

... Russia without any prejudice recognizes the self-rule and independence of the State of Lithuania with all the juridical consequences ... and for all times renounces with good will all the sovereignty rights of Russia, which it has had in regard to the Lithuanian nation or territory.

Peace Treaty with Russia
Moscow, July 12, 1920

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill:

1. Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
 2. They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
 3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
- Atlantic Charter
August 14, 1941

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A Day with the Guerrilla N.C.O. School

By DAUMANTAS

Officer of the Lithuanian Liberation Army

Reveille

A forest in Lithuania 12th September 1947.

The sun's first rays had barely kissed the top branches of the tall pine trees when the shrill whistle of the Officer of the Day aroused the Camp. The students of the N.C.O. Training Company hurriedly rolled out of their moss lairs, made up their tents and ran to the plaza "auditorium".

"Line up to my right! ... Eyes right! ... Attention!"



"40 men turned into statues ..."

40 men turned into statues. These freedom fighters had been selected on a competitive basis from the Birutė and Iron Wolf units of the Tauras Area to complement their warfare studies. This was the second graduating class. They had completed their training in the handling of modern weapons, and were near completing their education in the objectives of our cause and political orientation.

Through a flap in the tent I watched the group of men standing at attention. I thought back to the days

of independence when, ten years earlier, I had graduated from a non-commissioned officers school. Outwardly, there was but little difference between peacetime trainees and a class graduating under conditions of combat in a country actually occupied by the enemy. The uniforms and insignia were exactly the same. However, presently we were addicted to prone, rather than erect, postures and automatic weapons predominated.

There was something unfathomable etched in the grim faces of my fellow combatants, something that only thousands of nights and days, dozens of battles and skirmishes, agonizing hours of torture and suffering—physical and moral—could engrave. Not one man had his family left intact by the Russians. Every man carried scars of wounds. I looked at Kairys whose right elbow was shattered but who was as agile as any other man in handling his SSV. Strazdas suffered continual pain in the torn ligaments of both his hands. Skirgaila counts eight wounds on his lean body. There was hardly a spot on the body of Sakalas which did not show either bullet or bayonet marks. The shattered larynx of Bijūnas impeded his speech. The blood of these men had drenched their beloved native soil. These marks only bound them closer to the sacred cause they were defending.

I saw before me university and high school students, clerks, farmers and factory workers, several clergymen, as well as prominent intellectuals and veterans of the Independence Wars of 1918-1923. They were brought together by their love for their country, by their oath to defend their soil and their sisters-brothers from the terror brought by the Eastern barbarians. Renouncing their individual careers and desires for personal happiness, these hardened men had joined forces for merciless combat. They still hoped that, ultimately, the men who had, not so long ago, proclaimed the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, whose voices had come over the radio waves to thoughtful men and

women tensely listening around clandestine points under the German occupation to the plans of a postwar peace and order based on Justice,—that these men would not betray the trust placed in them by enslaved millions. They still hoped that the wartime leaders would finally realize their terrible responsibility. They must, sooner or later, find the courage to open the Iron Curtain and to remove the shameful stigma of the Twentieth Century—slavery, barbarity and terror—which is being spread and cultivated in shameless nakedness over Europe and Asia!

I looked at these several lines of men embodying the immortal spirit of our ancestors who had vigilantly defended the freedom of their country and of their neighbors. I recalled the report regarding the graduating class. The Tauras Area had given its best fighters who had distinguished themselves in ability and bravery during the past three years of combat. Nearly all of the trainees were high school graduates. Within the next few days they will become Corporals, even though their military training in high schools and their combat experience had already entitled them to a higher rank.

Breakfast

The usual camp routine began. Liepsnabarzdīs (Flaming Beard) with rolled sleeves, tended a huge pot holding several hundred liters of liquid food. Occasionally he patted his excellent beard, the cause of his alias. Close by stood Tigras and Ūkas frying bacon. Other men of the Supply Platoon were resting nearby, tired after a night of "wealth carrying." The men of the Supply Platoon we called "economists".

The camp lay along a fen and was circled by canals from three sides—which rendered unobserved approach rather difficult. Supplies for 60 men had to be brought in regularly and the "economists" had to carry food on their backs over the slippery swamp. Furthermore, they could not overburden themselves with food alone, because they must be prepared to fight back at a moment's notice in the event of an ambush or attack.

Inžinas (The Engine), the platoon commander, had just awakened and was exercising his huge frame in his attempts to rise. Something was in the air: he noticed that "The Flaming Beard" had tossed the last handful of some spice into the kettle and, after tasting his concoction, instead of spitting it out on the boots of the snoring Urėdas, he smacked his lips with gusto in appreciation of his own culinary effort. Liepsnabarzdīs fixed his visor with his right hand, patted his pistol with the left hand, courteously nudged lazy Inžinas with one foot and murmured:

"Mr. Commander—up with you! The training company is nearly through drilling. Breakfast is here!"

Inžinas left his lair of moss warmed by his body and hied himself to the tables laden with canteens and dishes—ready to accept the thanks of the trainees for the excellent breakfast made possible by his platoon's night wandering.

During the past three years of guerrilla camping, Inžinas had hardly tasted as much honor and glory as within these few brief weeks of training classes. The students knew well that it was much easier to voice words of appreciation to Inžinas, than for him to miss such comment. So three times daily the trainees praised the Supply Platoon Commander for his accomplishments. Privately, they sometimes added: "These classes gave the first, and probably the last opportunity for him to rise in the world. . . ."

Rymantas, Operational Chief of the Tauras Area and Superintendent of the school, arrived at the table.

The Officer of the Day and the Instructors gave their reports and the company was seated around tables. They could not linger long as they had to make way for the second relay of the "Chief," Company Commander, Instructors, the two visiting Unit Commanders, and the men of the Supply and Guard Platoons.

As soon as the men of the first relay satisfied their hunger, they engaged in the difficult negotiations with Inžinas regarding the ration of "liquid" to help their digestion. In vain! The pleas and wily hints were rebuffed with the customary answer so annoying to the men:

"Sit tight, men. You'll get it for the graduation. This time only the digestive systems of your superiors and economists will get assistance."

The men of the first relay left. Superintendent Rymantas, Unit C. O. Uosis, Training Company's Com-



Fighters Oželis and Tauras
Winners of the first and second graduation honors,
N.C.O. School of the Tauras Area, 1947.

mander Ambo, Instructors Šarvas and Čempionas approached the tables. This was my cue to emerge. Sargas, commander of the Guard Platoon, brought his men and the "economists" trooped to the tables.

Inžinas pulled out, from the moss, a bottle "with the snake" and "hailed" Rymantas. The latter tasted and liked the "snake water"—he was anxious to treat at least the sentinels. Impromptu examinations provided a convenient means.

He turned to a Private of the Guard Platoon who was known by the odd alias "Doleris" (The Dollar).

"Well, Doleris, what is a Sentinel?"

The soldier snapped back: "An armed soldier placed at a post to guard something."

"Fine!"—said Rymantas, and pushed a tumbler of the snake water to the beaming soldier.

The Superintendent attempted to urge the second tumbler upon Sentinel Audra, but the latter failed to give the correct answer. In accordance with the established traditions, the Superintendent spilled the contents under the table. By the time Rymantas completed his oral examination of the Guard Platoon, barely half of the men passed the test and consumed their share. The platoon's C.O., Sargas, angrily glared at his men and mumbled:

"I'll have to drive the men some more, otherwise the moss under the table will get drunk. . . ."

Liaison Man

Now followed a short rest period before the training was resumed. The men dispersed in small groups to talk or to sing softly.

Our liaison man, Arturas, arrived.

He informed us that the "Aktiv" was raging in a village not far from the camp; the Ivans were seizing grains in excess of the compulsory quotas. The faces of the men darkened: how will the residents and their "forest brethren" live through the winter and spring until the next harvest when the last grains will be swept out of the farmers' granaries?

Arturas noticed the uneasiness of the men. He gripped his oaken walking stick, inhaled two strong whiffs of his pipe and said:

"Men, we'll manage somehow. As long as God shall save us from deportation to Siberia by these *"rupužės"* * . . . Siberia is very wide. . . . Why do they rush their quotas and seizures? They'll take everything and then we'll be without bread. These damned lice-infested skunks want us to expire the sooner. . . . Only yesterday, in another village, wherever the farmer was short of one pound of his butter quota, they took away his cow. What do the "stribs" ** care that this cow was feeding five children?"

A shrill whistle interrupted the man: trainees were summoned for theoretical instruction in "the auditorium." Arturas completed his talk to the men of the

* Literally "toads," but a harsh blasphemous word in Lithuanian.

** "Istrebiteli"—"the exterminators," Russian MVD auxiliary troops.



Reading of the Orders.

Supply Platoon. We all knew that Arturas' three daughters had been exiled to Siberia and only the youngest one, Janė, survived the ordeal thus far. But—nearly every family had lived through a similar situation.

After making his report to the Superintendent, Arturas slowly moved out of the camp. Just before he entered the dense woods, he murmured something with great determination, knocked the pine tree with his stick, and disappeared.

My eyes watched him melt into the distance. He was our irreplaceable liaison man and intelligence gatherer. He was about 70 years old. He always managed to slip through encirclement and to save the secret orders and literature. Not by a hair of his beard would he show fear when the MGB-men go through his well worn longcoat. Thereafter, he would strike the automatic of one of the searchers and say: "Let's exchange, comrade—a musket like that would be handy for me to hunt skunks with." . . . The Russians never suspect that he is an "agent of the bandits" . . . and that they were "skunks" to him. . . .

Involuntary Volunteers

Camp life again returned to normal. In the kitchen area, four men were peeling potatoes under the alert eyes of Inžinas: the men were caught whispering after "taps" last night. The rest of the trainees, seated in the clearing ("the auditorium"), learned the intricacies of modern automatic weapons, disciplinary rules, operational planning, etc.

My attention was diverted to an elderly woman and a girl of 15 busily cooking our noon meal. A few days ago the two females had strayed into our camp while berry picking. The little girl's brother was a "strib" with the Russians, and it was safer to detain them in our camp until we moved elsewhere. The woman showed much surprise when she first saw us.

A resident of a nearby town, she did not realize the true objectives of the guerrillas. In the fall of 1946, several dozen Freedom Fighters had called on the town, crushed all of the resistance points of the Rus-

sians, destroyed the resisting Ivans, took what they needed and retired. Before that raid, and occasionally afterward, she saw some bodies of the "bandits" being mistreated in the town square. But she did not suspect why the Russians freely plied scythes on the corpses, "reined" the faces with rosaries, cut crosses and Gediminas Towers on the backs of the corpses, dragged and kicked the bodies for weeks. . . . Presently the old woman seemed to be happy with us "bandits".

Each evening when the men tidied up their equipment and weapons and lined up for evening inspection, she would unobtrusively stand against a tall spruce tree. Tears flowed down her wrinkled cheeks as she recited with us the words of our evening prayer:

"Lord, Thou Who created nations and Who fired their aspirations for freedom, restore, we beg Thee, freedom to our country. . . . Give us strength to carry on our hard lot as guerrillas. . . . Saint Casimir, lead us in combat, as you in olden days miraculously led our ancestors. . . ."

As the last echo of our Prayer died away, the old woman would not retire for a long time. She lingered at the foot of the spruce tree, listening to the muffled songs of the men seated around the campfire.

"Glow, glow, dear little flame,
Join us in our song
As in the forest fastness vanishes
Another day of worry and combat. . . ."

She wept profusely whenever Rymantas in his ringing tenor expressed the bitter longing of all our men:


"Evening came to the forest,
And longing came to us,
As through the gentle birch branches
Softly wafted the Wind from Home. . . .
In dense forests beasts are sleeping,
Birds rest on the branches too.
But lonely men are wakeful—
Our hearts are longing for our Homes. . . ."

The woman soon became accustomed to our rugged camp life. Scrupulously she did the work assigned to her in the kitchen area. Today she was especially diligent—she knew that we were expecting guests.

Camp Trial

The camp's leaders had their own special worries connected with the arrival of the high visitors: two huge pits, dug by the Reds during their advance in 1944, had to be leveled—or the Area Commander would be displeased. The Superintendent had commissioned me and the other Unit C.O., Uosis, to mete out "punishment" to four men during the lunch hour.

When the trainees sat down for their noon meal, we two "Judges" conspired to select the men to be penalized. The boys, not suspecting the significance of our treacherous glances, engaged in joke telling. Good! When the men rose from the tables, the trainees heard an unexpected verdict:



Fighter Stumbras undergoing examination in operational planning.

"Sakalas, Žaibas, Putinas and Ungurys are punished for boisterous conduct and unbecoming language—they are to level the two pits observed within the camp area."

Sakalas, an ex-service man, tried to argue by reciting certain statutory rules. Nevertheless, his legalistic arguments were dismissed and his final appeal to the Superintendent's conscience evoked a terse comment:

"No questions—proceed!"

Of course, Sakalas was right. However, had the plot been announced in advance, there would have been stony silence during the meal and the pits would remain where they were. Nevertheless, our moral compunctions over "the retroactive effect" were lightened when other men joined in the pit-leveling task.

Another unpleasant task faced me during the recess: I had to question and punish two men of the Third Company of the Birutė Unit.

Some time ago, fighters Daina and Vaidila accompanied other men to Kaunas on a certain mission. Having completed their own assignment, Daina and Vaidila could not resist the temptation to take "a couple of hundred grams." They went into a restaurant near the central railway depot. Vaidila became overly courageous after consuming an extra dose of the "medicine." He approached an officer of the militia who was sipping from a glass at the adjoining table. He tore "Lenin's head" from the officer's lapel and trampled it under his feet on the spot. The officer, of course, rushed out to bring reinforcements. He was back within a few minutes with a dozen uniformed and plainclothes officers who immediately and vigorously engaged in the forcible measures of bringing Vaidila "back to order." Daina drew his "armor" just in time. The MGB men were surprised and confused, and released Vaidila. The latter, once his arms were free, pulled his own Russian "Zvezda" (Star). The net result was that some Russian blood flowed, window panes of the restaurant were broken and the

MGB-men carried the window frames on their backs to their HQ in record sprinting. Daina and Vaidila returned safely to the unit. But their behavior unnecessarily endangered other Freedom Fighters who were engaged in performing their own specific assignments elsewhere in the city.

I admonished the men severely and deprived them of the right to take liquor during the next two months—even on their graduation day.

Alarm

In the afternoon, Ambo, Šarvas and Čempionas took their platoons for tactical exercise. Uosis and I inspected the guards. We tramped and crawled over the extended camp area and found the sentinels alert. We then retired into the tent of Rymantas. We had barely stretched our legs when we heard the Officer of the Day approach: "Break up the camp. . . . Attention!"

We hurriedly adjusted our uniforms and walked to meet the Area Commander and his Adjutant.

Commander Žvejys and his Aide, Naktis, listened to our reports, tasted some food, and inspected the camp. The officers gathered in the HQ tent for a consultation and to give accounts of the past three months' activities.

Suddenly, a burst of automatic fire shattered the peace in the eastern section of the camp. Hell broke loose. Sentinel Doleris came running to report that several dozen Russians were observed approaching and that the Third Platoon of the trainees is engaged in combat.

We expected such an attack for some time and we were prepared for such an eventuality. The entire camp had been divided into five combat sections: Sections I, II and III were made up of the trainees, IV of the Guard Platoon, V—Supply Platoon. Each section had dug its own trenches within its respective sector, and these were expected to hold out until the camp's evacuation. By then our munitions would be expended and the enemy reinforcements would be on their way. In every engagement, our objective was to deliver a strong blow to the enemy, inflicting the heaviest casualties, and then—to "vanish."

Rymantas took over the command.

