toast to Hitler on the Night of 23 August 1939

. . . In the course of the conversation, Herr Stalin spontaneously proposed a toast to the Führer, as follows:

"I know how much the German nation loves its Führer; I should therefore like to drink to his health."

Herr Molotov drank to the health of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg.

Herr Molotov raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who—through his speech of March of this year, which had been well understood in Germany—had brought about the reversal in political relations.

Herren Molotov and Stalin drank repeatedly to the Nonaggression Pact, the new era of German-Russian relations, and to the German nation. . . .

When they took their leave, Herr Stalin addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister words to this effect:

The Soviet Government takes the new Pact very seriously. He could guarantee on his word of honor that the *Soviet Union would not betray its partner*.

(Under Secretary of State) HENCKE.

Moscow, August 24, 1939.

/Ibid., pp. 75-76./

45. The Secret Protocol of 23 August 1939— Division of Loot

Secret Additional Protocol

On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the *northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.* In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

4. This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:	Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. RIBBENTROP	V. MOLOTOV

/Ibid., pp. 78./

46. Stalin Cements His Partnership With Blood of the Poles

German Ambassador Schulenburg to Berlin.

Telegram

Moscow, September 16, 1939.

I saw Molotov at 6 o'clock today and carried out instructions. Molotov declared that military interven-

tion by the Soviet Union was imminent—perhaps even tomorrow or the day after. Stalin was at present in consultation with the military leaders and he would this very night, in the presence of Molotov, give me the day and hour of the Soviet advance. . . .

Moscow conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like that stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and *had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention*.

In conclusion Molotov urgently asked for an explanation of *what was to become of Vilna*. The Soviet Government absolutely wanted to avoid a clash with Lithuania and would, therefore, like to know whether some agreement had been reached with Lithuania regarding the Vilna region, particularly as to who was to occupy the city.

/Ibid., pp. 95-96./

47. Poland Gets the Stab in the Back— 17 September 1939

(a) Polish Ambassador M. Grzybowski in Moscow to His Government.

Moscow, September 17, 1939.

M. Potemkin sent for me today, September 17, at 3 a.m., and read me a note from his Government, signed by Premier Molotov. The note communicates that the Soviet Government has ordered its troops to cross the Polish frontier. . . .

(b) Text of the Russian note to Poland's Ambassador in Moscow.

The Polish-German war has revealed the internal bankruptcy of the Polish State. During the course of ten days' hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial areas and cultural centres. Warsaw no longer exists as the capital of Poland. The Polish Government has disintegrated, and no longer shows any sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist. Therefore the Agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have ceased to operate. Left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable field for all manner of hazards and surprises, which may constitute a threat to the U.S.S.R. For these reasons, the Soviet Government, which hitherto has preserved neutrality, cannot any longer observe a neutral attitude towards these facts.

The Soviet Government further cannot view with indifference the fact that the kindred Ukrainian and White Russian people, who live on Polish territory and who are at the mercy of fate, are left defenseless.

In these circumstances, the Soviet Government has directed the High Command of the Red Army to order the troops to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the life and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.

At the same time the Soviet Government proposes to take all measures to extricate the Polish people from the unfortunate war into which they were dragged by their unwise leaders, and to enable them to live a peaceful life.

/Polish-Soviet Relations, *supra*, pp. 26-27./

48. Stalin Decides to Obliterate Poland

Moscow, September 20, 1939.

Molotov stated to me today that the Soviet Government now considered the time ripe for it, jointly with the German Government, to establish definitely the structure of the Polish area. In this regard, Molotov hinted that the original inclination entertained by the Soviet Government and Stalin personally to permit the existence of a residual Poland had given way to the inclination to partition Poland along the Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San Line. . . .

SCHULENBURG to Berlin.

/Nazi-Soviet Relations, *supra*, p. 101./

49. Stalin's Lust Grows—25 September 1939

Stalin and Molotov asked me to come to the Kremlin at 8 p.m. today. *Stalin stated* the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it *wrong to leave an independent Polish rump state*. He proposed the following: From the territory to the east of the demarcation line, all the Province of Lublin and that portion of the Province of Warsaw which extends to the Bug should be added to our share. In return, we should *waive our claim to Lithuania*.

Stalin designated this suggestion as a subject for the forthcoming negotiations with the Reich Foreign Minister and added that, if we consented, the Soviet Union would immediately take up the solution of the problem of the Baltic countries in accordance with the Protocol of August 23, and expected in this matter the unstinting support of the German Government. Stalin expressly indicated Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but did not mention Finland.

I replied to Stalin that I would report to my Government.

SCHULENBURG.

/Ibid., pp. 102-103./

50. Estonia to the Gallows: Berlin to German Embassy in Moscow—27 September 1939

Telegram from Tallinn No. 163 of the 26th for Army High Command, Attaché Section:

The Estonian Chief of Staff informed me of the Russian demand for an alliance. He stated that a naval base at Baltischport and an air base on the Estonian islands were demanded by Russia. The General Staff recommended acceptance of the demands as German aid was most unlikely, hence the situation could only become worse. On September 25 and 26, Russian aircraft carried out extensive flights over Estonian territory. The General Staff gave orders not to

fire on aircraft in order not to prejudice the situation. Rössing (German Military Attaché in Estonia). Frohwein (German Minister in Estonia).

BRUECKLMEIER.

/Ibid., p. 103./

51. Estonia Gets Conditions—Berlin Notifies Embassy in Moscow

Berlin, September 27, 1939.

Telegram from Reval No. 164 of the 26th:

The Foreign Minister conveyed a request to inform the Reich Foreign Minister of the following, if possible before his departure for Moscow:

The Estonian Government, under the gravest threat of imminent attack, perforce is prepared to accept a military alliance with the Soviet Union. Minister Selter with staff will fly to Moscow tomorrow, Wednesday, to negotiate. Aim of negotiation: Framing of a treaty in such manner that the sovereignty and internal security of the country are preserved and the Estonian nonaggression pact kept intact. Hence they intended to propose, in connection with the mutual assistance obligation of the contracting parties, to except the existing nonaggression pacts with third countries. It is further desired that naval and air bases should be made available only in case of war, when assistance obligation comes into play; in peace time as far as possible only preparation of the bases. The Russians first demanded Reval as a naval base, but seem prepared to agree to Baltischport or a port on Oesel. The Estonians wish if possible to grant air bases only on island. The general tendency is to meet the demands only as far as necessary to prevent an attack and maintain existing good relations with Germany. Frohwein.