Engagement

About 60 Russians managed to approach closely enough unobserved and they were attacking in three columns from the south, east and north. Unfortunately, our right wing was weak—our Section III was directly attacked within the sector it was to defend. Presently, the movements of that Section depended entirely on the enemy's "mercy." Our Sections I and II immediately engaged the enemy in order to relieve Section III.

On our right wing, the enemy came dangerously close—the Russian "Maxim" (heavy machine gun, dubbed "the dish" by our men) was sending a steady stream of fire along the line of our tents. The Guard Platoon was ordered to man the right wing trenches which were either lost or doomed to be lost: the loss of that position endangered the entire camp site.



Intelligence Officers and Unit Adjutants of the "Žalgiris" and "Vytautas" Units, Tauras Area.

Smiles after graduation and appointment to high duties, to replace the fallen. . . .

The booming voice of Sargas, C.O. of the Guard Platoon, carried above the fire of the automatic weapons: "Guard Platoon, take up Third Section trenches!"

Sargas led his men on the double. Sentinel Jūrelė opened up from his German "Hell" (German infantry machine gun) and advanced, intermittently running and firing. As he rose at one point to advance, he seemed to lose balance and his "Hell sweetheart" crushed him.

"Jūrelė is wounded! . . ." — his voice was clear.

Sargas ran toward the machine gun. Jūrelė pulled out his Russian "Star" pistol and, with the left hand pressing his bleeding chest, crawled back. When he reached a safer position, he sat with his back to the tree.

Three men of the Guard Platoon reached the Section III trench and disposed of the Ivans by tossing in a few hand grenades. Platoon Commander Sargas slumped over the trench's edge on his machine gun, with his chest cut across by a burst of automatic fire. No. 2 man, Fighter Daina, took over the machine gun. The platoon established itself in the trench and the situation on the right wing was restored. . . .

About the same time, Combat Sections I, II and III succeeded in halting the first wave of the enemy and took up positions in their trenches. The Supply Platoon, not molested by the enemy thus far, was ordered to take up positions at the western edge and to hold them until all of the units retired safely.

The Ivans went back to the attack. They blindly obeyed their commander's ill advised order—"Vper-yod! (Advance!). They fixed their bayonets and ran erect into our automatic fire . . . one by one they slumped beside their trained dogs. . . . It was a "hay mowing."

The voice of Rymantas was heard above the din:

"Men, I am wounded! . . . Quicken the fire! . . ."

Two bullets pierced his neck and right arm.

Soon thereafter the enemy's cross fire, coming from two advanced groups, cut down Tautvydas, Intelligence Officer of the Iron Wolf Unit.

The men did not lose heart when their field commander was led out of the battle area. Their quickened fire continued to mow down the blindly advancing Ivans. Meanwhile, we hurriedly gathered the HQ documents and prepared to evacuate the site. Combat Section I was the first to receive orders to retire, passing between "the auditorium" and "the kitchen."

After a half hour of ear-splitting noise the enemy's fire weakened—about 37 men, more than half of the attackers, lay sprawled in front of our trenches and showed no signs of life. Finally, the surviving Ivans and the wounded began to retreat in panic.

We won!

New Camp Site

Our fighters split into three columns and marched out over different routes, in accordance with their orders. It was impossible to complete the training here, because the Ivans would be back the next day in the regimental strength at least.

Our withdrawal was effected without any serious incidents, except that, near a certain village, my group and that of Uosis inadvertently stepped into an ambush force of the Ivans. Fortunately for us, the Ivans were more surprised than their guests. After a few

well-placed bursts from our guns, the Ivans retreated without attempting to engage us. The road was clear once more.

With the sun's last rays, our entire encampment reassembled in another clearing far from the place occupied by us in the morning.

On our own ancestral soil, in the depths of our native forest, we could not peacefully dig graves for our perished fellow freedom fighters! There was no place where we could, undisturbed, tie our wounds and say our evening prayers. . . .

Two shallow graves were dug. With an even greater determination, we tightly grasped our automatic "sweethearts" and, with deep though unvoiced sadness, paid our last respects to our fine fellow combatants—Tautvydas and Sargas. . . . The dying rays of the sun lingered on our faces. . . .

When the shadows deepened over the calm forest, we marched again. It seemed to me that the other silent men did as I did—I pressed my teeth and kept repeating mentally my oath to keep on fighting for the triumph of Truth and Justice on this earth, for the restoration of the Human Rights of which the world at large is speaking so much. I kept repeating that there is no other way—we must purchase these rights with our blood. . . . We had not yet paid the price in full. . . .

Betrayal of Europe

Comments on the Documentation of the Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941

IV.

127. German Reaction to the Events in Lithuania

By Col. Kazys Škirpa

(Concluded)

Of course, there was no reply from Grundherr either on the 23rd or the 24th of June. On June 24th I called at the Foreign Office with a note addressed to Hitler and with an accompanying letter addressed to Ribbentrop asking him to bring the note to Hitler's attention. I also delivered a letter addressed to Weizsäcker asking him to restore the possession of the Lithuanian Legation building. None of these letters was answered.

In the afternoon on June 25th, the answer reached me not from the Foreign Office but from the Supreme Command of the Security Forces: I was asked to call at the HQ. I realized that Germany elected to follow the road of madness.

I called at the Gestapo and faced Kommissar Dr. Legat, Director of the Aliens Bureau. I expressed surprise that I was summoned without the medium of the Foreign Office to a police office and that such a procedure contravened the established diplomatic etiquette and my diplomatic immunity. I reminded Dr. Legat that I had never recognized the annexation of

Lithuania, that I formally protested against it and that I was never removed from my post as the Minister of Lithuania by any legitimate Government. I agreed to answer his questions not because I recognized the police demand but simply in order to help Lithuania.

Dr. Legat said nothing to my declarations: he asked me to dictate my statements to the stenographer.

I dictated. I recited that at the end of June 1940 I had visited Kaunas determined to fight for the restoration of the violated sovereignty. That a Lithuanian Activist Front grew out of this visit and united patriotic elements in the country, under my direction. That the Germans were aware of this outgrowth, inasmuch as I had personally forewarned the German authorities to reckon with Lithuania's independence and on June 19, 1941, I presented a memorandum to that effect to the Foreign Office, asking to place no obstacle in the way of the Provisional Government.

When I was nearly finished, Dr. Legat came in to inquire whether the dictation was completed. He seemed displeased at the contents. He interrupted the dictation and put pointed questions to me.

"How is the fact to be explained that a Government was proclaimed in Lithuania during the advance of the German forces, without a previous agreement with the Reich Government?"

I explained that it was quite simple: the basic object of every insurrection is the same—to overthrow a disagreeable government or to create a government where there is none.

"How do you personally view the events in Lithuania?"

"As a Lithuanian, I can only rejoice at what had taken place in Lithuania."

Dr. Legat mumbled: "I can understand that." After some pondering, he asked once more:

"How to explain the fact that you are placed at the head of that Government, as its Prime Minister?"

"I think because the Lithuanian People and its insurrectionists placed many hopes in the Lithuanian Activist Front, and because I am considered to be its leader."

"That is all clear to me now. What do you intend to do presently?"

I answered that I was waiting for a reply from the German Foreign Office, and that I had appealed to Hitler to place no obstacles to my immediate return to Kaunas to assume the office to which my people called me.

Dr. Legat evidently did not expect answers of this tenor. He probably expected me to wilt before him, a representative of the Reich's *Machtpolitik*, rather than accept a personal responsibility for the events in Lithuania as my ministerial oath of office required. Finally, Dr. Legat came to the point—in a rather uncertain voice that betrayed his feeling of guilt:

"All this is very interesting. . . . But, as a police official, I have a directive from a higher instance which, in my experience, is the first of its kind and is very unpleasant to me. Namely, I have to inform you that, until further instructions, you should not leave your quarters at No. 1 Schenbachstrasse without my bureau's knowledge. . . ."

My protests did not help. An "escort" was assigned to accompany me back home. Nevertheless, I interpreted this measure as simply a means to exercise "pressure" on me.

Indeed, the next day, 26 June, Dr. Bruno Kleist's private secretary phoned me and asked me to call on her chief.

It must be recalled that Dr. Kleist was not officially classed as an official of the Foreign Office. Nevertheless, as the Nazi Party's Referent-Director of Eastern Policies, he worked in close contact with Ribbentrop. I informed Kleist's secretary that, in order to enable me to call on him, he should secure for me permission to leave my quarters. At the same time, I took advantage to dictate over the phone the contents of a telephonogram just dispatched by me to General Feldmarschal von Brauchitsch in connection with the burial of the Lithuanian insurrectionists killed in Kaunas. I stated:

"As a soldier, man and leader of the Lithuanian Activist Front, I consider it my duty and moral right to attend the burial of my fellow combatants.

"I had made many efforts to gain the consent of the

respective German offices but these were fruitless, thus far. Yesterday the State Security Police informed me that, without a special permit, I must not leave my quarters until further instructions.

"This circumstance and the shortage of time compel me to direct my request directly to you, Mr. Generalfeldmarschal.

"My sense of honor as a soldier is not weaker than the sense of honor of German soldiers.

"Therefore, I appeal to you, Generalfeldmarschal, and ask you to provide me immediately with the opportunity to travel to Kaunas."

Von Brauchitsch replied—too late: a General wrote that it was impossible to contact Brauchitsch quickly, as he was somewhere at the front.

German Intrigues

More interesting were the consequences of my dictation of its contents to Dr. Kleist's secretary: instead of a telephone call from Dr. Kleist or Dr. Legat, a Gestapo official rushed to my quarters in search of . . . General Stasys Raštikis. . . . I inquired of the purpose. The Gestapo man said that he was directed to transmit an invitation to the General to take part in an "urgent consultation."

General Raštikis asked for my advice. I told him that he could not afford to ignore a summons by the Gestapo. At the same time I disclosed the many-angled German pressure, and asked him to carefully memorize what the Germans had to say to him but promise them nothing.

To my surprise, General Raštikis failed to call on me the next day. A member-nominee of my Cabinet, he was permitted to fly to Kaunas on June 27th but he left me uninformed. Formally, the procedure was correct: as Minister of National Defence and a former Commander-in-Chief of the Army, his proper place was in Kaunas. But I feared that the Germans might be using his name—as the Gestapo hinted in Berlin. I had to dispatch a trusted messenger to find out what was happening in Kaunas.

My liaison man successfully overcame the hazards of traveling in the war zone without the Gestapo's blessing: he crossed "the green frontier" on a "book smuggler's" mission, just as many others had done before him. Meanwhile, I smuggled out my suggestions for action abroad. I urged our envoys to mobilize public opinion in behalf of independence of Lithuania by publicizing the insurrection and its achievements. German egoism was to be tickled by spreading far and wide the opinion that Germany's good faith was on trial in Lithuania. My instructions to responsible people in Lithuania called for assuming the country's administration; to hold firmly in negotiations with the Germans and to accept no concessions to sovereignty; to avoid armed conflicts with the Germans and attempt to maintain polite relations; to popularize the heroism of the insurrection and its leaders in order to compel the Germans to deal with them; to avoid for the time being violent attacks on the Ger-

man policy in the foreign forum. It must be recalled that my instructions were written at the height of the armed insurrection.

My emissary successfully made the trip and reported back to me in Berlin. He informed me that the Provisional Government under Deputy Premier Prof. Juozas Ambrazevičius shared my opinion on policy and that Gen. Raštikis had shown his complete solidarity and firmness, and that he told the Germans that he would not accept their offer to act as a "mediator." It was clear that the Nazis' trick was countered.

The Nazis found themselves in an unpleasant situation. It was naturally distasteful to them to contact me again. Nevertheless, this they did.

On July 8th I received a letter signed by Dr. Schütte, aide of Dr. Kleist. He proposed to call on me for a consultation and asked me to name the date and time. I was surprised that he placed all this on record in writing. I informed his secretary by telephone that he could call on me any time at all, inasmuch as I was confined to my quarters. Dr. Schütte delayed his call—mystifying me further.

Eventually I learned of two new factors which had encouraged the Nazis' hopes that they might yet succeed in destroying the Lithuanian Government with the aid of the Lithuanians themselves.

From the entry of the Wehrmacht into Lithuania, the Nazis spread their political cobwebs and accompanied all military units in order to exploit the military successes for the evil ends of the Third Reich. The Nazis energetically attempted to create a Lithuanian National Socialist Party—just as the Russians a year earlier had attempted to create a Lithuanian Communist Party. Unfortunately, the Nazis' hands were tied: their spokesmen were not authorized by their Führer to promise to would-be Lithuanian Nazis that the Third Reich recognizes the independence of Lithuania. Under such circumstances, more or less prominent persons would not enlist in the new party, and the Nazis were obliged to bury their project.

Nevertheless, the Gestapo enlisted a dozen Lithuanians who on July 9th, under the guidance of a Gestapo Lieutenant, signed a letter demanding that the Government, formed without the knowledge and co-operation of the Lithuanian National Socialists, should not be recognized; that no Government should be recognized until Prof. Voldemaras should return; that the German military assume administration.

Even though this was a home-made project of the Gestapo, the fact was painful to the interests of Lithuania. The Gestapo was provided with a formal argument that, after all, one faction of the Lithuanian insurrectionists did not recognize the Government. I entertain no doubt that Prof. Voldemaras himself would have unequivocally rejected such imputations.

Another provocation took place in Berlin. Practically on the same date as the dozen Lithuanian Nazis acted in Kaunas, three elderly former leaders submitted to me an ultimatum, dated 10 July, demanding that I disrupt the Lithuanian Activist Front, or else

—they would withdraw from the Front. Their formal motivation was as follows: since the independence of Lithuania was restored and a Government formed, the aim of the LAF was accomplished. These people were all adherents of "the Acts of Eydtkuhnen" who claimed that President Smetona, while still on the Lithuanian soil at Kybartai, had signed an act dismissing Premier Merkys from office and naming a certain diplomat stationed abroad to the post.

I was perfectly aware that the Gestapo had "ears" to hear this. Reluctantly, I was obliged to strike off the names of the trio from the LAF rolls: the Gestapo would learn that no ultimatum would scare us.

The Germans, of course, used both events against Lithuania. A spokesman of the Reich Foreign Office told a press conference, when he was asked why I was not permitted to travel to Kaunas, that the Lithuanian Government did not enjoy the confidence of the entire nation and that strong voices of the Lithuanians were raised in protest against it.

This development explained the delay in Dr. Schütte's visit. His chief, Dr. Kleist, hurried to Kaunas. On 11 July, wearing white gloves on his Nazi hands, Dr. Kleist explained to Prof. Ambrazevičius and Prof. Zenonas Ivinskis that Berlin had no objections to persons forming the Lithuanian Government: they might remain in office and administer their country. However, he desired but "one little thing": they should replace their calling cards bearing Ministerial titles and substitute some other titles, for instance, some sort of a National Council.

But neither professor, and no other Minister, showed any ambition to make a career with the Nazis and... Dr. Kleist went back to Berlin empty handed.

Thereafter, on 14 July, Dr. Schütte called on me for a consultation, regardless of the fact that Dr. Kleist had told Gen. Raštikis and Prof. Ambrazevičius that no conversations would be held with me, inasmuch as the Führer felt highly insulted by the announcement of a Government without a previous understanding with the Reich Government.

Our conversation began with mutual inquiries regarding each other's health and affairs. I joked that my circumstances were just as desired by the Germans: for a third week I was seated in my apartment and was perspiring in the hot July weather. Dr. Schütte perceived my allusion and confessed that my arrest was quite unnecessary, but that Dr. Kleist did not have his way with the Gestapo which "always spoils politics by its interference."

I joked again: nothing was spoiled in my personal affairs. I voiced an opinion that my arrest had served some useful purpose in that it helped clarify in the view of the Lithuanian people and the world's opinion something that I might not otherwise have been able to accomplish.

Dr. Schütte opened his eyes wide and evidently did not understand my hint. Then I told him plainly that the arrest of a Prime Minister of Lithuania made clear, as no propaganda would, to my people that the Ger-

mans were not bringing them freedom which had been purchased at such a heavy cost in Lithuanian blood in the struggle against the bolsheviks. The world at large would likewise understand that the German proclamation of a New Europe did not mean freedom to oppressed peoples.

Dr. Schütte felt embarrassed. He made a painful attempt to explain that a different policy had been planned for Eastern Europe. It had been planned to recreate the Baltic States and to form an independent Ukraine. However, just before the conflict with Russia, the supreme leadership of the Party decided otherwise and turned all the plans upside down. Many discussions had taken place but the decision was finally made: the Führer's appeal made no political promises to the peoples enslaved by Soviet Russia. It was feared that an announcement of a planned ultimate dismemberment of Soviet Russia into a series of independent states might cement the Red Army's resistance and might urge it to fight for a "*yedinaya*" (united) and "*nedyelimaya*" (inseparable) Russia, which would pose additional hardships in the Wehrmacht's mission of crushing the Red power.

Dr. Schütte criticized this policy and obviously attempted to ingratiate himself with me. Nevertheless, in the end he stated that it was impossible to change the policy during the military operations and this fact must be accepted frankly.

Coming to the problem of Lithuania, Dr. Schütte asked me for a suggestion "to regulate" the matter. He hinted overtly that the formation of a Lithuanian Government had caused a surprise and that it was especially "embarrassing" (*peinlich*) that I was selected to head the Cabinet. He did not venture to explain why my selection had been "*peinlich*," and I did not press him: if a person with no personal contacts in Berlin would have been selected, that Government would have been suppressed a long time ago, as the Gestapo would have exercised its prowess and there would have been no need for Dr. Schütte to call on me.

I advised Dr. Schütte to reckon with the independence of Lithuania. The Cabinet should be recognized. In order not to overstrain the strings, I offered practical concessions in matters where interests of both countries met. Just the same, it was necessary that I should be permitted to go to Kaunas for a consultation, as I had no right to speak for the others.

My impression was that the suggestion did not tempt the amiable Dr. Schütte. My insistence on the recognition of independence and of a Government was a heavy price. There was no direct reaction to my suggestion, except that on 19 July my detention at home was lifted, without my asking for it.

The Germans were nursing a plan of "protectorate." This was frankly admitted to me post factum, on 20 August, by Dr. Marquert, who was at the time a political adviser of the Ober Kommando.

Several days after the visit of Dr. Schütte, I learned that the Nazis planned an *Ostland*, wherein Lithuania

would be subjoined to several other countries and areas. Administration was to be under Reichskommissars appointed for each country, who were to be assisted by National Councils made up of handpicked people. I was impelled to dispatch another "book smuggler." I approached one of my former secretaries who was fully informed of the intrigue—his name must yet remain undisclosed. On 26 July I wrote a long letter to our Cabinet and my agent left—he traveled across Samagitia on a bicycle and reached Kaunas. He happened to land there just as the Cabinet was gathering for a session, and my emissary was enabled to enlarge orally on the letter. I frankly suggested that, if the Germans would disrupt the Government, they should meet with no compromise on our part and must use force openly. Thereafter, we should concert our effort for the preservation of manpower and national wealth. Eventually, when the Germans would realize that their Eastern venture was no Blitzkrieg, they might realize their mistake and we could reassert ourselves.

Dissolution of the Provisional Government

On his return trip, my emissary was seized by the Gestapo on the frontier. He was a clever man—he bribed the Gestapo man with the package of food which was sent as a gift to me by the Cabinet, and cigarettes, but he saved the all important papers which fully enlightened me regarding the situation in the country. My emissary told me that the Cabinet was holding firmly and would not retreat: Germany would be compelled to suppress it forcibly.

Indeed, the Cabinet met for a last session on 5 August 1941. All of the Ministers signed a protocol which enumerated all the difficulties placed by the Nazis and their pressure for liquidation. In addition thereto, the Cabinet drafted a memorandum to the Germans wherein the Ministers firmly stressed the Lithuanian People's title to independence and the fact that the Cabinet was removed from administration by the Germans in contradiction to the nation's will. Finally, Acting Premier Ambrazevičius signed a written reply to Reichsgeneralkommissar for Lithuania, Dr. von Renteln, wherein our Cabinet firmly declined to collaborate with the Nazi Zivilverwaltung in administering the country. This was an open slap to the Nazis.

Leonas Prapuolenis

Having liquidated the Government, the Nazis did not at once proceed with the liquidation of the LAF, the parent of that Cabinet. It was clear that the Nazis decided to avoid open provocation and bided their time, in an attempt to disrupt the LAF from inside. For instance, they induced a few members to leave the LAF and form a "Nationalist Party" which was to collaborate with the occupying power. Just the same, these few hotheads soon realized their mistake and that the Nazis were no friends of their patriotic cause. But the LAF command, under leadership of Leonas

Prapuolenis, ably utilized the breathing space to lay the foundations for a new underground network which would come into operation once the Nazis formally liquidated the LAF.

When ample data was collected, on 20 September the LAF Supreme Command presented to the Germans a long documented memorandum and protest. All of the leaders signed the memorandum.

Reaction to this "bomb" was not long forthcoming: on the next day the Gestapo and armed SS units raided the LAF HQ, meticulously searched the quarters and detained all the members who had signed the memorandum, including Mr. Prapuolenis. Soon thereafter Generalkommissar von Renteln published a decree confiscating the property of the LAF and liquidating the organization.

Such a reaction was anticipated in advance, and the LAF had emptied the drawers of all the more important correspondence. At the same time, the full text of the memorandum had been multiplied and spread all over the country in advance, together with the secret orders to go underground and to wage resistance against the new occupant.

The Gestapo found itself embarrassed: no documents were found which could provide formal evidence to prefer some charges. All of the arrested persons were released—but they had to sign a pledge that they would no longer engage in politics. However, Prapuolenis was not released, not simply because he refused to sign the pledge but more for the reason that he looked too dangerous to the Nazis. He was imprisoned at Tilžė (Tilsit) and later was moved to the Dachau KZ—which few people ever left alive.

Presently our people's stand was made clear on the record for the world's opinion to see. But we had to save our able fighter, Prapuolenis. On 8 October 1940 I was ordered to move to Southern Germany and I could not help him directly. Just the same, I made two unauthorized trips to Berlin in December 1941 and February 1942. I wrote a number of firmly worded letters to high ranking people, abusing my personal acquaintance with them. Among others, I had approached Minister Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, and Generalfeldmarschal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. These were no diplomatic letters—I appealed to save a man's life, basing myself on their sense of honor and justice. These measures proved to be effective even with the Nazis: both of these high functionaries demanded that the Gestapo release Prapuolenis. This aroused the Gestapo to full ire.

Having learned that I had dared to make appeals in behalf of Prapuolenis, the Gestapo served an ultimatum on me to leave Berlin at once. They wanted to confine me to the area of Garmisch-Kirchen in Bavaria. I bluntly refused, and spent several critical days in Berlin. And then I received the glad tidings: Prapuolenis will be released and I was "requested" to consider the former demand of the Gestapo as "non-existent in fact."

This happened at the end of February 1942 during my stay in Berlin.

I was compelled to wait several more months for the release of Prapuolenis and to undertake additional steps in his behalf. On May 15, 1942 it was my rare privilege to warmly shake the hands of Prapuolenis. He was saved! This was our first personal meeting—regardless of our long underground connections. Unfortunately, we met far from our country—at the Hotel Schottenhammel at Munich.

COL. KAZYS ŠKIRPA.

128. "If the Germans use force—well, let blood flow!"

After suppressing the Provisional National Government, the Germans proclaimed Lithuania as part of the so-called Ostland and instituted a German civil administration. The German-created Ostland accounted, roughly speaking, for 195,000 square miles with some 18 million people. Its western strip, along the Baltic coast, was called "Agricultural Zone," in opposition to the eastern part, labelled as a "Forest Zone."

They did not find many Quislings in Lithuania (none among leading personalities), though the ground there might very well have been more ripe for their germination (soon after the Soviet occupation) than in some other countries. Even those who at first, believing the Germans, cooperated with the occupation authorities soon realized the Germans' true designs and resigned their posts. Some of them were sent to German concentration camps, some were murdered. An overwhelming majority of the people proved to be as anti-German as they were anti-Soviet.

It is true, this anti-German feeling was not spontaneous. It grew gradually, though rapidly, as soon as German policy towards Lithuania began disclosing its hand. The policy was crafty and cunning. On the one hand, German troops were coming to Lithuania as ostentatious "liberators from the Bolshevik yoke"; they were promising to undo what the Soviet occupation had done—first of all, to abolish nationalization of private property introduced by the Soviet system and to return the confiscated property to its owners. All this was designed to gain the favor of Lithuanians. On the other hand, the evasive declarations as to the future political status of the country, suppression of the Provisional National Government, arrests of some leading patriots, refusal to permit return from Germany of many Lithuanians who had previously sought refuge there from the Soviet rule of terror—all these and similar restrictive measures did not fail to serve as significant indications of the contemplated German policy in Lithuania.

As time went on and the Germans continued to fail to implement their promises, the people became uneasy and restive. German explanations that failure was due to the exigencies of war did not succeed in allaying growing suspicions. They were still further

strengthened by the action of the Germans in assuming full control and management of the country's entire economic life.

These German encroachments were met by the people with the only weapons available—*evasions, sabotage, and passive resistance*. But when, finally, the Germans took the next step—that of bringing from Germany new settlers and placing them in the farms and in business establishments from which the Lithuanian owners were forcibly removed, an explosion was inevitable. The Lithuanians passed from passive to active resistance against German attempts to colonize Lithuania. "Don't leave your farms! Don't give up your business!"—was the call of the underground Lithuanian Press. "And if the Germans use force—well, let blood flow!"

... And blood did flow. The centuries-old struggle between the Teuton bent on conquest of the Lithuanian lands and the tenacious Lithuanians opposing this German "Drang nach Osten" was on again.

... Failure of German Mobilization ... Failure of Mobilization for Labor Service ... German Reprisals. ...

/Lithuania's Fight for Freedom, by E. J. Harrison, New York 1945, pp. 31-32./

129. The Atlantic Charter

Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security.

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

/The Department of State Bulletin, vol. V, No. 112, Publication 1632, August 16, 1941, pp. 125-126. Released by the White House August 14 (1941)./

130. Declaration by United Nations

A Joint Declaration by The United States of America, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, *Declare:*

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington,

January First, 1942.

The United States of America

by FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

by WINSTON CHURCHILL
On behalf of the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
MAXIM LITVINOFF
Ambassador

/Ibid., vol. VI, No. 132, Publ., 1676, Jan. 3, 1942, p. 3./

131. The Contract Between the United Nations and Lithuania Sealed

(a) It would be absurd to commemorate the Russian and the German occupations separately, as both of them in the main are as identical and as inseparable as the Siamese twins. . . .

The Lithuanian people, therefore, never staked their destiny on the victory of the occupying Powers (German or Russian); they are not staking it now, and shall not do so in the future, since neither the victory of the one nor the defeat of the other would solve the problem of the freedom and independence of Lithuania. *Lithuania is resolved at the right moment to throw in her forces with those of the rest of occupied Europe in order to regain a free and independent life and to carry on her creative work for her people and for the peace and happiness of mankind.*

/Underground "Nepriklausoma Lietuva," 15 June 1943./

(b) From the very beginning the Lithuanian nation has held the sovietization of Lithuania and her incorporation in the Soviet Union to be null and void.

The domination of the Soviets in Lithuania did not last long; it was ended by the outbreak of the German-Russian war and by the Lithuanian revolt against the Soviet Government at the beginning of that war. During this period the Lithuanians formed a Provisional Government which was set aside by the German occupation authorities and Lithuania has since been living for over two years under German military occupation.

As the war enters its final phase, the Lithuanian nation awaits with the greatest anxiety . . . The fact alone that Lithuania, which has taken no direct part in the war, has proportionately lost more people than any of the belligerent states, explains the anxiety. . . .

. . . The Lithuanian people wish to emphasize that in this fourth year of their struggle against foreign occupation and for the national independence of Lithuania, they are fighting for their very existence; that they, too, even as other nations, great or small, await the establishment of "a peace which will afford to all nations, the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Signed by:

*The Lithuanian National Union
The Peasant Populist Union of Lithuania
The Union of Combatants for the Liberty
of Lithuania*

*The Lithuanian Nationalist Party
The Social-Democratic Party of Lithuania
The Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party
The Lithuanian Front*

Kaunas, 14th October 1943.

/Lithuania's Fight for Freedom, supra, pp. 56-57./

(c) To the Lithuanian People!

The Lithuanian nation, endeavoring to liberate Lithuania from the occupation and to restore the functioning of Lithuania's sovereign organs, temporarily impeded by foreign forces, stands in need of united political leadership. With this aim in view, the Lithuanian political groups, as the exponents of the nation's political thought and instrument of its application, have agreed to unite all forces for common action and have created the SUPREME COMMITTEE FOR LIBERATION OF LITHUANIA.

. . . 9. The Committee will maintain close contacts with the Lithuanian Legations and Consulates and will collaborate with Lithuanians abroad, especially with Lithuanian Americans, as well as with all nations that recognize the principle of self-determination of nations and the right of Lithuania to independence. . . Vilnius, February 16th, 1944.

/Ibid., pp. 57-58./

(d) The Powers Signatory to the Atlantic Charter solemnly proclaimed by that act that they "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other" and that "they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." The Soviet Union, in adhering to the Atlantic Charter, pledged itself to observe the principles set forth therein.

Speaking at the Inter-Allied meeting held in London on September 24, 1941, the Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Maisky, declared: "The Soviet Union has applied, and will apply, in its foreign policy the high principles of respect for the sovereign rights of peoples . . . the Soviet Union defends the rights of every nation to independence and territorial integrity of its country."

However, when the Red Army crossed the frontiers of Lithuania . . . Lithuania is being treated as part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime is being re-introduced, and general mobilization for the Red Army . . . has been decreed. Furthermore, the arrests and executions of Lithuanian political leaders, public men and members of their families, and mass deportations of Lithuanian men and women into the depths of the Soviet Union have begun.

The Lithuanian Nation has always maintained and continues to insist that the so-called incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union was carried out in contravention of international engagements undertaken by the Soviet Union and in violation of the treaties entered into with Lithuania, and is null and void.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania, representing the entire Lithuanian Nation, solemnly declares that Lithuania does not hold herself to be a part of the Soviet Union. . . .

. . . The Lithuanian People regard the Red Army as a foreign army of occupation for which all the rules of International Law regulating the conduct of an army of occupation on foreign soil, are obligatory. Accordingly, Lithuania must not be treated worse than an enemy territory.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania formally protests on behalf of the People of Lithuania against the general mobilization decreed by the Foreign Soviet occupational authorities and against all other violations on the part of the authorities of the Soviet Union of the rules which govern warfare and define the limits of power of the authorities of occupation in occupied territories.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania equally protests against the forcible reintroduction of the Soviet regime in Lithuania and regards this as a hostile act of pure physical violence and moral terror. The Committee appeals to the conscience of the world against the extermination of the Lithuanian Nation which has already begun.

During the entire period of German military occupation, the Lithuanian People fought for the most sacred cause . . . bravely faced the excessively severe repressive measures . . . refused to be involved in a war for Germany's interests and resisted all the German efforts to enforce an effective mobilization of Lithuanian manpower.

Continuing its struggle for the restoration of sovereignty of Lithuania, the Lithuanian People will resist to the utmost all endeavors of the Soviet Union to yoke Lithuania to Soviet interests . . . all attempts to reintroduce the undemocratic Soviet regime in Lithuania and will defend themselves against all attempts to deport the Lithuanian masses. . . . This struggle . . . is a fight for its liberty, for its right to an independent life, for its very survival.