BRUECKLMEIER.

/Ibid., pp. 104-105./

52. Axe for the Estonians—Ballet for Ribbentrop

Timetable of Ribbentrop's Second Visit to Moscow.

28 September 1939.

Meeting resumed 3 to 6:30 p.m.

Dinner at Kremlin.

One act of ballet (Swan Lake); Stalin meanwhile negotiated with the Estonians.*

Meeting resumed at midnight.

Signing at 5 a.m.

Afterwards reception . . . till about 6:30 a.m.

* "Latvians" in the original.

/Ibid., p. 105./

53. Second Hitler-Stalin Pact: Boundary and Friendship Treaty

The Government of the German *Reich* and the Government of the *USSR* consider it as exclusively their task, after the collapse of the former Polish state, to re-establish peace and order in these territories and to assure to the peoples living there a peaceful life in keeping with their national character. To this end, they have agreed upon the following:

Article I.

The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR determine as the boundary of their respective national interests in the territory of the former Polish state the line marked on the attached map, which shall be described in more detail in a supplementary protocol.

Article II.

Both parties recognize the boundary of the respective national interests established in Article I as definitive and shall reject any interference of third powers in this settlement. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 105-106./

54. Lithuania Partitioned*Secret Supplementary Protocol*

The undersigned plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the USSR upon the following:

The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the USSR, while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the USSR shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:	By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
J. RIBBENTROP.	V. MOLOTOV.

/Ibid., p. 107./

55. Cries of the Victims Must Be Stifled*Secret Supplementary Protocol*

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, on concluding the German-Russian Boundary and Friendship Treaty, have declared their agreement upon the following:

Both parties will tolerate in their territories no Polish agitation which affects the territories of the other party. They will suppress in their territories all beginnings of such agitation and inform each other concerning suitable measures for this purpose.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:	By authority of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
J. RIBBENTROP.	V. MOLOTOV.

/Ibid., p. 107./

56. Russian Technique vs. Latvia: Munters Reports to Riga

October 2, 1939.

In the Kremlin from 9:30 to 12 p.m.

Participants: Stalin, Molotov, Potemkin, Zotov, Munters, Kocinš.

MOLOTOV: We wanted to talk over with you how to settle our relations. Shall they be approximately as with Estonia? . . . We need a naval base open all the year.

STALIN: I think that you will not swear at us. Twenty years have passed; we are stronger, and you also are stronger. We want to discuss those same airfields and military defense.

We do not encroach upon either your constitution, organs, ministries, foreign policy, financial policy or economic system. Our demands are based upon the war between Germany, England and France. Incidentally, should we agree there are very good perspectives in commercial-economic matters.

. . . Molotov started with the non-aggression treaty with Germany. "There had been a sudden turn on the part of Germany. We received it sympathetically (*sochuvstenno*), for it meant turning away from war, at least a general war. We have agreed in all basic questions, and now we not only have no problems for a struggle but not even for friction. Our foundation is secure. We fixed the frontier precisely . . . however, we are thinking of the future. One State has already paid the price (*poplatilas*). That was the fault of the English, French and Poles. With Germany we have established relations on a lasting basis, and also in regard to the Baltic States our views do not differ from those of Germany. . . . Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have already disappeared; others may also disappear . . . but we are principally thinking of ourselves. That which was determined in 1920 cannot remain for eternity. Peter the Great saw to it that an outlet to the sea was gained. . . . We, therefore, wish to ensure ourselves the use of ports, roads to these ports and their defense. (There was neither haste nor threats. Regarding the Lithuanians it was said that perhaps they will receive Wilno. — MUNTERS.)

MUNTERS: . . . In view of the fact that they have non-aggression treaty (*Molotov corrected me, treaty of friendship*), we do not understand what additional security there could be.

MOLOTOV: We cannot permit small States to be used against the USSR. Neutral Baltic States—that is too insecure (*nenadezhno*). . . .

MUNTERS: . . . As long as you are friendly with Germany no one can take advantage of us.

STALIN: England has already demanded from Sweden certain airfields and the admission of some submarines; Sweden may easily be drawn into the war. . . .

. . . What will be done with Poland is not precisely known; to the east of the frontier the settlement is final. In the west there may be a protectorate. . . . I tell you frankly: a division of spheres of interest has

already taken place. When I said that we have to observe our peace treaty also with Germany: As far as Germany is concerned we could occupy you. However, we want no abuse (*ne zhelaem zloupotrebit*). *Ribbentrop is a sensible person.*

We shall need Liepaja, Ventspils; also your unemployed will have employment. (I interrupted here that we have no unemployment to which Zotov replied that we have 11,000). The territory having a Russian minority could be taken away from you, but we do not raise that question. . . .

/Molotov drew out a project. Stalin began to rattle off all kinds of figures: 15 submarines and auxiliary cruisers in bases; 4 airfields./

MUNTERS reports: My principal argument was that *public opinion must* receive the impression that that is a friendly step and not an enforced yoke leading to oppression. . . . Stalin showed amazing military knowledge and skill with figures. . . . Then Stalin incidentally said that in order to lighten our situation Riga could be dropped (mutual comedy with Molotov, who said that that was not well) Then again . . . Stalin mentioned 40,000. They began to calculate our population and that of Estonia. They estimated—4 aviation regiments with 240 aircraft . . . one or two tank brigades and one infantry brigade—a division would have been better. So 38,000-40,000—if you want, 38,000; if it were less the Estonians would laugh. . . .

STALIN: You have nothing to fear. Maintain 100,000. Your rifles were good and your army is better than the Estonian army. The treaty with Estonia has been criticized: (1) some said treason; (2) others said safety; (3) still others—let us see. The *garrisons are only for the duration of the war—if it ends they will be withdrawn*. . . . The heavens glow from the struggles of the giants. . . . In the war there will no longer be any neutrals. But if the war ends—we shall withdraw. We need Baltic ports—the Estonian ports are not ice free. Beck has lost everything (*promotal*). We have offered help, without garrisons, with better intentions. The reply: *nam vasha pomoshch ne nuzhna i prokrutili usy po polski. Nashe slovo krepkoye—vozmite Mongoliyu* (we do not need your assistance, and they rolled up their mustaches in Polish fashion. We keep our word—take, for example, Mongolia). After this treaty everyone will know—here are two masters—Latvians and Russians.