Lithuania is still a member of the International Community of independent sovereign states with all the rights and obligations ensuing therefrom. The free Democracies and the highest spiritual authorities of the world have never explicitly or implicitly recognized any attempted change in the international status of Lithuania. The Lithuanian People firmly believe that the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter and obligations thereby assumed by the United Nations are applicable to Lithuania as to all other nations, large and small, and that Lithuania will again enjoy full sovereignty rights after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

However, the continuing hostilities of war against Germany may cause Lithuania to remain for some time under the Soviet military occupation. This occupation should not preclude the practical restoration of state functions of the sovereign Lithuanian authority.

The Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania appeals to His Majesty's Government of Great Britain and to the Government of the United States of America to dispatch their missions to Lithuania, without delay, in order to safeguard the rights and the vital interests of the Lithuanian People and to save our nation from threatening extermination.

Vilnius-Kaunas, September 30, 1944.

/Ibid., pp. 59-60./

132. Russia Renounces Ribbentrop-Molotov Pacts

London, July 30, 1941.

Text of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Poland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

One, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recognizes the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity. . . .

Gen. Wł. Sikorski

I. Maisky.

/Polish-Soviet Relations 1918-1943, Documents, New York 1943, pp. 56-57./

133. Britain Concurred in the Soviet-Polish Pact

London, July 30, 1941.

Text of the Foreign Office Communique:

One, an agreement between the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union was signed in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office on July 30th. General Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister, signed for Poland; Mr. Maisky, Soviet Ambassador, signed for the Soviet Union. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden were present.

Two, the agreement is being published.

Three, after the signature of the agreement, Mr. Eden handed to General Sikorski an official note in the following terms:

"On the occasion of the signature of the Polish-Soviet agreement of today, I desire to take this opportunity of informing you that . . . His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have entered into no undertaking towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which affect the relations between that country and Poland. I also desire to assure you that His Majesty's Government do not recognize any territorial changes which have been effected in Poland since August 1939."

General Sikorski handed to Mr. Eden the following reply:

" . . . This corresponds with the view of the Polish Government which, as it has previously informed His Majesty's Government, has never recognized any territorial changes effected in Poland since the outbreak of the war."

/Ibid., pp. 55-56./

134. Stalin, Too, Concurs . . .

Moscow, December 4, 1941.

The Governments of the Republic of Poland and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, imbued with

the spirit of friendly concord and fighting collaboration, declare:

1. German Hitlerite imperialism is the worst enemy of mankind,—no compromise with it is possible....

2. Implementing the Treaty concluded on July 30th, 1941, both governments... will wage war against the German bandits hand in hand with Soviet troops. In peace-time their relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship and mutual honest observance of the undertakings they have assumed.

3. After a victorious war and the appropriate punishment of the Hitlerite criminals, it will be the task of the Allied States to ensure a durable and just peace. This can be achieved only through a new organization of international relations on the basis of unification of the democratic countries in a durable alliance. Respect for international law backed by the collective armed force of all the Allied States must form the decisive factor in the creation of such an organization. Only under this condition can a Europe destroyed by the German barbarism be restored and a guarantee be created that the disaster caused by the Hitlerites will never be repeated.

Signed: By authorization For the Government of
of the Government of the the Polish Republic,
Soviet Union,

STALIN

SIKORSKI

/Ibid., pp. 57-58./

135. Russia and England Put the Atlantic Charter Into a Treaty

His Majesty The King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Desiring... to contribute after the war to the maintenance of peace...

Desiring, moreover, to give expression to their intention to collaborate closely with one another as well as with the other United Nations at the peace settlement and during the ensuing period of reconstruction on the basis of the principles enunciated in the declaration made on the 14th August, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain to which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has adhered;...

ARTICLE III. (1) The High Contracting Parties declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period....

ARTICLE V. The High Contracting Powers... agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe. They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objects, and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial

aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States....

Done in duplicate in London on the 26th day of May, 1942, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

ANTHONY EDEN

V. MOLOTOV

/The Dept. of State Bulletin, vol. VII, No. 170,
publ. 1812, September 26, 1942, pp. 781-783./

136. U.S.A. and Russia Embody the Atlantic Charter in a Treaty

Mutual Aid Agreement of 11 June 1942.

Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics... as signatories of the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, have subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration, known as the Atlantic Charter, made on August 14, 1941 by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the basic principles of which were adhered to by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on September 24, 1941;...

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this eleventh day of June, 1942.

For the Government of the United States
of America:

CORDELL HULL

*Secretary of State of the
United States of America.*

For the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics:

MAXIM LITVINOFF

*Ambassador of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics at Washington.*

/The Dept. of State Bulletin, vol. VI, No. 155,
publ. 1754, June 13, 1942, pp. 532-534./

137. Hull at Washington 17 December 1942

With the victory won and freedom restored to those who have lost it or who are seeking it, there would then arise under point three of the Atlantic Charter the fullest opportunity for each people to select their leaders and their forms of government.

/War and Peace Aims, Special Supplement No. 2 to the
United Nations Review, U.N. Information Office, New
York, December 1, 1943, p. 9./

138. Litvinov Weakly Seconded the War Aims—Washington, 12 January 1943

We may all take heart from the thought that the day is drawing near for the ultimate triumph of the common cause of the United Nations and the whole of freedom-loving humanity, the day when all may return to peaceful toil in conditions of complete freedom.

/Ibid., p. 8./

**139. Roosevelt Alludes to Russian Practices
12 February 1943**

It is one of our war aims, as expressed in the Atlantic Charter, that the conquered populations of today be again the masters of their destiny. There must be no doubt anywhere that it is the unalterable purpose of the United Nations to restore to conquered peoples their sacred rights. . . . The right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter does not carry with it the right of any government to commit wholesale murder or the right to make slaves of its people or of any other people in the world.

/Ibid., p. 10./

**140. Sumner Welles Same Day—Prior to His
Appeasing Writer's Career**

Opening of the UN Exhibition in New York.

In Articles 2 and 3 there are set forth the very foundations essential to the maintenance of individual liberty and democracy in international society. The assurance is given that the United Nations "desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned," and that "they respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

/Ibid., p. 10./

**141. Welles Reaffirms to Canada at Toronto
26 February 1943**

What the people of the United States are striving for, I am persuaded, is exactly what the people of Canada are striving for. They seek the attainment of the noble objectives set forth in the Atlantic Charter.

/Ibid., p. 10./

**142. Madame Chiang Kai-shek at Chicago
22 March 1943**

We should support the Four Freedoms which epitomize all that we want. We should also support the men who fathered the Atlantic Charter, for we believe that their purpose was not to tantalize the sorely tried, staunch peoples fighting against violence, nor was it promoted by the necessity to meet the dire need of the moment, but because they were convinced that a better world based on those universal principles must come into being.

/Ibid., p. 10./

143. The Katyn Forest

Berlin Radio 13 April 1943, at 9:15 a.m.

From Smolensk comes news that the native population has revealed to German authorities where in secret mass executions . . . the GPU murdered 10,000 Polish officers . . . Norwegian press representatives were on the spot. . . .

/Death at Katyn, National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent, New York 1944, p. 8./

**144. Poland Asks Red Cross to Investigate
Polish Government Communiqué**

London, 17 April 1943.

. . . The Polish Government has instructed its representatives at Geneva to request the International Red Cross to send a delegation to investigate on the spot the true state of affairs. It is to be desired that the findings of this organization . . . clarifying the matter and . . . establishing the responsibility for it, should be issued without delay. At the same time . . . the Polish Government . . . denies to the Germans the right to draw from a crime which they ascribe to others, arguments in their own defense. The profoundly hypocritical indignation of German propaganda will not succeed. . . . The Polish Government denies to whomever may be guilty of this crime the right to exploit it for political maneuvers.

/Ibid., p. 10./

145. Russia Precludes Impartial Investigation

On April . . . 23 (1943), a reply from the Red Cross Committee at Geneva was published, acceding "in principle" to the demands of Poland and Germany for the appointment of a commission of neutral experts to look into the circumstances of the Katyn massacre. The Committee pointed out, however, that it could take this step only if so requested "by all parties concerned," and then only under the terms of its memorandum to the belligerents of September 12, 1939. Inasmuch as Russia refused her consent to the investigation, the Polish Government on May 1, 1943, withdrew its request.

/Ibid., p. 14./

**146. Russia Breaks Relations with Poland
and Installs Puppets**

It might seem as if this move on the part of the Poles for an impartial judgement would have been welcomed by Moscow as an opportunity to exonerate herself of guilt for the crime and to fix it elsewhere. Instead, alleging as her reasons Poland's appeal to Geneva, on April 26, 1943 Russia broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government and took steps towards forming in Moscow the "Union of Polish Patriots," a body made up of Polish Communists. To offers of mediation on the part of England and the United States, Moscow replied that she was willing to renew diplomatic relations with Poland only if the government of that country be reconstituted in such a way that elements in it friendly to Russia had a "decisive influence." In other words, Moscow demanded that Poland be bolshevized.

/Ibid., pp. 14-15./

**147. The Katyn Crime Swayed Poles to Collaboration with Lithuania—but Mikolajczyk
Objected . . .**

Arguments Regarding Enemy No. 1

All the nations menaced in their existence by the Germans and bolsheviks—Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, White Ruthenes, Ukrainians, Slovaks,

Romanians, not to mention the Hungarians and Bulgarians—consider that the bolsheviks are the most dangerous, the mortal enemy No. 1. Poland alone broke out of this chain and considered Germany the enemy No. 1.

From that moment on, the ways were parted in this war. . . . We are simply concerned with fixing the fact that the national instinct of all the small neighbors of Poland impelled them to take the road different from the one taken by Poland.

One cannot simplify the problem by blaming some one for "collaboration." That would only mean moving the problem from a political basis to the level of name-calling. People who engage in that kind of preoccupation forget that, f.i., Finland was probably the most democratic country of the world in the best meaning of that term; more democratic than Poland or England; yet, during the years 1939-1945, Finland conducted two wars against the Soviets, one of these shoulder to shoulder alongside Germany, while losing thereby nothing of its sincere character of a democracy.

Finland was obviously in a better situation than other partners. Nevertheless, both the nations which had lost their state organizations in the process of war and those which had never enjoyed statehood,—being tossed on the war waves they had in their instinctive spasm grabbed the sharp German razor before drowning in the bolshevik torrent.

. . . In 1944 . . . I conversed with a Ukrainian in Kraków. . . . He said . . . "I would like to join the fate of the Ukraine with that of Poland. Today, more than ever, we understand that this is the only natural tie. Yet (he spread his arms), what can we do as long as you aid our mortal enemy." . . .

I attempted to correct him . . . but the Ukrainian did not let me finish:

"That holds no sense to us. It does make sense, however, that you are blowing up the ammunition consigned to killing the bolsheviks, that you destroy bridges over which march the troops to kill the bolsheviks, that you kill the Germans each one of whom might kill at least one bolshevik."

In the Ukrainian situation, the thing was understandable. It was even more drastic in the views of the White Ruthenes. . . .

Going back to Polish-Lithuanian affairs during the war, we must recall that by the nature of events these became more complicated, classical for a separation of the ways.

When the illusions of a restoration of independence of the Baltic States by Germany were lost, there could no longer be any talk of an alliance with the Germans. Lithuania, with Estonia and Latvia, found themselves in the same situation as Poland, all deprived of sovereignty. While Hitler did not conceal his exterminating program regarding Poland and, in relation to the Baltic peoples, he frequently tried to pass as "liberator," the internal situation of these countries differed little from that of Poland. Only the

lower administration and police were entrusted to Poles in the "Gouvernement General"; not more powers were enjoyed by the Lithuanians, either: the lower administration and police. The Lithuanian press ceased to exist. The published papers were German papers printed in Lithuanian, Polish, White Ruthenian or Russian, differing little in their contents. They engaged in no mutual polemics. The Lithuanian University was shortly shut down. The gymnasia existed in the sense that students reported to classes and were permitted to study in some place, i.e., in a hospital. In economic life, the Lithuanians exercised no more influence than the Poles in the Gouvernement. Not one name of a statesman, minister, general or other more influential political leader of the three Baltic States could be found on the lists of people collaborating directly or indirectly with the German Government. On the other hand, there were many of them to be found on the rolls of the concentration camp inmates at Tilsit and elsewhere.

In reaction to this state of affairs a very powerful underground Lithuanian organization was born and it published tens of clandestine Lithuanian newspapers, recalling by their names and contents the principal prewar dailies of Kaunas. Finally, they organized underground units of the military forces.

Why, then, regardless of the total or analogous community of misfortune, mutual relations between the Polish and Lithuanian inhabitants were never as fatal as during the German occupation?

Criminals

A casual observer, primarily a victim of such relations, such as some determined Pole of Vilnius, blamed this on the Lithuanian side, which utilized its official-police mandate for repressions against the Poles.

However, the matter requires a closer examination. German Hitlerites in their political stupidity exhibited a certain talent in one respect. That was—bringing all types of human guttersnipes to the surface. Sometimes the Lithuanian police organized by them sank to the level of ordinary murderous criminals . . . their moral qualification is best described by the term—renegades.

It seemed to some (even at this date) that the fashionable premise of collective responsibility should be placed on the entire Lithuanian people.

Memorandum of Krupavicius

However, the first move for the unification unexpectedly had come from the Lithuanian side. I am unable to name this Lithuanian, inasmuch as my efforts had failed to determine whether he succeeded in escaping from the grasp of the Soviet regime. However, as a representative of the underground organization, he had developed energetic activity in behalf of the Polish-Lithuanian reconciliation. Already early in 1942 he declared:

"We must categorically protest against the identification of the police and other bums with the Lithuanian people. *Every people has its own bandits.*"

The underground Lithuanian press violently denounced their own "renegades" who ingratiated themselves with the Germans. "Black Lists" were published. At the same time, the Lithuanian underground shared with the Polish underground authorities, for publication purposes, a memorandum not printed anywhere officially, of the former ministers Krupavičius and Grinius, which these gentlemen had delivered to the Germans.

The memorandum was exceptionally bold, if one takes into consideration the conditions of terror. It had come about in the following manner. The Germans began colonizing a section of Lithuania, namely Sudavia. They evicted Lithuanian farmers and, in order to show their own "good will," they, just as the bolsheviks "on the recovered lands," moved the original owners to the areas of Vilnius and settled them on Polish farms, wherefrom the Poles were ordered to clear out within two hours. One may well imagine how this procedure reflected itself on the Polish-Lithuanian relations. At that time!

Therefore, the memorandum defended not only the evicted Lithuanians but in very sharp words took under defence the evicted Poles. . . .

Simultaneously, the Lithuanians expanded their hold on the internal situation of their own people. Unprejudiced objectivity impels us to admit that, during both occupations, the Lithuanians showed much patriotism and, in the first place, their national solidarity. These qualities enabled their secret organizations to infiltrate all of the surface chambers of administration, police, editorial offices, radio, and even Gestapo. . . .

On the opposing polar points

On the other hand, the Polish underground organization likewise grew stronger and more powerful. It would seem that the moment and the natural impulse should dictate that mutual efforts be joined against the common enemies . . . Yet . . . exactly on this spot arose a question, greater than basic one: *against which enemy primarily?*

Regardless of the oppression by the Germans, regardless of the terror and unheard-of brutality of methods, regardless of the ensuing dislike and hatred for the Germans by the masses of population,—the Lithuanians continued to insist that the bolsheviks were the greater enemy and that, in any event, the Germans should not be obstructed in cutting the bolsheviks to pieces, even though they should not be assisted in the task.

The Polish side stood on the opposite pole: that it would be a crime to aid the Germans in anything, even in their combat against the bolsheviks, and that it behooved to obstruct them in that task.

Consequently, while both the Polish and Lithuanian political centers placed themselves on the side of the Western Allies—the Poles betting on England and the Lithuanians relying on America—their tactics inside the country were too radically opposed to

enable collaboration,—even if the Vilnius question be discounted and even if collision between the Polish population and the Lithuanian administration had not taken brutal forms.

In this phase, which persisted until 1943, instead of a reconciliation, things moved to a paradoxical situation wherein the apolitical masses of the Polish and Lithuanian population considered neither the bolsheviks nor the Germans to be the Enemy No. 1, but—mutually—each other.

Formal Proposal of a Common Front

The second phase began immediately after the disclosure of the Crime of Katyn and the disruption of the Polish-Soviet relations.

It manifested itself in the numerous attempts of an underground reconciliation. The Lithuanians acted not only in their own behalf, but also as mandatories of the underground networks of Estonia and Latvia. I am not in a position to attest whether these mandates were sufficiently verified. At any rate, *the proposal was clear: a common front of the Baltic States with Poland.*

On the issue of Vilnius, the Lithuanians proposed the following formula: the question of Vilnius must be referred to the competence and decision of the Polish Government in England on the one side, and the Lithuanian Government (National Committee) in America on the other. No territorial-frontier issues were to be considered at this moment inside the country. There would simply be a close collaboration, on the basis of equality of all the nations which desired to take part jointly against the common enemies.

German defeats followed thereafter. Their final defeat could no longer be doubted. The bolsheviks were approaching the country. The Lithuanians intervened once more among their fellow nationals engaged in administration and police to treat the Poles favorably. Indeed, the relations at home eased to a considerable degree in this respect. In view thereof, Polish armed forces operating on the terrain tried to cause no casualties on encountering the Lithuanian police.

Alas, this period lasted too short a time.

"The guns played closer," as Żukrowski expressed himself in his novel. Yet no one felt any "deep" or shallow joy on this account.

Exactly at this moment, the sharp outlines of a fatal chasm, the bottom of which could not be discerned, became even sharper.

Instructions from London

The Polish side avoided a final understanding. The Lithuanians suspected "Vilnius Poles," as usual and they dispatched delegates to Warsaw. The latter returned with empty hands: the instructions were coming from Warsaw, and not—as deemed by the Lithuanians—suggested by Vilnius to Warsaw.

I did not have in my hands these instructions which, undoubtedly, were in the first place radioed from London. It was difficult in that dark and bloody mist to find out what it was all about. It seemed, indeed, that

the situation after the year 1943 was basically clarified and was different from that of the past years. Even a child could understand that the German aggression was being pushed into a problem of time only.

Today, in the perspective of the events, the matter seems to me clearly outlined. *The Government of Mikołajczyk*, as—for that matter—all of the previous and subsequent Polish declarations, followed in the direction of amassing "demonstrations of good will" toward the Soviet Union.—Under such conditions, a common front with the Baltic peoples could only compromise these lowly prostrations before Stalin, performed under the baton of England.

The collection of these lowly prostrations remained in England, while the country remained not only enslaved but internally divided and embattled.

* * *

Finally the second Soviet occupation brought to the surface the spontaneous action of true fraternity, breaking the bones of the artificial political calculations. In 1945, for the first time since the forgotten past, the Lithuanians and Poles stood shoulder to shoulder against their common enemy.

By that time, the instructions from abroad ceased to arrive. In truth, there was nobody to whom these could be dispatched. Only a handful remained: the survivors in the forest.

J. M (ACKIEWICZ).

/“Lwów i Wilno,” No. 49, 23 November 1947, London./

148. Roosevelt to UN Food Conference, Hot Springs, Va., 18 May 1943

This is the first United Nations Conference. Together, also, we are working to build a world in which men shall be free to live out their lives in peace, prosperity and security. The broad objectives for which we work have been stated in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of United Nations, and at the meeting of the twenty-one American Republics at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942.

/War and Peace Aims, Special Suppl. No. 2 to the United Nations Review, U.N. Information Office, New York, 1 December 1943, p. 7./

149. Roosevelt Reiterates the Atlantic Charter to Same Body

Washington, D.C., 7 June 1943.

Our ultimate objective can be simply stated: It is to build for ourselves, for all men, a world in which each individual human being shall have the opportunity to live out his life in peace; to work productively, earning at least enough for his actual needs and those of his family; to associate with the friends of his choice; to think and worship freely; and to die sure in the knowledge that his children, and their children, shall have the same opportunities.

That objective, as men know from long and bitter experience, will not be easy to achieve. But you and I know also that, throughout history, there has been no more worthwhile, no more inspiring challenge.

That challenge will be met.

/Ibid., p. 7./

150. Britain's "Absolute Assurance" on the Atlantic Charter

Viscount Cranborne, Lord Privy Seal, in the House of Lords 15 April 1943.

... The Atlantic Charter, the Articles of which, as is stated in the Preamble, represent the common principles governing the policy of the signatories... that justly famous document, which has received the adherence of all the United Nations. I can give... an absolute assurance that His Majesty's Government for their part intend to do their utmost, both in the spirit and in the letter, to implement its provisions.

/Ibid., p. 11./

151. "Absolute Assurance" Qualified Seven Weeks Later...

Viscount Cranborne in the House of Lords
3rd June 1943.

As your Lordships are aware, the Atlantic Charter was a bilateral declaration of intentions to which a large number of other nations subsequently subscribed. It is therefore manifestly impossible for His Majesty's Government who are only one party to this agreed statement to put without consultation with the others and any special interpretation upon any particular passage. Moreover, it seems to me most undesirable to do so. The Atlantic Charter does not seek to explain how the broad principles are to be applied to each and every case which will have to be dealt with when the war comes to an end. At this moment, when it is impossible to say in what circumstances they will fail to be applied, it would be most unwise to enter into discussions as to exactly how this or that Article is to be interpreted.

/Ibid., p. 12./

152. Sikorski Deluded Himself at the Cairo U.N. Day 14 June 1943

... There shall be no place for discrimination, nor for a few stronger nations dictating to the weaker ones. Instead, there shall be equality, honest co-operation, based on respect for mutual rights, for cultural peculiarities, for the principles of the Four Freedoms.

/Ibid., p. 7./

153. Churchill Would Not Compromise His Conscience—Guildhall, London, 30 June 1943

We seek no profit, we want no territory or aggrandizement, we expect no reward and we will accept no compromise. It is on that footing that we wish to be judged first in our own consciences and afterward by posterity.

/Ibid., p. 8./

154. Two Weeks Later Churchill Qualified the Atlantic Charter

House of Commons, Debate, 14 July 1943.

The so-called Atlantic Charter, indeed, the well called Atlantic Charter, was not a treaty requiring ratification or any formal endorsement of a constitutional character on the other side of the Atlantic. It was a

statement of certain broad views and principles which are our common guide in our forward march.

/War and Peace Aims, Special Suppl. No. 3 to the United Nations Review, U.N. Information Office, New York, 30 April 1944, p. 7./

155. Britain Limits the Charter to "Allied" Countries

Viscount Cranborne, Lord Privy Seal, in the House of Lords 22 July 1943.

... The immediate desire of His Majesty's Government is to bring encouragement and hope of liberation to the enslaved peoples of Europe, to support those elements who are prepared to act at the right moment against our common enemies. ... When the Allied countries are liberated it will be the aim of the United Nations, and in particular of His Majesty's Government ... to apply the principles enshrined in the Atlantic Charter and to re-establish Governments representative of the wishes of the people concerned.

/Ibid., p. 8./

156. Self-Determination "A Living Reality" to Roosevelt 14 August 1943

Today, on the second anniversary of the signing of the Atlantic Charter, I would cite particularly two of its purposes and principles on which we base our "hopes for a better future for the world."

First—respect for the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live. When the Atlantic Charter was first signed, there were those who said that this was impossible of achievement. And yet, today, as the forces of liberation march on, the right of self-determination is becoming once more a living reality.

Second—world-wide collaboration with the object of security for all; of improved labor standards, economic adjustment and social security.

/Ibid., p. 8./

157. "Use Force, If Necessary, to Keep the Peace"—Hull, 12 September 1943

Radio Broadcast by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

• It is abundantly clear that a system of organized international co-operation for the maintenance of peace must be based upon the willingness of the co-operating nations to use force, if necessary, to keep the peace. ... Readiness to use force, if necessary, for the maintenance of peace is indispensable if effective substitutes for war are to be found.

... Another cause of armed conflict is aggression by nations whose only motive is conquest and self-aggrandizement. ...

/Ibid., p. 34./

158. Australia Fought for the Atlantic Charter—Evatt, 14 October 1943

Herbert V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, in the House of Representatives at Canberra 14 October 1943.

... I regard every word of the Atlantic Charter as of importance. Australia should fight hard to see that

its principles are carried into practical effect to the greatest possible extent. ...

I ... emphasize that Australia has a real concern in the ultimate European settlement, that the broad principles of such settlement are already indicated in the Atlantic Charter, and that special arrangements made as a result of the military exigencies do not and cannot prejudice such final settlement. I think it is our duty to contribute at all times toward the practical achievement of the positive objectives stated by Allied leaders in their declarations.

/Ibid., p. 9./

159. "Military Exigencies" in Four-Power Moscow Declaration, 1 November 1943

The Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, ...

8. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation. ...

/Ibid., p. 109./

160. Stalin "Unchanging"—Ribbentrop-Molotov Deal Improved

Premier Stalin's Report to Moscow Soviet 6 November 1943.

The victory of the Allied countries over Hitlerite Germany will put on the agenda the important questions of the organizing and rebuilding of the state, economic and cultural life of the European peoples. The policy of our Government in these questions remains unchanging. Together with our Allies we shall have to:

First: Liberate the peoples of Europe from the fascist invaders and help them rebuild their national states dismembered by the fascist-enslavers—the people of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece, and other states now under the German yoke must again become free and independent;

Second: Grant the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to decide for themselves the question of their form of government;

Third: Take measures that all fascist criminals responsible for this war and the sufferings of the peoples bear stern punishment and retribution for all the crimes they committed, no matter in what country they may hide;

Fourth: Establish such an order in Europe, as will completely preclude the possibility of new aggression on the part of Germany;

Fifth: Establish lasting economic, political and cultural collaboration among the peoples of Europe based on mutual confidence and mutual assistance for the purpose of rehabilitating the economic and cultural life destroyed by the Germans.

/Ibid., p. 15./

161. "Let Us Assure Our Defenders on the Battle Fronts"

Joseph C. Grew, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, at St. Thomas Church in New York 5 Dec. 1943.

... Measures must and shall be taken to prevent that cancer of aggressive militarism ... once again to rear itself in malignant evil. ... Let us assure our defenders on the battle fronts that this time their heroism shall forever finish the job begun in 1914. ...

... Two great cornerstones ... have already been swung into place. One was the Atlantic Charter; the second was the Moscow agreement. Others will follow.

/Ibid., p. 33./

162. The Teheran Declaration Masking Secret Deals—6 December 1943

We—The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy. ...

... We shall seek the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose people in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. ...

Emerging from these cordial conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

ROOSEVELT, CHURCHILL, STALIN.

Signed at Teheran, December 1, 1943.

/Ibid., p. 113./

163. Roosevelt Reiterates the Principles, 24 December 1943

Radio Broadcast by the President from Hyde Park, N. Y.

... The right of every nation, large or small, must be respected and guarded as jealously as are the rights of every individual within our own republic.

The doctrine that the strong shall dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies—and we reject it.

But, at the same time, we are agreed that if force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be applied—for as long as it may be necessary.

/Ibid., p. 36./

164. Russia Openly Reverts to Aggression After Teheran

Moscow Broadcast 5 January 1944.

On January 5, a declaration of the exiled Polish Government on the question of Soviet-Polish relations was published in London. It contained a number of erroneous affirmations, including an erroneous affirmation concerning the Soviet-Polish frontier.

As is known, the Soviet Constitution established a Soviet-Polish frontier corresponding with the desires

of the population of the western Ukraine and western White Russia, expressed in a plebiscite carried out on broad democratic principles in the year 1939. The territories of the western Ukraine, populated in an overwhelming majority by Ukrainians, were incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine, while the territories of western White Russia, populated in an overwhelming majority by White Russians, were incorporated into Soviet White Russia.

The injustice caused by the Riga Treaty in the year 1921, which was forced on the Soviet Union ... was thus rectified. ...

The Soviet Government does not consider the frontiers of the year 1939 to be unchangeable. The borders can be corrected in favor of Poland on such lines that districts in which the Polish population predominates be handed over to Poland. In such case the Soviet-Polish border could approximately follow the so-called Curzon Line, which was adopted in the year 1919 by the Supreme Council of Allied Powers and which provided for the incorporation of the Western Ukraine and western White Russia into the Soviet Union.

Poland's western borders must be extended through the joining to Poland of age-old Polish lands taken away from Poland by Germany, without which it is impossible to unite the whole of the Polish people in its own state, which thus will acquire a necessary outlet to the Baltic Sea.

The just striving of the Polish people for complete unity in a strong and independent state must receive recognition and support. The emigre Polish Government, cut off from its people, has proved incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union. It has proved equally incapable of organizing an active struggle against the German invaders in Poland itself. Moreover, with its wrong policy, it frequently plays into the hands of the German invaders. At the same time, the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union lie in the establishment of firm and friendly relations between our two countries and in the unity of the Soviet and Polish peoples in the struggle against the common outside enemy, as the common cause of all the Allies requires.

/The United Nations Review, vol. IV, No. 2, 15 February 1944, pp. 91-92./

165. Roosevelt Denies Political Deals at Moscow and Teheran

President Roosevelt's Broadcast on Message to Congress, 11 January 1944.

This Nation in the past two years has become an active partner in the world's greatest war against human slavery.

... When Mr. Hull went to Moscow in October, and when I went to Cairo and Teheran in November, ... there were many vital questions concerning the future peace, and they were discussed in an atmosphere of complete candor and harmony. ...

And right here I want to address a word or two to some suspicious souls who are fearful that Mr. Hull or I have made "commitments" for the future which might pledge this Nation to secret treaties, or to enacting the role of Santa Claus. . . .

But there were no secret treaties or political or financial commitments. . . .

/Ibid., p. 81./

166. "Stalin and I Also Spoke and Agreed" on Poland—Churchill, 22 February 1944

House of Commons Debate.

I took occasion /at Moscow and Teheran/ to raise personally with Marshal Stalin, the question of the future of Poland. I pointed out that it was in fulfilment of our guarantee to Poland that Great Britain declared war upon Nazi Germany. . . . It was with great pleasure that I heard from Marshal Stalin that he, too, was resolved upon the creation and maintenance of a strong integral independent Poland. . . . and I am convinced that they represent the settled policy of the Soviet Union.

Here I may remind the House that we ourselves have never in the past guaranteed, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, any particular frontier line to Poland. We did not approve of the Polish occupation of Vilna in 1920.* The British view in 1919 stands expressed in the so-called Curzon Line which attempted to deal, at any rate partially, with the problem. I have always held the opinion that all questions of territorial settlement and re-adjustment should stand over until the end of the war and that the victorious Powers should then arrive at a formal and final agreement governing the articulation of Europe as a whole. That is still the wish of His Majesty's Government. However, the advance of the Russian armies into Polish regions in which the Polish underground army is active makes it indispensable that some kind of friendly working agreement should be arrived at to govern the wartime conditions and to enable all anti-Hitlerite forces to work together with the greatest advantage against the common foe.