Having accepted nothing, we parted till October 3, at 6 p.m.

/Latvia in 1939-1942, Washington 1942, pp. 95-97./

57. Latvia Goes Down—"Mutual Assistance Pact" October 3, 1939.

In the Kremlin from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m.

. . . In view of the fact that the material stipulations of Article III and of the secret protocol are of a purely strategic nature . . . they must be given a temporary character . . . limiting their application exclusively to the duration of the war.

Most essential, however, . . . the conclusion of *this treaty must not appear in the eyes of the Latvian people to be an imposed heavy yoke* . . . there cannot be the slightest doubt that the treaty will be interpreted as the creation of something similar to a protectorate—a situation unacceptable to a liberty loving nation. . .

For this reason I . . . cannot propose to accept . . . the project as basis . . . although in general all concessions here are made on our part.

In order to soften that impression I consider it indispensable to stipulate . . . garrisons . . . not only for the duration of "the present war in Europe," but also that at the end of the war the garrisons will immediately be recalled.

MOLOTOV: (Stalin writes, draws, walks around, seizes books and newspapers)—Our concession of yesterday is final. You now retreat. . . . You are larger than Estonia but want to give less. . . . You have 60,000 territorials (*aizsargi*), well, it makes no difference, 40,000. Our military men consider 30,000 to be unacceptable. Your proposals are entirely unacceptable. . . . Weigh the situation. . . .

STALIN:—You start from conditions of peace, but one must start out from worst. . . . I have only one correction: Article III to read "for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the USSR frontiers and to enhance its own independence." I accept, omitting the word "frontiers." You do not trust us, and we don't quite trust you either. You believe that we wish to seize you. We could do that now, but we do not do it. . . . We shall pay your tariffs and a great revival will take place. Liepaja and Ventspils are small matters; they are not Hangö and Tallinn. We do not wish to delay. You had twice as much time as the Estonians. You already see how the Estonian nation values the treaty. This is best proved by Selter's telegram. Your army remains untouched, in a couple of days you can arouse an army, we can do nothing quickly in these scattered places. We raised 3½ millions in six days. Our garrisons will be a preventative force. If the war will spread the treaty will later have to be supplemented. In Pitragi we shall not disturb your fishermen. The artillery will be in towers—let them fish as much as they like. . . . A German attack is also possible. For six years German fascists and the communists cursed each other. Now an unexpected turn took place; that happens in the course of history. But one cannot rely upon it. We must be prepared in time. Others who were not ready paid the price. . . .

. . . But it must be understood that there must be no delay. We do not ask that people be uprooted from their homes. It may be necessary on the coast (*pozhalui nado budet u morya*) . . .

. . . . Won't you let our sailors go to see the girls? Not even on their "days off?" They are well behaved. . .

In August the Germans, in speaking of the divisions of spheres of interest, mentioned the river Daugava, dividing Latvia into two parts. The Russians did not agree, saying that nations cannot be treated in this

way. The Germans always work with a hammer; for example, they intend to turn the Czechs into Germans. Then the Russians announced their interest in Liepaja. Perhaps German pretensions can awaken again. The Czechs wanted to fight, and also the heads of the army, but the leaders spoiled this (pomeshali). The English, so say the Estonians, a few years ago wanted to buy Osel and Dago Islands. In connection with the existence of our army and bases there will be great activity in your ports. . . .

MOLOTOV: . . . It would be best to sign tonight, and then tomorrow we would celebrate and issue it to the press. . . .

Pact of Mutual Assistance Between Latvia and the USSR

. . . Article III. In order to insure the safety of the USSR and to consolidate her own independence, the Latvian Republic grants to the Union the right to maintain . . . naval bases and several airfields . . . on leasehold at a reasonable rental. . . .

Article V. The carrying into effect of the present pact must in no way affect the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their political structure, their economic and social system, and their military measures. . . .

Article VI. . . . The present pact shall remain in force for a period of 10 years, and in the event that one of the contracting parties does not consider it necessary to denounce the present pact 1 year prior to the expiration of such period, it will automatically remain in force for the following 10 years. . . .
Moscow, October 5, 1939.

V. MUNTERS.

V. MOLOTOV.

/Ibid., pp. 98-104./

58. Lithuania Next, Schulenburg Reports 3 October 1939

Molotov summoned me to his office at 2 p.m. today, in order to communicate to me the following:

The Soviet Government would tell the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, who arrives today, that, within the framework of an amicable settlement of mutual relations (probably similar to the one with Estonia), the Soviet Government was willing to cede the city of Vilna and its environs to Lithuania, while at the same time the Soviet Government would indicate to Lithuania that it must cede the well-known portion of its territory to Germany. Molotov inquired what formal procedure we had in mind for carrying this out. His idea was the simultaneous signing of a Soviet-Lithuanian protocol on Vilna and a German-Lithuanian protocol on the Lithuanian area to be ceded to us.

I replied that this suggestion did not appeal to me. It seemed to me more logical that the Soviet Government should exchange Vilna for the strip to be ceded to us and then hand this strip over to us. Molotov did

not seem quite in accord with my proposal but was willing to let me ask for the viewpoint of my Government and give him a reply by tomorrow noon.

Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, as in the eyes of the world it would make us appear as "robbers" of Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet Government figures as the donor. As I see it, only my suggestion enters into consideration at all. However, I would ask you to consider whether it might not be advisable for us, by a separate secret German-Soviet protocol, to forego the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory until the Soviet Union actually incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based.

/Nazi-Soviet Relations, supra, p. 112./

59. Ribbentrop Attempts to Save Appearances— 4 October 1939

I, too, do not consider the method Molotov suggested for the cession of the Lithuanian strip of territory as suitable. On the contrary, please ask Molotov not to discuss this cession of territory with the Lithuanians at present, but rather to have the Soviet Government assume the obligation *toward Germany* to leave this strip of territory unoccupied in the event of a posting of Soviet forces in Lithuania, which may possibly be contemplated, and furthermore to leave it to Germany to determine the date on which the cession of the territory should be formally effected. An understanding to this effect should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.

/Ibid., pp. 113-114./

60. The Thief Would Not Hold His Tongue— Schulenburg Reports 5 October

Immediately after Under State Secretary Gaus' first telephone call I transmitted to Molotov this morning the request not to divulge to the Lithuanian Foreign Minister anything regarding the German-Soviet understanding concerning Lithuania. Molotov asked me to see him at 5 p.m. and told me, that, unfortunately, he had been obliged yesterday to inform the Lithuanian Foreign Minister of this understanding, since he could not, out of loyalty to us, act otherwise. The Lithuanian delegation had been extremely dismayed and sad; they had declared that the loss of this area in particular would be especially hard to bear, since many prominent leaders of the Lithuanian people came from that part of Lithuania. This morning at 8 a.m. the Lithuanian Foreign Minister had flown back to Kowno, intending to return to Moscow in one or two days.

I said that I would immediately notify my Government by telephone, whereupon I called Herr Gaus. An hour later Molotov informed that Stalin *personally* requested the German Government *not* to insist for *the moment* upon the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory.

/Ibid., p. 114./

61. Fellow Thief Tries to Save Face—Ribbentrop to Schulenburg 5 October

Legation in Kowno is being instructed as follows:

1) Solely for your personal information, I am apprising you of the following: At the time of the signing of the German-Russian Nonaggression Pact on August 23, a strictly secret delimitation of the respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe was also undertaken. In accordance therewith, Lithuania was to belong to the German sphere of influence, while in the territory of the former Polish state, the so-called Four-River Line, Pissa-Narew-Vistula-San, was to constitute the border. Even then I demanded that the district of Vilna go to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government consented. At the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty on September 28, the settlement was amended to the extent that Lithuania, including the Vilna area, was included in the Russian sphere of influence, for which in turn, in the Polish area, the province of Lublin and large portions of the province of Warsaw, including the pocket of territory of Suwalki, fell within the German sphere of influence. Since, by the inclusion of the Suwalki tract in the German sphere of influence, a difficulty in drawing the border line resulted, we agreed that in case the Soviets should take special measures in Lithuania, a small strip of territory in the southwest of Lithuania, accurately marked on the map, should fall to Germany.

2) Today Count von der Schulenburg reports that Molotov, contrary to our own intentions, notified the Lithuanian Foreign Minister last night of the confidential arrangement. Please now, on your part, inform the Lithuanian Government, orally and in strict confidence, of the matter as follows:

As early as at the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 23, in order to avoid complications in Eastern Europe, conversations were held between ourselves and the Soviet Government concerning the delimitation of German and Soviet spheres of influence. In these conversations I had recommended restoring the Vilna district to Lithuania, to which the Soviet Government gave me its consent. In the negotiations concerning the Boundary and Friendship Treaty of September 28, as is apparent from the German-Soviet boundary demarcation which was published, the pocket of territory of Suwalki jutting out between Germany and Lithuania had fallen to Germany. As this created an intricate and impractical boundary, I had reserved for Germany a border correction in this area, whereby a small strip of Lithuanian territory would fall to Germany. The award of Vilna to Lithuania was maintained in these negotiations also. You are now authorized to make it known to the Lithuanian Government that the Reich Government does not consider the question of this border revision timely at this moment. We make the proviso, however, that the Lithuanian Government treat this matter as strictly confidential. End of instruction for Kowno.

I request you to inform Herr Molotov of our communication to the Lithuanian Government. Further, please request of him, as already indicated in the preceding telegram, that the border strip of Lithuanian territory involved be left free in the event of a possible posting of Soviet troops in Lithuania and also that it be left to Germany to determine the date of the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the territory involved. Both of these points at issue should be set forth in a secret exchange of letters between yourself and Molotov.

/Ibid., pp. 115-116./

62. Berlin Informs Schulenburg of Lithuanian Reactions—5 October 1939

The Lithuanian Minister called on me this evening in order, as was expected, to inquire about German claims to a strip of land in southwestern Lithuania. Herr Skirpa, however, even when he entered, had a friendlier appearance than was to be expected. For Minister Zechlin had in the meantime delivered information in Kowno as instructed, so that I did not need to go any further into the questions that Herr Skirpa put. I restricted myself to a brief mention of today's telegraphic instructions to Herr Zechlin. Since Herr Skirpa expressed to me the satisfaction of his Government that we had withdrawn our claim, I stressed that the announcement of our need was "not at the moment pressing." (It is noteworthy that Herr Skirpa knew and traced exactly on the map of Poland that happened to be spread out before us the line agreed upon by us in our secret protocol with the Russians).

The Minister then gave the further information that the Russians expected to get an assistance pact with Lithuania as well as permission to station Russian garrisons, at the same time agreeing in principle to the joining (*Anschluss*) of Vilna and environs to Lithuania. Herr Skirpa asked me if I had any ideas or suggestions to give in this regard. I stated that I was not informed and added that in connection with our negotiations in Moscow German interests had not been claimed beyond the Russo-German line in the east known to Herr Skirpa.

In conclusion the Minister asked to be given any possible suggestions. Herr Urbsys was still remaining in Kowno today and tomorrow; he himself—Skirpa—was at the disposal of the Reich Foreign Minister at any time.

WEIZSAECKER.

/Ibid., pp. 116-117./

63. Molotov Accepts Ribbentrop's Formula—Note to Schulenburg

Moscow, October 8, 1939.

Secret

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honor hereby to confirm that in connection with the secret supplementary protocol, concluded on September 29 (28), 1939, between the USSR and Germany, concerning Lithuania, the following understanding exists between us:

1) The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the protocol and marked on the map attached to the protocol shall not be occupied in case forces of the Red Army should be stationed (in Lithuania);

2) It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for the implementing of the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the expression of my highest consideration.

W. MOLOTOW.
/Ibid., pp. 118-119./

64. Finns Have a Premonition—

Berlin, October 9, 1939.

The Finnish Minister had announced a visit today to the Reich Foreign Minister. On the latter's instructions I received Herr Wuorimaa this afternoon. He presented the following facts:

By virtue of the developments in the Baltic States, Russia had now penetrated so far into the Baltic that the balance of power there had been upset, and predominance threatened to pass to Russia. The lack of interest in this matter on the part of Germany had attracted attention in Finland, since there was reason to assume that Russia intended to make demands on Finland identical with those made on the Baltic States.

The Finnish Government had requested of Wuorimaa that he find out whether Germany remains indifferent to Russia's forward thrust in this direction and, should that not prove to be the case, to learn what stand Germany intends to take. . . .