During the last few weeks the Foreign Secretary and I together have labored with the Polish Government in London. . . . I have an intense sympathy with the Poles, . . . but I also have sympathy with the Russian standpoint. . . . I cannot feel that the Russian demand for a reassurance about her Western frontiers goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable or just. Marshal Stalin and I also spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the North and West.

. . . There will be . . . no question of the Atlantic Charter applying to Germany as a matter of right and barring territorial transferences or adjustments in enemy countries. . . . Unconditional surrender means that the victors have a free hand. . . . If we are bound,

* The issue concerned solely Lithuania and Poland, not Russia.—*Lithuanian Bulletin*.

we are bound by our own consciences to civilization. We are not bound to the Germans. . . .

/The U.N. Review, vol. IV, No. 3, 15 March 1944, p. 107./

167. Eden Shelves the Atlantic Charter, 23 February 1944

House of Commons Debate.

MR. EDEN: . . . Let me say one word about Poland, and it will only be one word, because the House will understand that the Prime Minister's words which he used yesterday were very carefully chosen, . . .

. . . Stalin spoke and agreed upon the need for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany in the North and West. That represents the position of His Majesty's Government.

MR. STOKES: Does that mean that His Majesty's Government have abandoned the principles of the Atlantic Charter?

MR. EDEN: . . . I was just coming to the Atlantic Charter myself. . . . What I am about to say does not mean that we wish to try to claim some strained or unilateral interpretation for the Atlantic Charter. . . . Germany would not, as a matter of right, be able to claim to benefit from the Atlantic Charter in such a way as to preclude the victorious Powers from making territorial adjustments at her expense. There are certain parts of the Atlantic Charter which refer in set terms to victor and vanquished alike. Article 4 does so. But we cannot admit that Germany can claim, as a matter of right on her part, whatever our obligation, that any part of the Charter applies to her.

/Ibid., pp. 108-109./

168. Roosevelt Claimed Stalin Freed "Millions" From Enslavement and Oppression . . .

February 22, 1944.

His Excellency

Joseph V. Stalin . . .

. . . The magnificent achievements of the Red Army under your leadership have been an inspiration to all. . . . Millions of Soviet citizens have been freed from enslavement and oppression by the victorious advance of the Red Army. . . .

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

/Ibid., p. 124./

169. "Independence" of Seized Countries "Restored" . . .

Molotov's Report to the Supreme Soviet

1 February 1944.

Comrade Deputies: . . .

Now, too, we have national army formations in the Red Army. Our Army has Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, Georgian . . . and certain other army formations. Some of these army units were created during the Patriotic War. Now that all the peoples of the Soviet Union strive to take their place in the ranks of the Red Army, creation of army formations of the Republics is of great importance to us. . . .

. . . Who fails to appreciate whole-heartedly what

the Red Army does to prepare the imminent liberation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Moldavia and the Karelo-Finnish Republics? . . .

. . . The enemies of the Soviet Union need not doubt that as a result of these new army formations the forces of our State will grow still stronger. This will make them more cautious in the future. . . .

The proposed transformation of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and . . . of Defense is a new forward stride in the solution of the national problem . . . in direct accord with the principles of our Lenin-Stalin national policy . . . the Soviet State has reached a new level in its development, turning into a more complex and virile organism. . . .

Since the time when the Soviet Union was founded, the Constitution has insured to the Union Republics such a supreme expression of their sovereign rights as the right of free secession from the USSR. But as time passes the stronger becomes the desire of the peoples of the Soviet Union to live in close friendship among themselves, to help one another and to march together through all trials under the guidance of Soviet power.

The recognition by the Union of the increased requirements of the Republics in their state activities, including foreign activities . . . only serve to . . . reveal still more fully the historic meaning of the existence of the Soviet Union to the peoples of the East and West.

/Ibid., pp. 128-130./

170. Preview of Forcible "Repatriation" Under Four Freedoms . . .

Soviet Information Bureau of the Russian Foreign Commissariat.

Moscow, February 28, 1944.

Various rumors have been disseminated in the foreign press recently with regard to negotiations . . . between the Soviet Union and Finland. . . .

During the meeting . . . Mme. Kollontay conveyed to Dr. Paasikivi the reply of the Soviet Government containing the following armistice terms:

. . . 2. Re-establishment of the Soviet-Finnish agreement of 1940 and withdrawal of Finnish troops to the 1940 boundaries.

3. Immediate return of Soviet and Allied war prisoners as well as Soviet and Allied persons of the civilian population. . . .

/The United Nations Review, vol. IV, No. 14, 15 May 1944, pp. 127-129./

171. Hull Reassures on "The Principles"—Broadcast 8 April 1944

. . . As I look at the map of Europe . . . As the Nazis go down to defeat, they will inevitably leave behind them . . . a legacy of confusion. It is essential that we and our allies establish the controls necessary to bring order out of this chaos as rapidly as possible. . . . Therefore, for us, for the world, and for the countries

concerned a stable Europe should be an immediate objective of allied policy.

. . . Liberation from the German yoke will give the peoples of Europe a new and magnificent opportunity to fulfill their democratic aspirations, both in building democratic political institutions of their own choice, and in achieving the social and economic democracy on which political democracy must rest. It is important to our national interest to encourage the establishment in Europe of strong and progressive popular governments . . . creating the conditions of lasting peace. . . .

There has been discussion recently of the Atlantic Charter and of its application to various situations. The Charter is an expression of fundamental objectives toward which we and our allies are directing our policies. It states that the nations accepting it are not fighting for the sake of aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise. . . . It is not a code of law. . . . It points the direction in which solutions are to be sought; it does not give solutions. It charts the course upon which we are embarked and shall continue. That course includes the prevention of aggression. . . . The Charter certainly does not prevent any steps, including those relating to enemy states, necessary to achieve these objectives. What is fundamental are the objectives of the Charter and the determination to achieve them.

It is hardly to be supposed that all the more than thirty boundary questions in Europe can be settled while the fighting is still in progress. This does not mean that certain questions may not and should not in the meantime be settled by friendly conferences and agreement. . . .

. . . Our foreign policy is comprehensive, is stable, and is known to all men. As the President has said, neither he nor I have or will make any secret agreement or commitment, political or financial. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 127-129./

172. Molotov Reaffirms Deal With Hitler On Romania

Broadcast by Molotov from Moscow 2 April 1944.

The Red Army, as the result of a successful offensive, has reached the Prut River, which is the state frontier between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Rumania. Thus the beginnings have been made in the full re-establishment of the Soviet state frontier as fixed in 1940 in accordance with the agreement between Soviet Russia and Rumania.

This agreement has been treacherously violated by the Rumanian Government, in alliance with Hitlerite Germany. At present, the Red Army is carrying out the clearance of Soviet territory of all the enemy still there. . . .

Simultaneously, the Soviet Government declares it does not pursue the aim of acquiring Rumanian territory or of altering the existing social structure of Rumania.

/Ibid., pp. 132-133./

173. Churchill on Poland, May 24, 1944

For a long time past the Foreign Secretary and I have labored with all our strength to try to bring about a resumption of relations between the Soviet Government and the Polish Government which we recognize. . . . We are the Ally of both countries. . . . We have signed a 20-year treaty with our Ally, Soviet Union, and this Treaty is the foundation of our policy. . . .

. . . I must repeat that the essential part of any arrangement is regulation of the Polish eastern frontier. . . .

I have the impression—and it is no more than an impression—that things are not so bad as they may appear on the surface between Russia and Poland. . . .

/The United Nations Review, vol. IV, No. 5, July 15, 1944, pp. 193-4./

174. The Last Joint Act of Hypocrisy—Yalta, February 11, 1945

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean conference:

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (A) to establish conditions of internal peace; (B) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (C) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the pop-

ulation and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (D) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build, in cooperation with other peace-loving nations, a world under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of mankind.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

J. STALIN

February 11, 1945.

/The New York Times, February 13, 1945, p. L-4./

175. Read Press Accounts of the Surrender of Innocent 167 Baltic Refugees by Sweden to the Soviet Union in December, 1945-January 1946—and Riga Broadcast of the Mass Hanging in February 1946**176. Read "Treatment of Displaced Persons" in Lithuanian Bulletin of January-February 1947****177. Finns Surrender Baltic Refugees to Russia in January 1948**

On January 16 (1948) the Finnish Government, under pressure by Russia, decided to surrender to the Russians thirty Baltic refugees, mostly Estonians, inasmuch as Finland had undertaken an obligation, under the Peace Treaty with Russia, to surrender all refugees charged with treason or war crimes. Of course, the Russians are not shy to make such charges. . . .

The victims were to be transported in secrecy. Nevertheless, a group of newspaper men was waiting at the Helsinki railroad station. All of the "repatriates" were brought in chains. The police arrived in advance of the party but failed to bar them from the train cars. Regardless of the chained hands, each prisoner carried his worldly possessions tied in a small bag. One Estonian, on boarding the train, shouted: "Long Live Finland!"

One woman followed in the wake of the convoy. She was the wife of one of the "repatriates." She followed her husband of her free will.

On the same day when 30 Balts were being forcibly carried to the frontier station of Vainikala, four Estonians escaped from the Helsinki prison. When their forenoon walk period was over, they rushed the gate, seized the keys and escaped. Very shortly the guards

went in search and opened fire. Two prisoners were recaptured at once, two were seized later. One prisoner was wounded in the arm.

"*Dagens Nyheter*" of Stockholm stated that the guards were shooting wildly, "as madmen," paying no attention to passersby. This paper also stated that an Estonian engineer, Sirels, had attempted to flee the prison hospital but, after being shot, was seized.

The only Estonian who made good his escape was Alfred Karn, former art dealer. Some time ago he was granted permission by the prison authorities to attend the burial of his son—and he escaped.

The Swedish press is advocating abandonment of the policy whereunder Baltic refugees, seeking asylum in Sweden, are either surrendered or are not permitted to cross the frontier into Sweden.

/"Naujienos" Daily, Chicago, March 3, 1948./

178. Read Draft Convention on Genocide—State Department Bulletin, Vol. XVIII, No. 466, June 6, 1948, pp. 725-727

179. Read Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Washington 1948

180. Ineffectual Soviet Defense

(a) . . . Anglo-French proposals (in 1939) provided for help on the part of the USSR to those countries to which the British and French had given promises of guarantees, but they said nothing about their own help for the countries on the north-western frontier of the USSR, the Baltic States, in the event of aggressor attacking them.

In view of the above-mentioned considerations, V. M. Molotov announced that the Soviet Union could not undertake obligations with respect to some countries unless similar guarantees were given with respect to the countries situated on the northwestern frontier of the Soviet Union.

/Falsifiers of History. Soviet Information Bureau, Moscow, February 1948. Published by the Information Bulletin of the Embassy of the USSR, Washington, D.C., February 1948. Pages 30-31./

(b) . . . Halifax, through the medium of the Ambassador in Moscow, made another proposal to the Soviet Government to the effect that the Soviet Government should issue a declaration saying that "in the event of an act of aggression against any European neighbor of the Soviet Union, who would offer resistance, the assistance of the Soviet Government could be counted upon if desired."

What this proposal meant was mainly that in the event of an act of aggression on the part of Germany against Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or Finland, the Soviet Union would be obliged to render them assistance without any obligation on the part of Britain to render assistance—i.e., for the Soviet Union to become involved in a war with Germany singlehanded. In the case of Poland and Romania, too, who did receive Britain's guarantees, the Soviet Union was to

render them assistance against an aggressor; but even in their case Britain refused to assume any obligations jointly with the Soviet Union, leaving herself a free hand and a field for maneuvers of any kind, not to mention the fact that, according to this proposal, Poland and Romania as well as the Baltic States assumed no obligations whatever with respect to the USSR.

The Soviet Government, however, did not want to miss any opportunity to bring about agreement with other Powers for a joint struggle against Hitler's aggression. Without the least delay it presented to the British Government its counterproposal. . . .

(1) That the Soviet Union, Britain and France should mutually undertake to render one another immediate assistance of every kind, including military, in the event of aggression against one of these states;

(2) That the Soviet Union, Britain and France should undertake to render any kind of assistance, including military, to the states of Eastern Europe situated between the Baltic and the Black Seas and bordering on the Soviet Union, in the event of aggression against these states; and

(3) . . . to determine within a short space of time the volume and forms of military assistance to be rendered to each of these states in both cases mentioned above. . . .

On May 8 the British reply . . . proposed that the Soviet Government should make a unilateral declaration. . . .

Once again the Soviet Union was expected to assume unilateral obligations. . . . Britain and France who on their part assumed no obligations whatever to the Soviet Union with regard to the Baltic Republics. . . .

It is easy to see that actually the British proposal was addressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin. The Germans were invited to attack the Soviet Union, and were given to understand that Britain and France would maintain neutrality if only the Germans attacked through the Baltic States.

/Ibid., pp. 32-33./

(c) Toward the end of May, Britain and France made new proposals . . . but still left open a question of essential importance to the Soviet Union—namely, the question of guarantees for the three Baltic Republics situated on the northwestern frontier of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the rulers of Britain and France . . . hedged. . . .

/Ibid., pp. 34-35./

(d) Is it not a fact that of all the non-aggressive great Powers in Europe the Soviet Union was the last to make a pact with the Germans?

Of course, the falsifiers of history and other reactionaries are displeased with the fact that the Soviet Union succeeded in making good use of the Soviet-German pact to strengthen its defenses; that it succeeded in moving its frontiers far to the West and in barring the way of the unhampered eastward advance

of German aggression; that Hitler's troops had to begin their offensive to the East, not from the Narva-Minsk-Kiev line, but from a line hundreds of kilometers farther west; that the USSR was not bled to death in the Patriotic War, but emerged victorious from that war. . . .

/Ibid., p. 42./

(e) On September 17, 1939, the Soviet troops, at the order of the Soviet Government, crossed the pre-war Soviet-Polish border, occupied Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine and proceeded to build defenses there. . . . In the main, it was the line which is known in history as the "Curzon Line". . .

A few days later the Soviet Government signed pacts of mutual assistance with the Baltic States, providing for the stationing of Soviet Army garrisons on the territory of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the organization of Soviet air fields and the building of naval bases there.

Thus the foundation was laid for the "Eastern" front.

/Ibid., p. 43./

(f) . . . Finland unleashed the war against the Soviet Union.

/Ibid., p. 45./

(g) It should be noted that . . . the Anglo-French bosses of the League of Nations immediately took the side of the Finnish Government, declared through the League of Nations that the USSR was the "aggressor". . . . At the bidding of its Anglo-French bosses, the League of Nations, which had disgraced itself by its connivance with and encouragement of the Japanese and German-Italian aggressors, obediently passed a resolution against the Soviet Union and demonstratively "expelled" the latter from its midst.

But matters did not end there. In the war which the Finnish reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government to continue hostilities.

/Ibid., p. 46./

(h) On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish Peace Treaty was signed.

. . . But this did not yet mean that the formation of an "Eastern" front from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been completed. Pacts had been concluded with the Baltic States, but there were as yet no Soviet troops there capable of holding the defenses. . . . In the middle of June, 1940, Soviet troops entered Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On June 27, 1940, Soviet troops entered Bukovina and Moldavia. . . .

Thus the formation of an "Eastern" front against Hitlerite aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea was completed.

The British and French ruling circles . . . did not realize that *it was not a question of infringing or not infringing upon the national rights of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland*, but that the point was

to organize victory over the Nazis in order to prevent the conversion of those countries into disfranchised colonies of Hitler Germany.

/Ibid., pp. 48-49./

(i) Was the United States right when it landed its troops at Casablanca in spite of the protests of the Moroccans and of direct military counter-action on the part of the Petain Government of France whose authority extended to Morocco? Unquestionably it was right. . . .