From the words of the Minister it could be inferred that the Finnish Government was rather disturbed over the Russian demands and would not submit to oppression as did Estonia and Latvia. . . . I merely said that I hoped and wished that Finland might settle matters with Russia in a peaceful manner.

WEIZSAECKER.
/Ibid., p. 121./

65. Sweden Is Interested Only in Finland

Berlin, October 9, 1939.

The Swedish Minister called on me today to tell me that a serious situation would arise in the Baltic region if Russia were to make demands on Finland which threatened the independence and autonomy of Finland. The Minister wished to inform me of the preceding with reference to the close relations between Sweden and Finland. It should not be forgotten that, in contrast to Estonia and Latvia, strong and vigorous forces were in power in Finland, who would not submit to Russian oppression. . . .

WEIZSAECKER.
/Ibid., p. 123./

66. Lithuanian-Russian Pact of Mutual Assistance

. . . For the purpose of developing the friendly relations established by the peace treaty of July 12, 1920, and based on the recognition of an independent state existence and nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other party;

Recognizing that the peace treaty of July 12, 1920, and the pact on nonaggression and peaceful settlement of conflicts of September 28, 1926, continue to form a firm basis for their mutual relations and undertakings; . . .

Article VII.—Fulfillment of this treaty shall not affect in any way the sovereign rights of the contracting parties, in particular their state organization, economic and social systems, military measures, and generally the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs. . . .

Article VIII.—The term of validity of this treaty in regard to the undertakings for mutual assistance between the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR (Articles II and VII) is for fifteen years and unless one of the contracting parties finds it necessary to denounce the provisions of this treaty established for a specified term of one year prior to expiration of that term, these provisions shall automatically continue to be valid for the next ten years. . . .

Moscow, October 10, 1939.

JUOZAS URBŠYS.

VYACHESLAV MOLOTOV.

/The Economic Reconstruction of Lithuania After 1918, by Anicetas Simutis, Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 128-131./

67. Russian Technique vis à vis Lithuania

Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Juozas Urbšys, arrived at Moscow on 3 October 1939, and learned from Stalin and Molotov that his country would receive the same treatment as was meted out to Estonia, Latvia: a mutual assistance pact with 50,000 Russian troops garrisoned in Lithuania. The cup of bitterness in return for 20 years of loyal friendship with Russia was to be "sweetened" by the return of the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, and a narrow strip of adjacent territory—to which Lithuania had a perfect title under its Peace Treaty with Russia of 12 July 1920.

Mr. Urbšys attempted to defend Lithuanian neutrality and pointed to Russia's interest to give Lithuania a more favorable treatment. He stressed that the Lithuanian people had bitterly opposed the denationalization efforts of the Tsars; that Lithuania inherited old and honorable traditions of independent statehood and a great historical past; that the people would feel insulted by the garrisoning of foreign troops and would lose confidence in its great neighbor.

No arguments in rebuttal were offered, except a mechanical repetition of phrases: "It is to your own best interests to accept our proposals, inasmuch as, with our garrisons on your territory, the entire 'tail' would move should anyone dare to touch you," and "You do not want to understand that a war, a great war is afoot."

Mr. Urbšys flew back to Kaunas on 4 October to report to his Government.

The Cabinet immediately met in a special session. Considering that Germany had already signed on September 28, 1939, a treaty of "Boundary and Friend-

ship" and had thus, in reality, sold away the Baltic Republics to Muscovy's mercy,—the Cabinet agreed in principle to enter into a treaty of mutual assistance and formulated its own counter-proposals.

The counter-proposals were immediately drafted by legal experts and approved by the Cabinet. The main features were the following:

1) In the event of aggression against Lithuania by any other state, or in the event of an attempt to attack the USSR across the territory of Lithuania, the Soviet Union shall give immediate and full military assistance.

2) Lithuania, assisted by the USSR financially and with arms, would double her present military establishment.

3) Assisted financially and with raw materials by the USSR, Lithuania shall construct defensive fortifications in the places agreed upon by both contracting states.

4) Both countries shall maintain military missions of their respective General Staffs to supervise the matters arising out of the pact and to coordinate matters of military collaboration.

On 7 October 1939, Mr. Urbšys, escorted by Vice Premier Bizauskas, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Brig. Gen. Stasys Raštikis, Director of Economic Affairs Dr. Juozas Norkaitis, and by a staff of legal and ethnographic experts, returned to Moscow. On the same night he was closeted in session with Premier and Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov, Deputy Commissar Potyomkin, and Soviet Minister to Lithuania Pozdnyakov. Stalin was absent this time.

The Lithuanians carefully observed Molotov's reactions during an impassioned plea of Mr. Urbšys. It seemed that the Russians would accept the Lithuanian proposals. Toward the end, however, Molotov dropped a hint that the resistance of the Lithuanians to the proposed pact "disturbs the Soviet pacts with Estonia and Latvia."

The second session, on 8 October 1939, was attended by Stalin. It became painfully clear that the Muscovites tenaciously clung to their own dictates. Stalin declared that a Lithuanian project might be accepted—with an amendment, however, that the Soviet garrisons would be admitted. As to the number of troops, Stalin "condescended" to accept the figure of 20,000, provided that such number be stationed *permanently* for the duration of the pact, to wit, 25 years. This "condescension" ominously compared with the provisions in the pacts with Estonia and Latvia, which recited that the Soviet garrisons were to stay there "for the duration of the present war (*na vremya etoy voyny*)." The Soviet delegates did not attempt to justify their insistence. Stalin was evasive. He spoke incoherently, at times our delegates could not understand him. One thing was clear: Stalin rejected the Lithuanian counter-proposals.

The very atmosphere of the "negotiations" rapidly disintegrated. Stalin and his aides were clearly impatient and dissatisfied over the delay.

Before adjourning for consultation, Lithuanian delegates inquired about the proposed new frontier with Russia. Molotov pointed his finger at the map, showing approximately the same borders as were later fixed by the pact—about one-eighth of the Lithuanian territory formerly occupied by Poland, disregarding the Soviet-Lithuanian boundary as fixed by the Peace Pact of 12 July 1920.

Mr. Urbšys and ethnographic experts tried to point out that the proposed frontier would exclude the districts predominantly settled by the Lithuanians. But the Muscovites would not listen to arguments. Molotov merely remarked that the Russian people are not yet informed of their government's intention to return Vilnius environs to Lithuania, while he personally succeeded in convincing the White Ruthenian (Byelorussian) Soviet of the necessity of such action, and that when "the people" will learn, he is not quite certain about the popular reaction to such "generosity" of the Soviets to Lithuania.