But then the same must be said about the actions of the Soviet Government which by the summer of 1940 organized an "Eastern" front against Hitlerite aggression and stationed its troops as far west as possible. . . . That was the only means . . . in order to . . . prevent the conversion of *peace-loving countries of Europe, among them Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland* into colonies of Hitler Germany. Only enemies of democracy or people who have lost their senses could describe those actions of the Soviet Government as aggression.

But it follows from this that Chamberlain, Daladier, and their entourage, who described this policy of the Soviet Government as aggression and organized the expulsion of the Soviet from the League of Nations, acted as enemies of democracy or as people who had lost their senses.

From this it follows, further, that the present-day slanderers and falsifiers of history who work with Messrs. Bevin and Bidault and describe the creation of an "Eastern" front against Hitler as aggression are also acting as enemies of democracy or as people who have lost their senses.

/Ibid., pp. 49-50./

(j) On June 22 of that year (1941) Germany attacked the USSR. . . .

The Soviet Union joined the war of liberation against Hitler Germany.

. . . The nations enslaved by Hitler breathed a sigh of relief, as they were certain that Hitler was bound to break his neck between the two fronts. . . .

The ruling circles of France were full of malicious glee as they did not doubt that "Russia would be smashed" in practically no time.

A prominent member of the Senate of the United States of America who is now President of the United States, Mr. Truman, stated on the day after Germany's attack upon the USSR:

"If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and in that way let them kill as many as possible." (*New York Times*, June 24, 1941.)

/Ibid., p. 52./

181. Stalin Hints Revenge on Poland and Lithuania September 7, 1947

Stalin's Message "To The Russian People" on the 800th Anniversary of the Founding of Moscow.

Greeting to Moscow, capital of our Motherland, on the occasion of its 800th anniversary.

... The services of Moscow consist not only in that it three times liberated our Motherland in the course of history from foreign oppression—from the Mongolian yoke, from the Polish-Lithuanian invasion, from French intrusion.

The service of Moscow consists first and foremost in that it became the basis of the uniting of dismembered Russia into a unified state with a united leadership. . . .

The historic service of Moscow consists in that it was and remains the basis and the initiator of the creation of a centralized state in Russia. . . .

... Moscow represents simultaneously the mouth-piece of the liberation movement of toiling mankind from capitalist slavery.

... the inspirer of the construction of a new Soviet democracy. . . .

... the banner of struggle of all toiling people all over the world, of all subjugated races and nations, for their liberation from the domination of plutocracy and imperialism.

... the center for the organization of friendship among the nations and the fraternal collaboration in our multi-national state. . . .

/The New York Times, Sept. 8, 1947, p. 5./

182. Stalin's Nazi Partners Indicted and Hanged at Nuremberg in 1946

183. United States Reservation at the Nuremberg Trial

Upon the signing of the Indictment in Berlin on 6 October 1945, Justice Jackson, on behalf of the United States, filed the following statement of reservation with the Tribunal and with the Chief Prosecutors of France, Great Britain, and Soviet Russia:

Berlin

6 October 1945

M. Francois de Menthon,
Sir Hartley Shawcross,
General R. A. Rudenko.

Dear Sirs:

In the Indictment of German War Criminals signed today, reference is made to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and certain other territories as being within the area of the USSR. This language is proposed by Russia and is accepted to avoid the delay which would be occasioned by insistence on an alteration in the text. The Indictment is signed subject to this reservation and understanding.

I have no authority either to admit or to challenge, on behalf of the United States of America, Soviet claims to sovereignty over such territories. Nothing, therefore, in this Indictment is to be construed as a recognition by the United States of such sovereignty or as indicating any attitude, either on the part of the United States or on the part of the undersigned, toward any claim to recognition of such sovereignty.

Respectfully submitted,

/signed/ Robert H. Jackson

ROBERT H. JACKSON.

Chief of Counsel for the United States.

To the Clerk or Recording Officer,

International Military Tribunal:

The representative of the United States has found it necessary to make certain reservations as to the possible bearing of certain language in the Indictment upon political questions which are considered to be irrelevant to the proceedings before the Tribunal. However, it is considered appropriate to disclose such reservations that they may not be unknown to the Tribunal in the event they should at any time be considered relevant. For that purpose, the foregoing copy is filed.

/Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. I, Washington 1946, pp. 81-82./

184. Read the News Headlines Since Yalta

185. Consult the Memoranda of the Balts and the Peasant Union

186. State Department's Circular Letter to Governors

Department of State

Washington, March 26, 1948.

The Honorable the Governor of———.

Sir: There have recently come to the Department's attention several cases in which a person acting as attorney for the Consul General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in New York City, claimed the right in behalf of nonresident Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians to receipt for their distributive shares derived from estates in process of probate.

The Department has never recognized the incorporation of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and consequently does not regard Soviet consular officers or their attorneys as having any right to act on behalf of nonresident Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian nationals with respect to distributive shares owing to them from estates of persons dying in the United States. In the cases of Latvian and Estonian nationals, such right has been reserved to consular officers of the respective countries by article XXV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1928 between the United States and Latvia (45 Stat. 2641) and article XXIV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights of 1928 between the United States and Estonia (44 Stat. 2379). Moreover, even in the absence of applicable treaty provisions, the Department does not consider that Soviet consular officers in the United States have any right to represent nationals of a third country, whether residing in the United States or elsewhere, without the country's consent. It is respectfully requested that you advise the courts of your State having to do with probate proceedings of the position of the Department with respect to the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, and that you request them in considering the validity of powers of attorney given by persons in the Baltic States or their attorneys to give

appropriate consideration to this Department's position of nonrecognition of Soviet sovereignty in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.

As you doubtless know, it has been generally recognized by American writers on international law as well as by the courts that the questions as to what regime in a foreign country is to be recognized as the government thereof and what persons are to be recognized as representing such regime are matters for determination by the executive branch of our Government, although there have been some instances in which the legislative branch has had a part in the recognition of new states. Needless to say, where the conclusion of a treaty or the sending of an ambassador or minister is involved, the Senate has a part. (I Moore, *International Law Digest*, 245-247; I Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 161 et seq.; I Hyde, *International Law* (2d ed.) 156 et seq.; Hershey, J. G., *The Legal Effects of Recognition in International Law*, p. 24; Berdahl, C. A., *The Power of Recognition*, 14 *American Journal of International Law* (1920) 519. See also *Jones v. United States* (137 U.S. 202, 212); *Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.* (246 U.S. 297, 302); *Guaranty*

Trust Co. v. United States (304 U.S. 126, 137); *United States v. Pink* (315 U.S. 229, 230).

Very truly yours,

ERNEST A. GROSS,

The Legal Adviser

(For the Secretary of State).

/Congressional Record, vol. 94, No. 98,
June 1, 1948, page 6977./

187. Russia Organized Its Own "Ostland"

Article 13 of the Soviet Union's Constitution is supplemented as follows:

"In order to render mutual assistance in economic and political spheres and also in the defense sphere of the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), the following soviet socialist republics are uniting voluntarily on the basis of equality: Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Byelorussia."

/"Pravda," Moscow, No. 77, March 17, 1948./

188. Read the Leading Article, *Lithuanian Bulletin*, May-July 1948

The End.

Lithuanian Folk Art

By Jurgis Baltrušaitis, Ph.D.

(Continuation)

IV.

Painting and Engraving

In Lithuanian folk art, painting is of an entirely different character from sculpture. It, too, is religious art but its traditions are less stable and its technique more spontaneous. The pictures are usually executed on wooden panels covered with a coating of stucco. But sometimes canvas, glass, or even paper are used. The artist himself prepares his colors, with oil or eggs. The subjects are not much different from those used for wood carvings. Certain compositions such as those depicting St. George, who is to be found in almost every house in Samagitia (reputedly the relic of the Teutonic Order's influence), or the Crucifixion, the Pietà, the Virgin of the Seven Sorrows and St. Rocco, often are directly inspired by the reliefs. Holy images found in the churches or illustrations observed in sacred books also serve as models but the theme is not always reproduced exactly.

Some of them are charming for their very artlessness as, for instance, the pictures depicting the hands of God emerging from a circle of clouds and throwing down great loaves of bread to the kneeling peasants. There is no firmness in the design, the composition is irregular, the scale of colors reduced to two or three tones. But these very defects lend a note of poetry to the pictures. Painted by a village Douanier Rousseau, Christ and the Saints are very close to the people. Their very clumsiness makes them much more real than any correct design could. Sometimes the strokes

are more vigorous. Heavy outlines ring the silhouettes and the decorative movement is strongly accented. The spots of color are disposed with a certain boldness. Enormous flowers appear on the vestments and there are ornaments everywhere.

But it is in the engravings that a more masterly art becomes apparent. Here, too, the wood carvings inspire the artist. As in sculpture, the elements of technique are introduced by Western currents.

Doubtless the artists first copied the incunabula and the illustrated books observed in the rural rectories but the sources of inspiration were continually renewed. Engravings came from Germany and from even farther afield. Several compositions have their prototypes in French popular art. Perhaps the wide sale of playing cards, which were also engraved in wood, contributed to their propagation. Epinal prints may have followed the same route.

For the most part these engravings come from Lower Lithuania, Samagitia. The most ancient examples which have come down to us go back to the beginning of the Eighteenth Century. A St. George is dated 1710 (Fig. 36). The latest engraving bears the date 1853. From 1864 to 1904, the production of engravings was practically interrupted by the Russian ukase forbidding all printing in the Lithuanian language, in Latin characters. During these four decades of inane repression only a few reprints, with their inscriptions




FIGURE 36

St. George, "Patron Saint of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy,"
A.D. 1710.

changed, made their appearance. After the period of repression this art did not seem to be able to recover. At present, in consequence of the frenzied private collectors' activities, a large part of the plates and proof-sheets is scattered in Germany, others are in Poland; very few were left in Lithuania itself.

The subjects of the pictures are exclusively religious or didactic. Among the themes which the pictures have in common with the wood carvings are: St. George, Jesus of Nazareth, St. John Nepomut (Nepomucene), St. Anne, St. Francis of Assisi, all the familiar figures. But the composition is not always the same and there is a greater variety of prototypes. The village artists copied not only the venerated statues but also etchings and popular engravings, even pictures by the great masters: a Christ attributed to Roger van der Weyden, found in Vilnius, a Coronation of the Virgin by Rubens, compositions by Veronese (from previously deformed reproductions), a Crucifixion by Dürer.

The copying was unrestrained: entire parts are often lacking. The artist cuts or adds at will. Sometimes one and the same plate contains fragments of diverse origin. Recast according to an inexact model, the famous masterpieces are quite often unrecognizable.

The process followed by the artist is quite simple: a coating of wax and chalk is spread on a carefully prepared wooden plank (usually of linden wood) and the principal lines are drawn with a pencil or a

pen. Then the design is cut out with a knife. The printing ink, applied in large blobs, often spreads beyond the outlines. The proof sheets are pulled on a rudimentary press or by the application of paper. Sometimes the engravings are colored by hand.

The compositions are usually large and require the assemblage of several plates; sometimes they are a meter high. They may depict a group or a single personage; sometimes there is a succession of scenes, placed side by side or one above the other. In the first instance, the forms are fully spread out as in a fresco. The teaming figurines recall the art of the miniature.

The tool guided with difficulty by the artist, traces lines which possess energy but are irregular and lack suppleness. Parallel hatchings indicate shadows and suggest the relief. The same heavy stroke outlines the earth and the clouds, the rays of the sun and the trees—the whole universe in which the personages have their being. All available space is crammed. The forms crowd one another and overrun the background; it betrays the horror of a vacuum felt by all archaic art, joined to baroque profusion. The images are aligned on the same plane. Hierarchical distribution (or distribution according to a rigid register) creates around the principal personage a space without depth in which are to be found, as in the stage settings, churches and houses, hills and plants. Human beings



FIGURE 37
The Nazarene.

are twice smaller than the Saints. Nature is reduced to symbolic ornaments: large flowers like those which decorate chests, enormous leaves on stems. It is an epitomized landscape. Sometimes a perspective is sketched in but the fields rise like a tapestry or form a pedestal for the scenes. The personages do not live in a real world. They exist in the midst of garlands, aureoles and sun rays, amid showers of stars and cascades of clouds which look like circuses of chaotic rocks. Despite this baroque luxuriance, there is a heaviness and a severity of expression which belong rather to the Middle Ages than to the Classical Century. Reinstalled in the frame of the superposed zones, in the clime of ancient mysteries, in a system regulated by old dogmas, these Angels and Madonnas regain the atmosphere of Gothic drama. As in folk sculpture, the artist spontaneously evokes the spirit of another age.

But despite this unity of character and of technique, it is possible to distinguish several trends: a severe style, a flowery style, and a sumptuous style.

The severe style is especially evident in the subjects borrowed from sculpture. When a rustic God is reproduced, the image remains imbued with His original austerity. Jesus of Nazareth, upright, with hands bound, with too large a head, is delineated in several strokes. It is a monumental figure set inside a niche (Fig. 37). The hatchings covering the whole of the silhouette intensify its somberness and lend to the body the aspect of a trunk. There is the same arrangement in other scenes: the numerous personages are placed on superposed foundations without losing their frontality. Their rugged and dense masses press with authority into a frame which does not seem to be made to their measure.

The flowery style also unfolds in generous and very full compositions. Fragile figurines would not suit its vegetation. Foliage and petals strew the garments. Instead of pen spaces, there are seed plots and luxurious carpets. Our Lady of Loretto, adorned like the Virgin of a reliquary, is surrounded by a garland of the Mystic Rosary, set with medallions. St. John Nepomut seems to grow out of a basket of flowers (Fig. 38). Elsewhere, stars like sunflowers decorate the sky. Over-run by this garden the personages nevertheless keep their robust character.

This stability gives way only under the weight of the rays and folds which streak and break the surfaces in all directions. The Saints become heavier and more expansive. Chubby little angels surge from the clouds. The robes swell out as if in a breeze. All this heavy eddy clearly belongs to a peasant baroque.

The monumental feeling disappears completely only in the pictures which portray multiple scenes. There the panel becomes fragmentary. Each of the assembled plates is made up of one or several independent compositions: it is a mosaic of pictures framed in a ribbon of foliage and flowers. The design becomes schematic. The narrative element dominates but there is no continuity in the tale. The pieces of cut-up film are sometimes set side by side without coherence. Members of the same group are not always united.



FIGURE 38
St. John of Nepomut (Nepomucene).

They are ranged at regular intervals. As in the small reliefs comporting several figures, their movements are rigid; a recumbent personage has the same silhouette as one standing erect. They look like overturned statuettes.

As depicted in this particular world, sacred history and sermon alike take on the aspect of a village fairy tale.

These characters which appear so contradictory, do sometimes have unity. The picture of St. George of the year 1710, the oldest and one of the most beautiful relics which had come down to us, is at once impressive by its amplitude and by the multiplicity of its details. From the top to the bottom of this great plate, astride his dappled steed with the little hoofs attached so clumsily, capers a cavalier of pageantry, with ostrich-plumed helmet and billowing cape. He vanquishes a medieval dragon, ferocious and comic at the same time. All around him, in the rare spaces left vacant by the principal subject, between the hoofs of the steed, around its tail and its head, are crowded little houses hanging in space, a tiny crowned queen, angels and plants. The Saint of supernatural stature fights in an overcrowded universe. By its theme as well as by its accent, this print of a childlike gravity, in which flowers and vast undulations intermingle, sums up and illustrates the very diverse aspects of the whole of Lithuanian imagery.

(To be continued)

Soviet Activities in Lithuania During the Nazi Occupation

By A Lithuanian Intelligence Officer

Dissolution of a Network

The NKVD hastily evacuated its personnel and bureaus—the *OO* (*Osobyi Otdyel*—Special Division for army personnel), *DTO* (railroad control), *PO* (frontier control), *EKO* (supply service) and *OOS* (*Otdyel Osoboy Sekretnosti*—Division of Top Secrecy)—in June 1941.