At dawn on 9 October 1939 Mr. Bizauskas and Gen. Raštikis flew back to Kaunas to report to the Government. The Cabinet, foreseeing no assistance from any source, decided to empower the delegates to sign the pact proposed by Moscow.

On 10 October 1939 the delegates returned to Moscow by plane. Another evening session was held in the Kremlin, with Stalin absent. Our delegates announced their Government's consent in principle to sign the Moscow-sponsored pact, with several amendments. The Russians behaved extremely impatiently. Our delegates were astounded when the bolsheviks placed before them a new draft which combined two pacts into one: the treaty delineating the frontiers, and the mutual assistance pact, originally submitted in two separate drafts.

The bolsheviks turned a deaf ear to any argument on technical questions or the adjustment of the frontiers. Our delegates asked for a recess and retired to their Legation.

The delegates returned to the Kremlin later at night and the texts in two languages were drawn. While waiting for the papers, the Muscovites brought in food and drinks. Finally entered "the most prudent and beloved father and leader of nations, the most illustrious Stalin The Sun," accompanied by Marshal Voroshilov and Zhdanov. The pact was signed, and the moment of signing was photographed.

At 5 P.M. on 11 October, the Kremlin gave a lavish banquet in honor of the Lithuanian delegation. The Soviet leaders delivered their orations. Both Stalin and Molotov strongly insisted that they would "faithfully and sacredly" observe their obligations and would not interfere in our internal affairs, and that they desired to maintain the traditional Soviet-Lithuanian friendship.

EDUARDAS TURAUSKAS.

(To be continued)

Lithuanian Folk Art

By Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Ph.D.

(Continuation)

Architecture

Horses and birds shaped by crossed boughs on the gable-ends were reminiscent of the ancient zoomorphic combinations common to Romanesque sculpture. These protected the home from destruction, sickness, fire. According to the legend, evil spirits which hovered over the village entered only the homes which had no such ornaments—which provided them with a perch to pause for breath. (Fig. 4).




FIGURE 4.

Typical Lithuanian carved rooftop ornaments.

This was the type of home in which lived the peasant who could improve his living conditions and make use of novel methods. With a striking consistency, these forms appeared throughout the centuries and were found in structures remodeled in accordance with the needs of the times. In the same way, the *klėtis* today fills modern requirements, yet savors of ancient traditions.

Church constructions were patterned along the same traditions. Since the beginning, the churches were built of timber. The Cathedral of Vilnius, consecrated in 1387, was burned down by the Teutonic Knights. In 1390, King Jogaila complained to the Pope of the destructions by the Teutons of a new church whose building materials were sufficient for the erection of a bridge across the Neris River. The Cathedral was rebuilt, and in turn burned to the ground in 1394.

Church structure did not differ greatly from that of the home. As in the period of the first Christians, this was the home to welcome the new God. Until very recent times, a model of the *klėtis* served for church construction as well as home building. Devoted to paying tribute to God, the home of the peasant was improved, the lay-out was enlarged, the roof was raised higher, windows were made great, but the main lines of style were faithfully retained. (Fig 5). A




FIGURE 5.

The church-*klėtis* of Rumšiškis.

simple balustrade separated the nave from the altar. Presently, the *prieklėtis* was the structure's porch. When there was an apse, it was sometimes built along the entire length of the outer walls; sometimes the apse was narrow, within the customary proportions.

The inner walls were painted the same color. The ceiling was most frequently blue, as the firmament of the sky, and it was studded with gilded stars. Windows were often decorated with multicolored squares, the latest touch of the influence of the great Gothic windows. On great holidays, the beams, ceilings, the altar and statues were covered with wreaths, flowers, and foliage. The decor of trees and stars transformed the church into a peasant fairyland. Dressed in its holiday finery, the church seemed to shine under its external wooden bark.

The bell was sheltered in a tower, originally built in the façade and, later, in the middle of the roof elevation. In some places, the bell was suspended in the interior of the "porch", the vestibule, or even in the sacristy. But most often, a separate edifice was built to lodge the bell. The bellfry itself was never really a part of the church structure. It was developed independently. At Vabalninkas in the far north of the

country, and at Varėna in the south-east, the great beams forming a double-sloping roof formed and supported the bellfry.

In general, however, construction of a church was a far more complex process. The design was sometimes square, and sometimes octagonal. There were innumerable variations of the general design, from simple pyramids under pointed roofs, to bold scaffoldings where tiers seemed to flow from one another as from a magic box. (Fig. 6). At Vajasiškis, the three




FIGURE 6.

The bell towers of Vaiguva and Vajasiškis.

tiers, one leaning on the other, formed a sort of Oriental *ziggourat*. Often the tower was raised on a pyramidal base which in some cases formed the main part of the building. The walls were vertical or inclined. More stories were added. The projecting cornices marked the tier divisions. The apertures were large and developed into arcades.

The bulky solidness and the uniform foreparts made these towers, standing on large pedestals, remarkably forceful for edifices built of light timber materials. They had the appearance and sharpness of a military structure. Here was robust architecture without superfluity. The types similar to oblique masonry walls reminded one of the huge mills without pinions. They were compared to Ukrainian and Polish monuments, especially those of Galicia, where the belltowers may have derived from observation towers of the ancient forts.

However, such simple churches and belltowers could do only for small villages. If there was need for a larger building, the design and construction of Western architecture were adopted: the church with several naves or with a central dome. The Cathedral, designed as a structure of stone and concrete, changes its aspect completely when built of timber. Foreign systems were often fused with local forms. The character of a large church was thus imprinted on the *klėtis*.

The little chapel was divided by columns into three separate naves. Galleries were raised from the aisles




FIGURE 7.

The church of Kėdainiai.

and towards the entrance. (Fig. 7). More sacristies were added, a transept appeared. A steeple or two bell towers were placed on the façade. The windows were generally of rectangular design, but sometimes they terminated on a triangular arch. The construction, transformed in wood, was shorn of its usual decor. The buttresses, the arcades were omitted. Curves were completely done away with. Nothing destroyed the austerity of the entire pattern. Complete harmony lay in the homogeneity of the whole. These were tremendous barn-like buildings whose severity elicited a cistercian architecture.

Such was also the case in churches following the classic lines, having marble roofs, colonnades and cornices. At Utena, the entablature was fitted onto an additional roof which ran the length of the wall, as in some bell-towers or clock-towers. (Fig. 8). The




FIGURE 8.

The church of Utena.

cupola assumed an octagon shape and supported a small square turret, the lantern or skylight. The reduction of curves added a particular firmness to the structure. Without luxury, without orderly arrangement where everything is calculated and each profile is studied, it is piece of a somber and artistic carpentry work.

In the churches of the 17th and 18th centuries, irregular baroque bulbs were raised on the roof or in the towers; their light motifs underline and emphasize the massive construction. The wood was not concealed by a layer of stucco. In place of friezes and mouldings, there was an interplay of wooden planks. The church of the land of the Nordic navigators was assembled like the keel of a large boat. In Lithuania, the church was the handiwork of the woodcutters. Even when inspired by the bricklayer, the builder of the log cabins does not renounce his trade. He gains new ideas from the mason and develops an architecture of an unusual sort. In doing away with the characteristics and the decor which belong only to the stone structure, he avoids mistakes in details and creates his peculiar art.

A similar modification was evident in the synagogues of Lithuania. The Jews had enjoyed a haven and freedom of their religion and customs since long before 1388, in which year Vytautas The Great granted his first written *Privilegium* to the Jews. Clause Fourteen of that writ protected the Jewish houses of prayer: "Any one causing damage to an Israelite school-synagogue will be punished by law, either two talents or two pounds of pepper." This religious tolerance is traditional, a great heritage of the Lithuanian people.

The oldest preserved examples of the synagogue are traceable to the 17th century. Galleries and assortments of superstructures surrounded the central structure which was rectangular. In some cases, towers were placed at angles, but the entire ensemble was covered by an enormous roof. As a matter of fact, architecture was centered on the construction of the roof. Massive pyramids which were continually added to the structure lay heavily on the walls. At Vyžuonos, in southern

Lithuania, there were two pyramids, and there were three at Jurbarkas on the Nemunas. These fantastic superstructures were sometimes several times as high as the walls of the façade. Sometimes, a second story was built between two roofs. A cupola, also covered by a roof, was raised in the more important synagogues. The cupola at Šaukėnai, in central Lithuania, was octagonal. At Valkininkai (Fig. 9), it was fashioned on a square plane on the outside, but was octagonal in the interior. Here was recognizable the principle of the double plan of jointing, followed in the Orient.




FIGURE 9.
The synagogue of Valkininkai.

Nevertheless, aside from the cupola, the architecture attributed to the local builders seems to have reflected the native tradition. It is perhaps the synagogue which provides the truest picture of the elaborate abodes of the noblemen of the 17th and 18th centuries. According to available information, the synagogue was also the most extravagant example of the architecture of the period. Often it was furnished with cubic angular pavilions capped by huge roofs. The scale of this type of architecture places it in the class of the larger church and bell tower. Just as the type of home, the *klėtis*, was designed along entirely rational and economical lines of construction, here the design was the application of formative research and the use of the bold effects of proportions.

(To be continued.)

Lithuanian Contribution To America's Making

By Constantine R. Jurgėla, LL.B., LL.M.

(Continued)

Commodore A. Keppel, in a letter written 26 July 1755, to Governor Sir Charles Lawrence, mentions Lieutenant Theodore Barbut of the 48th Regiment who was wounded in the Battle of the Fort Duquesne (cf. J. Moss Ives, *A List of Additional Manuscripts of the French and Indian War* in the Library of the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass., 1908, p. 45). Theodore was an unusual name for a contemporary Englishman, but the family name, Barbutis-Barbutas, is a familiar Lithuanian name,

alongside typical Lithuanian names of Gimbutas, Narbutas, Kaributas, Tarbutas, Tvirbutas, Seibutas, etc.

Americans in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

In the late decades of the 18th Century we find Americans, two in particular, participating in the affairs of the Commonwealth of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under its last king, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski.

Charles Lee, an English-born American (1731-1782), arrived in the Commonwealth in 1764. He became immensely popular at the royal court. In quick succession, he was named Aide-de-Camp to the king, and he journeyed to Turkey as a member of the diplomatic mission to announce to the Sultan the accession of a new ruler to the throne of the Commonwealth. He was commissioned a Major General in the Royal Polish Army.

After a brief sojourn in Colonial America, Lee returned to the Commonwealth in 1769 for a few months. He fought, on the Muscovite side, against the Confederates of Bar, among whom the Pulaskis were prominent, and he served under General Ryepnin in a Russian expedition against Turkey. Later, he served in the American Revolution and, until his capture by the British at Baskingbridge, N. J., on 17 December 1776, was second in command of the Continental Army under George Washington. Seven decades after his burial with full military honors as an American hero, some incriminating documents were discovered showing that he may have been in the service of Britain.

Lewis or Louis Littlepage (1762-1802), a native Virginian and a former protegee of John Jay, arrived at Gardinas-Grodno in Lithuania, in 1784. He became English secretary to King Stanislas Augustus and gained the complete confidence of the ruler. He served as the king's confidential representative in private and minor diplomatic missions abroad—and in 1788 Thomas Jefferson, American Ambassador in Paris, noted the young American's career coupled with greed and gay life.

Littlepage induced John Paul Jones to accept a commission in the Imperial Russian Navy—which ruined the American hero—and became an agent of Baron Igelstroem and von Sievers, Muscovite ambassadors and stage managers in Poland and Lithuania.

Littlepage sold the king's confidences for cash and, in the words of von Sievers, became "wholly of our system . . . with power over the king's mind." Littlepage claimed to have fought on the Lithuanian side in the Insurrection of 1794, in the defence of Vilnius. Nevertheless, he was dishonorably discharged after the fall of Praga, Warsaw's suburb, where Russian Marshal Surorov massacred 20,000 soldiers (including about 5,000 Lithuanians) and civilians, sparing no man, woman or child.

Stanisław Krzemiński, a Polish writer who studied this matter, commented: "Littlepage was one of the most repulsive personalities ever engaged by King Stanislas Poniatowski for personal affairs and minor diplomacy. Once having taken hold of the king, he never let him go until a large sum was collected in payment of the royal debts." (*Stanisław Poniatowski i Maurycy Glayre*, Warszawa 1901, vol. I, p. 155).

When Russia paid Littlepage's claims against the king's estate in full, he returned to Virginia in 1800 and died there in 1802.