These nefarious institutions should have foreseen the forthcoming hostilities in view of the German concentrations. However, the NKVD was embroiled in putting an end to the Lithuanian armed resistance and was not prepared for a war—totalitarian regimes forbid even the thought of a retreat. Similarly, during the German retreat in 1944, Major General Just, commandant of Lithuania, was obliged to listen to Moscow radio for his own orientation.

It was logical to assume that the NKVD-NKGB had left behind their network of agents supplied with funds, radio transmitters, arms, etc., for espionage and sabotage in the enemy's rear. Even before the first Russian occupation, the NKVD had dozens of agents in Lithuania — Snieckus, Slavinas, Stromas, Dolskis, etc. During the occupation, the NKVD strove to achieve its goal—every fifth civilian, every tenth soldier should be engaged in the NKVD network. Nevertheless, it fell short of the goal, regardless of the efforts to enlist voluntary and involuntary informers. Nearly every priest had undergone torture as a means to enlist them. On the other hand, there were volunteers. Captain M.'s wife had volunteered to spy on the regimental commander of the N. cavalry regiment and her husband's friends. Her employers were delighted with her work. When the insurrectionists seized the NKVD files, I chanced to read a resolution by a high functionary of Riga on one of her reports: "*Kto etot 'Ideal 2'? Ochen tolkovyi chelovek*" (Who is this "Ideal 2"? A very clever person).

Credit is due to the NKVD for its impeccable accounting and diligence in its hellish work. Every person on its rosters had an "*Uchyotnoye Dyelo*" (Accounting File) with incidental information. The files were periodically reviewed by "Operative Plenipotentiaries" who inscribed their orders: "*Podverbovat kvartirnika*" ("Recruit a house agent"—a janitor or a lodger planted in the house); "*Ustavit pochtovyu kontrol*" ("Institute a postal control"). When sufficient incriminatory information was gathered, the suspect was shadowed—a sure sign of an impending arrest.

This carefully spread network dissolved as a spider web in the wind with the first shot of hostilities. "Operative Plenipotentiaries" and "the more conscientious" agents fled with the troops, while the involuntary agents sighed in grateful relief. The "accounting files" became heaps of discarded paper. The secret archives, including complete lists of agents, plenipotentiaries' notes, frontier police reports, etc., were lost.

New Trainees

The NKVD hastily brought together the escaped collaborators, militiamen and communists scattered in Russia. Late in 1941 the Soviets began organizing their intelligence in the German rear. Efforts were made to re-establish contact with the agents presumably left in Lithuania. New recruits were hastily trained, slipped through the gaps in the front or flown in by planes, with orders to compel the old agents to

return to their former "trade." Unfortunately for the NKVD, the Nazis now had complete lists and the former agents were closely watched. Some entered the German service, others were betrayed by their former collaborators, still others sought to start a clean life.

Alcohol conquered V. C., a former military intelligence officer of 1919-1920, and he became an agent of the NKVD. One day he was visited by a new agent, parachuted from a plane, who brought him greetings from "The Swallow," his former boss. But the Nazis were watching him and they liquidated the group without much trouble.

When the Blitzkrieg turned into a positional war, the Soviets gained more time to organize their intelligence. All natives of the Baltic States—refugees and prisoners alike—were carefully screened. Selected individuals were sent to a so-called "Lithuanian Division" near Gorki, and a "Special Company." Members of the latter were trained in diversionist tasks. Its graduates went to a transit camp in Moscow and thence to specialized schools for radio operators, spies, saboteurs and "partisans." The most notorious school was located in the Malakhovka suburb of Moscow. Army experts, including one Lithuanian long resident in the Soviet Union, taught the carefully guarded trainees. Party "indoctrinators" taught the "Leninist-Stalinist discipline." Balts received "spiritual guidance" from their visiting "presidents" and other "leaders" on the Kremlin leash. Training required 3 months.

A remarkable feature was that the first trainees were not traitors at heart. On the occasion of a bolshevik holiday, trainees of a mixed Estonian-Lithuanian company arranged a "festival" of folk songs and folk dances. The Estonians lustily sang a certain song made popular during the Russian occupation of their country—it told how "scoundrel Stalin" enslaved poor Estonia. The interpreter blandly told the assembled Russian dignitaries that the song praised Father Stalin as the liberator of Estonia. The announcement was followed by loud ovations—much to the trainees' amusement. . . .

Graduates were formed into squads of 2-3 persons. These were reinforced at Kalinin by a Russian radio operator, and were thence flown to Lithuania. Nevertheless, throughout 1941-1942, Russia's only sources of information about Lithuania were Kaunas radio broadcasts and an occasional newspaper brought by chance to Russia.

There was much friction between the Party organs and military intelligence officers at Kalinin. The Party demanded that the parachutists engage in forming Party "nests," propaganda and active sabotage. The army was interested exclusively in the dislocation, armaments, movements etc. of the German armed forces. Army officers saw no point in conducting a propaganda which would betray the agent; it was foolish to blow up railroad tracks as the Germans would only intensify their alertness. The officers claimed that the Party simply served as a medium in selecting the agents who were to obey the army's directives. The Party men argued that, on the contrary, the work was to be strictly "political" and the armed forces merely supplied the technical facilities—radio sets and planes. One group leader received two conflicting sets of orders and, upon reaching Lithuania by air, turned to a peaceful life. . . .

Field Operations

The departing squads received extra rations of liquor, "for a greater fortitude," and consumed the rations on the spot—as most of them boarded a plane for the first time and had never made a jump. After a few hours of travel by air, two members of the plane's crew tossed the agents overboard—no chance to waver. Landings were not always successful. The parachute of one Russian girl failed to open and she fell as stone into the Semeliskes forest. The parachute of a Lithuanian tangled in the plane's rudder and the man was dragged all the way from Taujenai to Vievis until his parachute deteriorated into shreds and he fell to his death.

Intelligence squads, as distinct from saboteurs, were poorly armed: one pistol and one hand grenade per squad. The orders were to avoid combat and, in an extremity, to use the pistol on themselves and the hand grenade on the radio set. No one was to be taken prisoner! The promise of military honors was accompanied by a threat that the long hand of the NKVD would reach "traitors."

Real trouble began with landing. The jumps were made at night. The agents had to locate each other and "the baggage" of radio and food dropped by a special parachute. The navigators sometimes erred. An agent who was to be dropped near Plotzen in East Prussia found himself near Prienai in Lithuania. Being a German, he could not hide effectively in Lithuania. Another squad, intended for Sudavia, landed near Insterburg in Prussia and was soon liquidated.

Nevertheless, most of the squads landed in their specified locations, in a fen or a forest. They hid for a few days, as they were unfamiliar with actual conditions in the enemy's rear. They could not risk showing their clumsily forged papers. But hunger forced them to come out of hiding. A great many agents availed themselves of the opportunity to go home. It was estimated by the Lithuanian underground that, throughout 1942, not one such group was able to perform its specific task. The agents received some help in the areas populated by Poles and Russians, but they could hope for no aid in the Lithuanian-language areas: the Germans enjoyed no sympathy but the Russians were hated bitterly.

Individual Incidents

Three men and a girl, all four convinced Stalinists, landed by air in Trakai county in the spring of 1942 under orders to continually disrupt the Kaunas-Vilnius rail traffic. Their first mine proved to be a dud. The men were afraid to approach it, so the girl repaired the mine and the next train was blown up. There was little damage but it alerted the Germans. The squad was hard pressed, food supplies diminished, one man's injured leg needed medical attention. The men were afraid to call on farmers, so the girl tried—and was detained. Her friends walked into a group of pursuers and were all killed. The girl feigned innocence—but was betrayed by the diary. The diary disclosed that she was a Miss Viktorija Garijonyte, 20, from Birzai, daughter of a local communist. It contained panegyrics to Stalin—by men on a dangerous mission—and was intended to provide proof of the squad's activities. It recorded the baying of individual dogs, approaching footsteps, etc.

On 13 June 1942 two strangers were observed entering a house on the Napoleonas Street in Kaunas. When a German patrol followed them, the men opened fire. The Germans tossed hand grenades into the building, but the bolsheviks succeeded in tossing them back at the besiegers. The house was set on fire

after much shooting. One bolshevik killed himself, the other hid in the cellar and attempted to escape at dusk. The cornered agent built a sand barricade under the Girstupis bridge and hid in a sewer. The Germans brought firemen and attempted to flood the sewer. They engaged in ricochet firing. Finally a hand grenade contused the trapped man and he ceased firing. Still, the Germans would not venture into "the fortress." Finally,—the irony!—they brought two Jews from the ghetto and ordered them to climb into the sewer and to bring the unconscious man out. The latter refused to identify himself—until one of the victims tortured by him faced him. He proved to be one Kazys Trinkunas, one of the most sadistic NKVD investigators. . . . The incident created a popular story regarding two Jews who boasted that the "zydeliai" had accomplished what "the entire German army" could not. . . .

Members of another squad planned to abandon their task just as soon as they were in Lithuania. Nevertheless, each man distrusted the other until they discovered that they all thought alike.

A visitor walking down the Gedminas Street in Vilnius, unexpectedly came face to face with Blazys, a former chief of the NKVD in Panevezys, who had personally tortured him. He had been dropped by parachute only a few days earlier—and was fingering a rosary when he was detained.

The Germans weakened in 1944, and the Russians changed tactics. They established large "partisan" units in the huge forests of White Ruthenia. Agents intended for Lithuania were brought there and thence proceeded to their assignments. Several hundred such agents were dispatched. In addition thereto, the "Katyushas"—wives of the Red Army officers left behind—and Old Believer Russian settlers, reinforced by escaped prisoners of war, formed "nests" inside Lithuania though none had Lithuanian members. In the last stages of the German occupation these "nests" sheltered the infiltrating Russian saboteurs and re-established contact with Moscow.

Orthodox Bishop, NKVD-Gestapo Agent

When the Russians occupied the Baltic States in June 1940, the Orthodox Bishop Sergius was dispatched by the NKVD to Latvia and Estonia to "re-unite" their Orthodox Churches with the NKVD-controlled Moscow Patriarchate. The Orthodox Church of Lithuania had not formally disrupted its ties with Moscow.

Soon thereafter, Archbishop Eleferius of the Orthodox Diocese of Vilnius died. Burial of an Archbishop called for attendance by a dignitary of equal rank, and Sergius arrived from Riga. When this "churchman" was left alone with the corpse, he stole the golden cross of Eleferius. . . .

There was an insurrection and war in 1941. Having little faith in a Russian victory, Sergius remained in Vilnius. He established himself with the German SD (Security Service) and enjoyed his heavy drinking and a gay life. When fortunes of war wavered, Sergius evidently pursued an individual policy. For this reason, or probably because he knew too many of the Gestapo secrets, Sergius and his suite, while comfortably riding in a limousine from Vilnius to Kaunas, were attacked "by bandits" and killed. The Lithuanian police found in his automobile a valise crammed with the golden paraphernalia of liturgic rites and a grand collection of gems, women's necklaces, bracelets, rings, etc.

The Gestapo immediately superseded the Lithuanian police investigation. The blame was "fixed" on Soviet agents—and the matter was hushed.

Alfreds Bilmanis

2 Febr. 1887 - 26 July 1948

The Latvian People lost its greatest champion in an international forum.

The son of Christopher Bilmanis and Anna M. née Balodis, Alfreds Bilmanis was born in Riga, the metropolis of the Baltic States. A descendant of an old Latgalian family which had moved to Central Livonia, he developed an early interest in the past of his people and country which was then under Russian tsarist rule. An able student, he graduated as a "candidate in history" from the University of Moscow at the age of 23 and went to Strasbourg. In 1925 he received the degree of a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Stefan Batory in Vilnius.

A newspaper contributor since his student days, Bilmanis turned to teaching in 1912—at Erivan in the Caucasus and at Krasnostav. Called to perform military duty in 1914, he served with distinction as a junior officer in the Imperial Body Guards, was wounded twice and received some military decorations. After the Bolshevik Revolution, he was inspector of a commercial high school at Rivno (Równe), in Polish Ukraine. On 29 May 1919 he married Halina Salnicka, a Polish girl devoted to the Latvian cause. While courting his future wife and attending to his teaching duties, Bilmanis found time to head the local committee of Latvian war refugees.

Returning to Latvia early in 1920, Bilmanis became the head of the Foreign Office Press Bureau and associate editor of an agrarian daily. He organized Latvian writers and newspapermen and represented them at the international congresses. He organized the Latvian P.E.N. Club in 1929 and was active in the Rotary Club. He represented his country at the League of Nations in 1929, went to Moscow as Minister in 1932, and was transferred to Washington in 1935.

His first major work, a history of Poland, was published in 1923. It was followed by his history of Sweden (1925), "The Agrarian Problem in the Latvian Nation" (1926), "Natural Life of Latvia" (1927). His first English volume, "Latvia in the Making," appeared in 1928. Thereafter he produced over 100 books and pamphlets in Latvian, English, German, French, Russian, Spanish, Polish, in addition to his doctor's thesis in Latin. He died while revising the final chapter of his monumental History of Latvia, in English.

Since the enslavement of the Baltic States in consequence of the Hitler-Stalin alliance, he and his Baltic colleagues contributed much toward causing the issuance by the Department of State of the important policy statement of 23 July 1940 condemning the Soviet aggression.

The role of Dr. Bilmanis in Latvian-Lithuanian relations underwent a gradual evolution. A devoted friend of Ulmanis and Meierovičs, he enthusiastically subscribed to their Agrarian Party's domestic and foreign policies. Him-

self having organized the Latvian-Polish Society, he failed to dissociate from Latvia's pro-Polish policy at the height of Lithuania's defence against Poland's aggression and the Latvian "security measures" on the disputed territory previously liberated from the Red Russians by the Lithuanian Army.

Since the signing of the triple Baltic Entente in 1934, Latvian policy became cautiously friendlier to Lithuania. Dr. Bilmanis arrived in America in 1935 and loyally collaborated with his Baltic colleagues throughout his tour of duty in the United States. He soon observed the invaluable influence of the comparatively large Lithuanian American element and its great services in the cause of liberation of the Baltic States. He readily accepted invitations to address Lithuanian and Baltic American gatherings. His easy manners, versatility and disarming sincerity gained him numerous friends. He initiated the plans for a regional Baltic Union in a confederated European Commonwealth.

His maps continued to indicate Vilnius within Poland. Nevertheless, he gained a deeper insight in assaying historical facts and political friends when his former Polish friends studiously avoided social contacts and adulated Stalin while demanding, for a numerically reduced nation, the frontiers of 1939 in the East and the Oder-Neisse line in the West. By 1944, Bilmanis termed Kaunas "a temporary capital." His historical "Dictionary of Events in Latvia"

still contained some typical fallacies detractive of the Lithuanian past, as he accepted uncritically some of the old writings—out of his great love for his great little People. By 1947, he was a loyal friend who saw eye to eye with his Lithuanian collaborators. The Ukrainian problem likewise evoked his sympathy.

Dr. Bilmanis loved the United States and its people. He admired the American system of government and its institutions. He was humbly ashamed of the ignorance and doubletalk of the diplomatic novices influencing the foreign policies of this country during the war years. But he was hopeful. Indeed, the past two years produced a visible turn for the better and raised his hopes that the liberation of the Baltic States would soon become an object of active policy, rather than a shelved understudy.

An exemplary Christian in his private life, Dr. Bilmanis lived through a great spiritual crisis which, in 1947, culminated in his abandonment of affiliations with the Lutheran Church (his brother was a Lutheran minister) and the acceptance of the Roman Catholic faith.

The distinguished decedent lived a full life which he enjoyed. He fulfilled his earthly mission exceptionally well. May the cause for which he fought so valiantly and tenaciously, win in the end.