The Commonwealth's Fall Mirrored in America

The meritorious services of Thaddeus Kościuszko and the heroic deaths of Casimir Pulaski and John de Zieliński for American Liberty, aroused American interest in the Insurrection of 1794 in Poland and Lithuania, which was waged under the leadership of Kościuszko, a Brigadier General of the United States. The events in the Commonwealth were closely followed and reported in the contemporary American press. The liberal Constitution of 3 May 1791, and the mass participation of commoners in the great Insurrection greatly impressed American intellectuals.

Mieczislaus Haiman, Custodian of the Polish Museum and Archives in Chicago, collected private letters and newspaper stories of the period and published the materials in a 280-page volume: *The Fall of Poland In Contemporary American Opinion*, Chicago 1935. It contains voluminous reports regarding the events in the Commonwealth, including the Lithuanian Insurrection and the Samagite Insurrectionists' operations in Latvia.

Among writings of interest, a poem, *The Declaration of Independence*, by the Rev. George Richards (1769-1837), can also be applied to the situation in 1947-1948:

LITHUANIA'S eagle plumes his oft clipp'd wings,
And boldly turns the daring eye to heav'n:
Prompt for a flight above the throne of kings,
Down, by a NORTHERN tempest rudely driv'n
He sinks to earth: But shall he rise no more?
Yes! he shall rise, and yet to glory's acme soar.

Not CATHERINE'S herd of ever trembling slaves;
Not FRED'RIC'S drove of military beasts;
GERMANIA'S swarm; SPAIN'S consecrated glaives;
Nor ITALY'S anointed host of priests;
Shall LIBERTY impede, or check her course,
Which, as the bolted lightning sweeps with sure
aim'd force.

Yes; the poor wretch who broils beneath the blaze
Of either INDIA'S marrow melting clime,
Shall rouze, to FREEDOM rouze, and close his days,
As once life clos'd in nature's early prime,
When no crown'd despot mad with lust of pow'r,
To royal vultures cried, arise and flesh devour.

Woke by the wrongs of daily injur'd man,
Some bold MONTGOM'RY yet shall dauntless rise,
Where RUSSIAN deserts hive the droning clan,
Fling LIBERTY'S broad blaze o'er BOREAL skies,
And plant amid SIBERIA'S frozen waste,
The living tree of FREEDOM, sweet to human
taste.

Mr. Haiman, who reproduced these extracts on pp. 112-113 of his volume, notes that this poem was first published in Boston in 1793, in *The Magazine of History*, extra No. 150, vol. 38, No. 2.

(To be continued)

We, Americans, "Are Only Allowed To Dream Of..."

When the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation and the Latvian and Estonian exiles presented their appeals to the United Nations, some comments were made in the free American press.

The *New York Times* commented editorially on November 22, 1947:

"Appeal from Lithuania

"The first post-Nazi appeal against the crime of genocide, or the extermination of entire groups of human beings, has been submitted to the United Nations by the Lithuanian Legation in Washington, representing one of the three Baltic nations overrun and annexed by Russia but still recognized as independent by the United States. The Legation's appeal charges that the Russian authorities are proceeding with the extermination of the Lithuanian nation through wholesale arrests and murders, and especially through the deportation of large segments of the population to the slave labor camps of Siberia. The Lithuanian representatives appeal to the United Nations to take measures for safeguarding the Lithuanian people against the enslavement and extermination, in keeping with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the United Nations Charter.

"These charges have been raised before in neutral reports and find support in the flight of many Lithuanians from their country or into the underground resistance forces. Deportation and dispersal of whole populations and their extermination in slave labor camps have become common practice in Eastern Europe, and the Russians in particular are sensitive about "unfriendly" populations in strategic border areas. They liquidated as hostile the Checheno-Ingush Republic and the Crimean Republic and deported their populations into the interior. The inhabitants of the three Baltic states, who are likewise fighting Russian rule, appear to have been doomed to the same fate to make room for a solidly Russian frontier population.

"This confronts the United Nations with a problem. A resolution unanimously adopted by the General Assembly last December declared genocide to be an international crime for which principal and accomplices, whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, are punishable. A specific convention for international cooperation in stamping out this crime is now being prepared by the Assembly's committees, but this cannot absolve the Assembly itself from the duty of acting on its own

resolution. At the very least, it would seem to be under the obligation to investigate the charges. For even if Russia refuses to permit an investigation on the spot, there are ample precedents in the Spanish and Greek situations to hold an investigation on the basis of whatever evidence is available. What the Assembly cannot afford to do is to turn its back and look the other way when the spokesmen of small nations appeal for a hearing on life-or-death charges of this kind. And since the present Assembly session is drawing to a close, the task of examining these charges would seem to devolve on the Little Assembly as one of the first tests of its efficacy in meeting the purposes for which it was created."

Well, delegates to the General Assembly, including those of the United States, elected to "look the other way"... except that the delegate of the Union of South Africa made a passing reference to conditions in the Soviet-occupied countries while defending his own country from charges raised by India, and the delegate of El Salvador, Dr. Hector David Castro, mentioned on November 20, 1947, his receipt of complaints regarding the conditions in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.

These passing references aroused, however, the turncoat White Russian who acts as the Kremlin's principal spokesman. Comrade-Excellency Andriyash Hromyko (Andrei Gromyko) spoke at the General Assembly on November 21:

"... But apparently these documents are written by some traitors and quislings to their own people. These documents were written by traitors who have found refuge under the wing of Americans.

"The representative of El Salvador, and several others who

share his views, are well aware that workers, peasants, professionals, and clerical workers and all other workers in many countries are only allowed to dream of the rights which are at the disposal of all workers in the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics. . . ."

/Verbatim Record of the One Hundred and Twentieth Plenary Meeting, Flushing Meadow, N. Y., U. N. Document A/P.V.120./

We take pleasure in presenting a visible example of a typical representative of the happy and prosperous Russian Herrenvolk—a photograph taken by a Lithuanian, drafted for Soviet transport duty, in the vicinity of comrade Gromyko's own birthplace, near Smolensk.



This citizen of the Byelorussian SSR stands proudly in front of his own hovel. He confided ownership of a goat, a horse, and four hens. He strives to meet regularly the duties he owes to his great victorious Fatherland and its Führer, Stalin The Sun,—but regrets he was never able to make all payments and deliveries in full.